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This study concerns the historical and political causes that pre-
vented the independence of Puerto Rico during the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century. It also entails an examination of the evolutionary 
aspects of the Puerto Rican independence movement; the history of the 
political relations between Spain and Puerto Rico during this period; a 
discussion of the influences exercised by the United States and the Euro-
pean powers in the Caribbean; and provides insight into the factors that 
shaped present day Puerto Rican politics. 
Although this study ends in 1830, the struggle for the political 
independence of Puerto Rico still continues. While many important 
changes have been made in the political status of Puerto Rico during the 
past twenty-five years, many Puerto Ricans are still not satisfied with 
the present political conditions of the island~ These individuals, con-
tinuing a tradition that began in the second decade of the nineteenth 
century, feel that independence is the only available path for the po-
litical future of Puerto Rico. 
In the preparation of this thesis many sources were used, many of 
them dating from the first half of the nineteenth century. The author 
desires to take this opportunity to express his sincerest appreciation 
to the many individuals in the library of the Oklahoma State University 
who gave so generously of their time to assist in the location of im-
portant documents used in the preparation of this thesis. The writer 
also wants to acknowledge his indebtedness to the historical works of 
iii 
Professors Lidio Cruz-Monclova, Loida Figueroa, and Arturo F. Santana 
from the University of Puerto Rico. These historical writings served 
as a guide during the initial search for original sources on the history 
of Puerto Rico. 
A special debt of gratitude is owed to Dr. Michael M. Smith, De-
partment of History, Oklahoma State University, whose constant encour-
agement, infinite patience, and skillful direction assured the success-
ful completion of this study. 
Finally, a special note of gratitude must be given to my wife, 
Lydia. During completion of this study, she assumed many of my responsi-
bilities to allow the necessary time for research. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
During recent years, the story of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
has been told in many ways. It has been also the object of several im-
portant and interesting studies. Most of the research, however, concerns 
the political and institutional advantages of the present form of insular 
government and the obstacles that were overcome to make it a success. 
These studies have ignored the deep-rooted historical aspects of the 
Puerto Rican evolutionary political development, especially those of the 
nineteenth century. They have also ignored the effects of these his-
torical roots in the contemporary Puerto Rican political personality. 
As a result, some of the conclusions and recommendations of these studies 
are incorrect or have failed to provide an adequate interpretation of 
present day Puerto Rican politics. 
It also seems that in the general and continuing discussion of the 
relations between the United States and Puerto Rico, the views of Puerto 
Ricans themselves is often excluded. In the United States, both practi-
cal and academic concerns often assume that the political status of 
Puerto Rico has been satisfactorily resolved and that there are no, nor 
have there ever been, active political movements for independence in the 
island. These assumptions are commonly based on the fact that Puerto 
Rico is an autonomous commonwealth, associated freely with the United 
States by the desires of its people. What is not commonly known, 
1 
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however, is that this conunonwealth, for all practical purposes, still 
remains under the colonial tutelage of the United States and that the 
association is only temporary in nature. The ultimate political status 
of Puerto Rico still remains undecided. 1 
The Puerto Rican people are subject to the policies and programs 
of the United States and to the laws of the Federal Relations Statutes. 
All United States federal laws, except those of the Internal Revenue 
Service, are enforced equally in Puerto Rico. The Puerto Ricans, how-
ever, cannot vote to elect the President of the United States or partic-
ipate in any other federal election. As a result, they do not have 
representatives in Congress, except for a resident conunissioner who can 
discuss but cannot vote. While there is free trade between the United 
States and Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans pay no federal taxes, they are 
required to serve in the armed forces of the United States during na-
tional emergencies. 
The uncertain status of Puerto Rico has resulted in new demands for 
political changes, among them, complete independence. While no movement 
for this type of political solution has actually succeeded, and there 
has been no revolution in Puerto Rico comparable to the Cuba revolution 
of the nineteenth century or the wars of national independence in Latin 
America, there have been, as this study wi 11 indicate, several attempt~, 
for political insurrections on the island. These movements, however, 
failed to achieve their political goals as result of many causes, the 
most significant of which will be discussed in this study. 
Perhaps the most important reason for Puerto Rico's continuing de-
pendent status was the intervention of the United States and the Euro-
pean powers in the political affairs of the Caribbean during the first 
3 
part of the nineteenth century. The question of slavery in the United 
States, the danger that England and France posed for this nation's na-
tional security, the need for protection of trade and commerce in the 
Caribbean, and the concern of the United States for Cuba demanded the 
opposition of this nation to the political independence of the remaining 
Spanish colonies in America. Cuba's fate played a significant role in 
this decision as a result of its strategic importance in the Gulf of 
Mexico. As United States policy regarding the Spanish West Indies in-
eluded her, as well as Puerto Rico, and the predominance of that island 
was stressed in the American attitude toward the Caribbean -- indirectly 
affecting the independence of Puerto Rico -- it is necessary to include 
Cuba in any discussion concerning American interests in the Spanish 
Caribbean colonies. It was not in the best interests of the United 
States to allow either of these colonies to gain ~heir fr.eedom because 
of the possibility that England or France would seize them after inde-
' 2 
pendence. This circumstance, it was believed, would have seriously 
compromised American security and damaged United States commercial and 
. 3 trade interests in the Car1bbean. 
United States interests, therefore, required the maintenance of the 
status quo in Cuba and Puerto Rico until the danger of foreign inter-
vention in the Caribbean subsided or the islands were incorporated as 
4 
territories of the United States. Most of the principal American 
statesmen and politicians during the first two decades of the nineteenth 
century desired to take Cuba, however, they were not yet ready to pay 
the high price of ownership - most probably a war with England or 
5 
France. 
To maintain the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean under continued 
4 
cont.rol of Spain became then a major goal of United States policy. To 
achieve this purpose, the United States opposed not only non-Spanish 
foreign control of these colonies but also their independence as well. 
This policy prevented Cuba and Puerto Rico from joining the rest of the 
revolutionary movements for independence that were taking place in other 
parts of Spanish America. They could not gain their independence when 
political conditions in the Caribbean were most favorable for accomp-
lishing that goal. 
United States objectives were achieved by conducting an interna-
tional campaign designed to convince Spain that she was losing her con-
trol in the Caribbean as a result of the successful movement for inde-
6 
pendence in Spanish America. England and France joined the United 
7 
States in these efforts, but for different political reasons. Secre-
tary of State Henry Clay, as well as British Foreign Secretary George 
Canning, anticipated that the armies of the South American republics 
would be reorganized to free the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean. 
I 
They expected this development after.the completion of the military cam-
. . p 8 pa1gn 1n eru. As a result, the United States intensified her efforts 
to Gonvince Spain to safeguard her Caribbean colonies by taking neces-
9 
sary measures for their defense. 
The beginning of a national policy of expansionism that also an-
ticipated the annexation of Cuba and Puerto Rico and the potential danger 
to American trade and commerce by foreign domination of the Caribbean 
were also important concerns for the United States. In addition, many 
southern• leaders believed that the independence of the Spanish colo-
nies would have weakened their control over the black slaves. Puerto 
Rico and Cuba would have freed their slaves after independence, as the 
5 
other Spanish American republics had already done. This precedent could 
10 
have incited slaves in the United States to a rebellion. 
The United States also feared that England or France would seize 
Cuba and Puerto Rico as a result of the unstable political conditions 
existing in Spain and the marked inability of that country to protect 
her overseas possessions. These fears were not completely unfounded. 
In 1823 France had provided substantial military assistance to Ferdinand 
VII to help him regain his throne, and the Spanish monarch owed the 
French government a considerable amount of money. Spain also owed money 
to many British merchants for connnercial injuries suffered during the 
war. As Spain was unable to meet her economic obligations, it seemed 
logical to assume that she might transfer Cuba and Puerto Rico, her last 
remaining colonies in the Western Hemisphere, to either France or 
11 
England as payment for these debts. 
The political and strategic significance of the Caribbean and 
United States concerns there have been discussed.in great detail by such 
historians as Samuel Flagg Bemis, French Ensor Chadwick~ Arthur Preston 
Whitaker, Dexter Perkins, John H. Latan~, and others. They have writ-
ten, however 9 from the point of view of the United States-Cuban rela-
tions. As professor Arturo F. Santana indicates, 11most histories of 
American relations with the West Indies and the Caribbean during the 
nineteenth century stress the predominance of Cuba in American attention 
. 12 
to pohcy." Historian Graham Stuart has sunnnarized this fact as fol-
lows: 
In the foreign relations of the United States previous to the 
war with Spain, Porto Rico had generally been regarded as a 
sort of natural appendage to Cuba. In the public statements 
made by American statesmen regarding Cuba, mention was some-
times made of Porto Rico; but 9 even when nothing was said, it 
was generally understood that Porto Rico would follow in the 
wake of Cuba if that is land should ever transfer its alle-
giance from Spain. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why, 
in the foreign relations of the United States~ Cuba plays 
such a prominent part, while Porto Rico is virtually un-
mentioned. 13 
6 
This Cuban policy of the United States, as it has already been indicated, 
prevented Puerto Rican independence in the nineteenth century. 
The United States had observed with satisfaction the efforts of the 
~-~ ···~ -·~·--------'---
Spanish American repub lies to gain their independence. In the Carib-
bean~ however, where the United States sought political and commercial 
hegemony, the situation had been different. 14 To understand this dual 
policy and the reasons which compelled the United States~ England, 
France, and the Spanish American republics to intervene in the Carib-
bean, some historical background is appropriate. 
Since 1790~ the reign of Charles IV (1788-1808) in Spain had been 
marked by political instability and inefficiency. The repressive meas-
ures that had been taken by the Secretary of State Jose Mo~ino 9 Count 
of Floridablanca~ who wanted to stop the flow of French liberal ideas, 
had contributed considerably to Spain's turmoil. The activities of 
Manuel de Godoy, the Prime Minister, in favor of Napoleon ruined the na-
tion and parts of her empire. By the Treaty of Basel in July 1795, 
Spain had ceded its portion of the island of Hispaniola to France; and, 
by the second Treaty of San Ildefonso, had transferred the valuable 
Louisiana territory to Napoleon. These losses of territory and the 
questionable behavior of Manuel de Godoy, the Queen Marfa Luisa de 
Parma, King Charles IV~ the Duchess of Alba and other important members 
of the Court also had affected the government and weakened the trust of 
15 the Spanish people. 
In 1796 Charles IV joined France in a war against Great Britain. 
7 
In 1801 Napoleon forced Spain to attack Portugal. In spite of the dis-
astrous conditions of Spain, heavy taxation, political dissatisfaction, 
and lack of funds, Spain was compelled to aid the French war effort by 
declaring still another war against England in 1804. In October~ 1805~ 
when the British destroyed the Franco-Spanish fleet at Cape Trafalgar, 
Spain lost most of her navy, her ability to protect her overseas colo-
nies, and her naval supremacy in the Caribbean. 
In 1808 Napoleon invaded Spain and placed his brother Joseph Bona-
parte on the Spanish throne. The Spanish people refused to accept 
French control and revolted on the glorious Dos de Mayo (May 2~ 1808) 
against the new government under the leadership of several juntas. As 
a direct result of this action~ both conservatives and liberals unified 
behind the banner of Ferdinand VII for a long peninsular war. The im-
prisonment of the Spanish king at Bayonne gave Spaniards a rallying 
point; Spain's national honor was at stake. 
The Spanish people, with the help of the British forces 9 had some 
initial victories against the French. Napoleon's drive could not be 
stopped, however, and by March~ 1810, the French forces were already 
near C~diz~ on the southern coast of Spain. These activities resulted 
in several revolts in the South American colonies. Venezuela set the 
example by deposing the Captain-General on April 19, 1810~ proclaiming 
16 
her autonomy. 
Most of the colonies in other parts of Spanish America also re-
volted against the French dominated peninsular government. They soon 
established local self governing juntas, as Caracas had done, to rule 
in the name of Ferdinand VII. These initial revolts would develop later 
into full revolutionary movements for independence. 
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As the rest of the South American continent began to slip from 
Spanish control, the strategic position of Puerto Rico and its con-
tinued loyalty to the Crown became increasingly important for Spain. 
The colony was separated from the rest of the continent and could be 
utilized as a staging area for Spanish military operations against the 
mainland. Spain did not realize, however, that the successes of the 
wars of independence in other parts of Spanish America and the dis-
turbed political conditions in Spain had also affected the Spanish 
Caribbean and the loyalty of its people. The Puerto Ricans, influenced 
by the events in Spanish America, began to demand changes in the co-
lonial relations and in the political system of the island, but the de-
mands failed to receive attention. When Spain increased her authority 
and colonial controls, the colonists decided to resist the p.olicies of 
the central government. 
The history of Puerto Rico had been, until then~ that of a poor 
colony. As Robert W. Anderson has accurately indicated: 
As a small, underpopulated, resource-poor island whose value 
to its imperial overseer was purely military, Puerto Rico 
displayed none of the great institutions that are normally 
associated with Spain's American Empire. Instead of the 
great ecclesiastical and civil hierarchies of the vice-
royalties of Middle and South America, there was rule by 
generally pedestrian military governors. The religious 
orders barely touched Puerto Rico, and the Church itself 
played no significant role on the island •••• Neither the 
city, as a focus of intellectual or aristocratic activity 
nor the encomienda as the principal form of land owne7-
ship and exploitation, was important in Puerto Rico. 1 
Puerto Rico had been utilized primarily as a military outpost protect-
ing the main entrance to the Caribbean, which the ships of the Spanish 
flota (merchant marine) utilized in their voyages to Panama and Carta-
gena. As a result of this role in controlling and defending Spanish 
navigation between the Americas and Spain and its strategic importance 
9 
to the southern Caribbean defense system, Puerto 'Rico had been attacked 
many times by the major European powers that sought to destroy the 
Spanish colonial empire. 
In 1595 Sir Francis Drake attacked San Juan, the capital of Puerto 
Rico, but failed to penetrate its major defenses in spite of the fact 
that the British had twenty-six ships and over 4 9 000 armed troops in 
. . 18 the 1nvad1ng force. Three years later George Clifford~ Earl of Gum-
island.. He captu,red, San Juan and !llC:?~t of the f,orj:i.f~.c;.:at,ipns~c an,d i,er 
sixty,-seven days -,tried to _make t,J;le,.Spanish colony Ci· B:ri;t.i9-h-.:s~~t;;;Lem~;n,t. 
His plans fai_led and he had. to ret·::.;::~at,c· after an outpreal.< of dysent.ery 
19 
had caused 400 .c:asualties among. :hi:s ,troops. 
In 1625 the Dutch9 ,as part of a campaign designed by the Dutch 
West India Company to harass Spanish colonial trade 9 attacked and 
burned San Juan. The Dutch, however, also failed to conquer the de-
fensive military fortifications. The French, English, and Dutch, in 
addition to the pirates and buccaneers from various nations, attacked 
the island periodically during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eight-
eenth centuries. 
20 
Their activities had no important consequences. 
As a result of the conflict between the European major powers 
which followed the French revolution, the British General Ralph Aber-
cromby attacked San Juan in 1797, again, as previous attempts, the 
British forces failed to conquer the island. The Spanish Bourbons had 
made important changes in the economy and in the administrative func-
tions of government and had liberalized the trade relations between 
Spain and Puerto Rico. They had also stimulated agricultural produc-
tion and had made efforts to resolve the existing inequalities that 
10 
existed in trade, business~ and work opportunities between peninsulares~ 
who were Spaniards born in Spain, and the native born creoles. These 
temporary changes influenced many' Puerto.Ricans,' who consequently~ 
21 
rallied to defend the island and defeat the British forces. 
Despite these foreign attacks, ,:Puerto Rico remained loyal to 
Spain. The strong peninsular influence present in the Puerto Rican 
military garrisons had been an important factor in reenforcing this 
loyalty. The peninsulares despised many of the native born Puerto 
Ricans, who lived mainly in the interior and on the coastal plains of 
the island. They directed the political, economic~ and religious life 
of the colony and controlled all other activities related to colonial 
management. 
Because of San Juan's importance as a center of peninsular con-
trol and guardian of the southern trade routes of Spain, it had re-
ceived many important economic and political concessions from Spain. 
The creoles, however, had received little attention from the Spanish 
government. As a result,, the. rural .. colonists established early trade 
relations with non-Spanish European and American traders, and, ignoring 
royal edicts which prohibited such commerce~ they had been able to de~ 
22 
velop profitable smuggling and clandestine operations. In spite of 
the trade contacts with the enemies of Spain~ the Puerto Ricans re= 
mained loyal to the Crown and in many cases, as during the attack of the 
British in 1797, participated in Spain's defensive wars. 
The Puerto Ricans asserted "their national consciousness" when the 
other Spanish American colonies began to gain their independence. The 
sentiment initially favored reforms in the relationship between Spain 
and the island. As the political conditions deteriorated in Spain, 
11 
widespread dissatisfaction became predominant~ especially among the in~ 
fluential creoles. The struggle for independence in Venezuela and 
Santo Domingo strengthened considerably the spirit of nationalism and 
the desire for political reforms. 
In 1811 the first serious attempt at armed revolt began in San 
G , d h f h . . 23 erman an ot er towns o t e ~nter~or. To soften the demands of the 
Puerto Ricans and to reduce the effects that the Spanish American revo-
lutions were having on the island, in 1812 the Spanish government insti-
tuted some important reforms by placing into effect the provisions of 
the national constitution that had been approved by the Cortes -- the 
Spanish Parliament -- in cAdiz. Two years later, however, these re-
forms were annulled when Ferdinand VII returned to the throne and re-
established absolutism in Spain. 
Puerto Rican aspirations were partially satisfied by the C~dula de 
G . 24 1 d h h h k d 1 1 rac~a~ a roya ecree w ic t e ing issue to improve oca economic 
conditions. This decree, however, did not provide for major political 
concessions. Therefore, the supporters of independence renewed their 
efforts to liberate Puerto Rico. Between 1812 and 1825 several con~ 
spiracies occurred in the island; most~ however~ were discovered by the 
government. In spite of the fact that the revolutionaries received help 
and encouragement from Venezuela, they had to operate virtually isolated 
from the mainstream of Spanish American revolutionary activities because 
of Puerto Rico's insular position. 
The repressive measures taken locally by the Spanish colonial 
government and the political exile of some· important leaders, such as 
Marfa Mercedes de Barbudo, also affected the independence forces. Many 
Puerto Rican revolutionaries emigrated to South America and M~xico as a 
12 
result of the despotic military regime on the island. The loss of this 
leadership and the fact that during this period Puerto Rico never had a 
charismatic leader such as Sim6n Bol{var or JosJ Mart{ who could rally 
support by the force of his personality, also affected the struggle for 
national independence. 
The split in the emerging political movement between several fac-
tions affected considerably the independence movement. The few con-
cessions made by the Crown served to strengthen the hopes of many Puerto 
Ricans. Not until 1835, when many liberals joined the more radical 
groups, could a more unified movement for independence be planned. By 
this time, the revolutionary forces had received inrreparable damage 
with the death of Sim6n Bol{var, and with anarchistics conditions pre-
vailing in Spanish America. They could not regroup for a successful 
independence movement. The Puerto Rican revolutionaries also understood 
that they were not only fighting against the repressive measures of 
Spain but also against the interests of the United States in the Carib-
bean. 
The support of the Spanish American republics to the independence 
of Puerto Rico subsided with the death of Simon Bolivar and the subse-
quent struggle for power that ensued among his principal generals. In 
addition, the Spanish American republics, faced with the possibility of 
a conflict of interest with the United States over the control of the 
Caribbean, their limited naval strength, and their failure in organizing 
a: unified front after the Panama Congress, opted not to interfere with 
the remaining colonial possessions of Spain. This action demoralized 
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On August 10~ 1815, Ferdinand VII promulgated the C~dula de 
Gracia to foster Puerto Rican economic development. This law allowed 
for the exemption of certain taxes, free trade with the peninsula~ low 
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duty payment for foreign vessels, and granted permission for foreigners 
to settle in the island. After five-year residence, these settlers 
could become Spanish citizens. This act helped the immigration of 
those individuals who were fleeing the Spanish-American republicso A 
considerable number of peninsulares from Venezuela settled in Puerto 
Rico. 
CHAPTER II 
SPAIN AND PUERTO RICO ON THE EVE OF 
WARS FOR INDEPENDENCE 
The political turmoil that besieged Spain and her Spanish American 
colonies at the beginning of the nineteenth century as a result of the 
Napoleonic invasion caused great anxiety and concern among Puerto Ric-
ans. The island underwent a period of uncertainty when constitutional 
monarchy and the basic principles of the French and American revolu-
tions became part of the aspirations of the Spanish people. The French 
invasion of Spain and the indecisive actions of the Spanish government 
also affected the political expectations and the loyalty of Puerto 
Ricans. In spite of the uncertainty about the political future of 
Spain, however, "the Puerto Rican politicians," as Robert W. Anderson 
has written, "showed remarkable patience and flexibility in adjusting 
1 
their claims and expectations to the vagaries of peninsular politics." 
Following the instructions of the Suprema Junta de Sevilla, the 
first of the Spanish juntas to declare war against Napoleon 9 on July 24, 
1808, Puerto Ricans rejected the French government of Joseph Bonaparte 
and proclaimed their allegiance to Ferdinand VII, the imprisoned Spanish 
2 
monarch. In Puerto Rico, however, "the will to think and act inde-
3 
pendently had already began to curd" and the people no longer wanted 





A rising national consciousness or "Puerto Ricanism," influenced 
by the political events in the peninsula and by the belief of many 
Spanish Americans in the inevitability of a prolonged struggle for in-
dependence, had already begun to manifest early in the century. The 
peninsular conflict also resulted in the development of a strong sense 
5 
of individualism, personality, and identity among Puerto Ricans. This 
sense of nationality became evident soon in the instructions sent to 
the insular delegate to the Cortes, Ramdn Power y Giralt; in the plans 
for revolutionary activities of Marshall Antonio Valero de BernabJ, a 
distinguished Puerto Rican military officer who fought beside Bolivar 
and became a leading figure in the wars for independence; and even in 
the activities of a Puerto Rican buccaneer, Roberto Cofresi, who pro-
claimed his eternal hatred for the Spaniards on the open seas. 6 
After 1810 Puerto Ricanism and the struggle for political conces-
sions from Spain to end colonialism acquired three different and im-
portant ideologies. Distinct political factions emerged as a result of 
the changes that were occurring in Spain. A liberal group, consisting 
mostly of influential upper-class creples, favored changes in the 
colonial status and a less authoritarian form of government. These 
creoles sought improvements in the political, economic, and social in-
stitutions of the island rather than complete independence. They dis-
trusted the activities of the revolutionaries because they felt that 
independence could bring political instability and economic chaos. The 
liberals did not believe, however, that the independence of Puerto Rico 
would have resulted in a racial strife between the white and the black 
population of the island, as it had occurred previously in Haiti. This 
had been an important consideration in the struggle for Cuban 
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independence. The Cuban liberals believed that as soon as Spain ended 
her colonial tutelage in the Caribbean, the blacks in that island would 
7 
rise in a revolt against their white overlords. 
The separatists, the other political faction which consisted mostly 
of creoles, some well-to-do foreign plantation owners, members of the 
lower clergy, and several members of the armed forces, believed that 
Puerto Rico, after a prolonged period of colonial domination, had 
achieved the necessary development to permit the organization of a 
sovereign state. The separatists followed a political ideology of total 
emancipation for Puerto Rico and accepted the abolition of slavery as an 
important part of their struggle for independence. 
A conservative faction, consisting of Spaniards, wealthy Puerto 
Ricans, members of the government and foreign immigrants, opposing the 
activities of both the liberals and the separatists, also developed 
during this time. The conservatives wanted no political changes that 
could affect their strong influence in the local economy. They defended 
the colonial status of Puerto Rico and opposed any modification in gov-
ernmental institutions because, being mostly peninsulares, they saw re~ 
forms as dangerous to their political and commercial control of the 
island. 
The Puerto Rican liberals did not realize, however, that their 
hopes and expectations for a systematic improvement in the relations be-
tween Spain and Puerto Rico were unattainable. The Spanish authoritarian 
institutions were too well established to permit peaceful changes, es-
pecially if such changes would affect the authority of the governor or 
the commercial monopoly of the peninsulares. The colonial policies of 
Spain had continued to be authoritarian and conservative in spite of the 
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of the liberal views of some of the members of the Spanish Cortes. The 
few concessions granted during this time, such as the acceptance of an 
insular delegate in the Cortes~ were only temporary measures occasioned 
by Spain's need to continue controlling her overseas possessions during 
the critical period of the Napoleonic invasion. 
An analysis of the policies and objectives of the Spanish govern-
ment created during the absence of Ferdinand VII indicate that there 
were no plans for changing the previous authoritarian rule exercised in 
the Spanish colonies. As the nature of the new government was basically 
conservative, no changes could be expected in the relations between 
Spain and her colonies. The liberal views held by some members of the 
Cortes concerned Spain, not her imperial possessions. 
During this time, the colonies had token representation in the 
Cortes; but this concession did not alter the colonial administration 
of the empire. The mercantilistic system and the vested commercial 
interests of the merchants of C~diz, Sevilla~ and Cataluna, always took 
precedence over all other considerations. 8 
After the glorious uprising of the Spanish people on May 2, 1808, 
juntas had been organized in all Spanish provinces not conquered by the 
French invading forces. These juntas assume~ governmental powers in 
the name of the absent king Ferdinand VII. Out of these grew the Junta 
Suprema Central Gubernativa del Reyno' "which though it soon became 
odious to the Spaniards themselves, offered a nationality sufficient for 
9 
England to recognize the government and form with it an alliance." 
The new Spanish government was officially organized in Aranjuez on 
September 25, 1808. The Junta's president was the Count of Florida-
blanca, a well-known conservative and an enemy of republican ideas, 
20 
including those of the American revolution. It consisted of military 
officers~ magistrates, members of the clergy, members of the nobility, 
. 10 and some m1ddle class merchants. One of its first acts was to name 
11 
the Bishop of Orense a~ Inquisitor General. This conservative 
representation in government would not have given the Puerto Rican 
liberals the freedom of action they desired. 
By the end of 1808 the war between Spain and France reached a cri-
tical period because of the repeated disasters of the Spanish army, the 
continuing advance of the French forces~ and the withdrawal of the 
British army into Portugal. The Junta Suprema followed the retreating 
forces from Aranjuez to Sevilla, where it planned to reorganize the war 
effort and "consider by what means it might hope to secure the fidelity 
. 12 of the colon1es. 11 To accomplish this last purpose 11 it gave politi-
cal recognition to the ultramarine colonies by raising their status to 
that of equal provinces of Spain and by permittipg them to have a legal 
13 
representative in the Spanish Cortes. 
On January 22, 1809, a royal decree signed by Francisco de Saave-
dra 11 the new president of the Junta Suprema, proclaimed the "vast and 
valuable dominions that Spain has in the Indies are not colonies as 
those of other nations, but an essential and integral part of the 
14 monarchy. 11 The decree further ordered the Spanish American colonies 
and the Philippines to send representatives to the Junta Suprema. The 
decision concerning the selection of deputies was not received well in 
the colonies because it did not provide for equal political representa-
. 15 
t1on. 
The defeat of the Spanish Army at Ocana, the occupation of Anda-
lucia by the French, and the loss of the prestige and confidence of the 
21 
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Spanish people caused the disintegration of the Junta Suprema. A Con-
sejo de Regencia (a regency council) composed of five members, assumed 
the control of the government. This Consejo, as its predecessor the 
Junta Suprema, consisted of conservative members of the clergy and the 
armed forces, including the Bishop of Orense, Pedro Quevedo Quintana, 
General Francisco Javier Castafios, General Antonio Esca~o, General 
Francisco Saavedra, and General Miguel de Lardiz~bal. This group, 
acting as if the king were present, periodically issued despotic de-
/ 17 crees 9 such as the Facultades omn1modas, which gave the governor of 
Puerto Rico absolute power to suppress all political illegitimate ac-
tivities, especially those of the liberals and the separatists. 
At the insistence of the Count of Toreno and of the representa-
tives of Cuenca, Hualde, Le&n, and others 9 the members of the Consejo 
de Regencia reconvened the Cortes on September 24 9 1810. Before the 
French invasion9 this parliament had been composed of three separate 
estates 9 representing the nobility, the Church, and the bourgeoisie. 
The new Cortes was to be organized into two assemblies or chambers, one 
comprised of popularly elected deputies, the other of members of the 
Church and the nobility. Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, who had di-
rected the affairs of the Junta Suprema, became the principql spokesman 
for the new system. Jovellanos distrusted both the absolute power of 
the king and the political behavior of the masses. He believed that the 
new system was properly balanced because one assembly could control the 
king while the other could control the "popular license.n 18 In the 
end, this idea was rejected, and the Cortes assembled in one chamber. 
The Cortes was less conservative than the Consejo de Regencia. 
Its members were drawn mostly from the middle class. While much has 
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been written about the "liberal ideas" of this parliament; in effect~ 
the Cortes generally 
Lorenzo Villanueva's 
practiced a conservative policy, as Joaquin~ 
19 
diary of the secret sessions indicates. Ini-
tially, the Cortes consisted of ninety-seven members of the clergy, 
eight noblemen~ forty-six members of the armed forces~ sixteen college 
educatorsll sixty lawyers, fifty-five public officials, fifteen land-
owners, f h f d h . . 20 d ive mere ants, our writers, an two p ys1c1ans, a goo 
measure of conservatism with middle class objectives and values. 
This Cortes soon lost the confidence of the people. When Ferdinand 
VII, released by the overthrow of Napoleon, returned to Spain in 1814 
and refused to accept the liberal Constitution of 1812, which had or-
ganized a constitutional monarchy, provided electoral franchise~ and 
had provided other important concessions to the Spanish people, there 
was no Dos de Mayo to support the actions of the Cortes. The people 
had been so dissappointed with the work of the Cortes that they urged 
the king to reestablish absolutism in Spain. 21 
Spanish liberalism had been represented by a political faction 
which was barely beginning to emerge from the chaos of peninsular poli-
tics.22 This faction, which disappeared with the return of Ferdinand 
VII, would reappear during the Riego revolt in 1820. Puerto Rican 
liberals, however, placed their hopes and aspirations for a better co-
lonial administration in this powerless group. 
The colonies too had been dissatisfied with the work of the Cortes 
and with the inequality of their representation. While the peninsulares 
had been authorized one representative for every 50,000 people, the 
Spanish American colonies, which had been declared to be an integral 
part of the Spanishkingdom, could only elect one representative for each 
23 
province. The peninsular provinces had 208 members in the Cortes~ be-
sides a deputy for each provincial junta and city which had sent repre-
sentatives to the Cortes of 1789. This unequal representation clearly 
indicates "how great was the departure from a theory of equality which 
23 
had been thrice enunciated in a few months." 
The Consejo de Regencia could not have permitted the creoles to be 
represented in the same proportion as the inhabitants of the peninsula. 
The larger population of Spanish America would have given that region a 
majority in the Cortes~ much to the disadvantage of the peninsulares. 24 
To resolve this problem~ a decree was issued on June 28, 1810~ limiting 
the number of colonial representatives to twenty-eight~ without desig-
nating how many should pertain to each province. The consequence of 
this decision was that in many colonies no elections were held~ while 
25 
in others the elected representatives declined going to Spain. 
Puerto Rico~ however~ accepted the decision of the Consejo de Re-
gencia because the liberals wanted many commercial and trade reforms and 
economic concessions.Ram6n Power y Giralt became the insular repre-
sentative to the Cortes. As the other Spanish American colonies had to 
be represented initially by substitute natives who were residing in 
Spain, until the legitimate representatives arrived, Power became the 
only elected deputy present when the Cortes convened in cAdiz. As a 
result 9 he became the Vice President of the Cortes 9 to the satisfaction 
26 
of the Puerto Rican liberals. They viewed the selection of Power as 
an indication of the Spanish interest in resolving the existing colonial 
injustices and as "a golden opportunity for the criollo group to air its 
27 
grievances before the Crown." 
In 1810 the colonial administration of Puerto Rico was based on the 
24 
Novlsima Recopilaci&n de Leyes de Indias and the Recopilacidn de Leyes 
de Castilla, which dated from the seventeenth century. Under this sys-
tem, mercantilism predominated in all areas of trade and commerce under 
the strict supervision of representatives of the Crow·n, normally penin-
sular officers. All power resided in the hands of a governor, who was 
the chief executive in Puerto Rico. The governor also exercised the 
responsibilities of captain-general, a military administrative po-
sition. The governor, therefore, ruled under a code of military law, 
which he enforced by the promulgation of decrees •. 
Puerto Ricans did not have representation in the insular government 
and could not change any law promulgated by Spain. As Puerto Rico was 
a very poor colony, it depended upon an annual subsidy from the Mexican 
treasury. It could trade only with Spain. In 1811 the local treasury 
contained only 37,719 pesos, an amount insufficient to fund the neces-
28 
sary expenses. These conditions were expected to change with the ap-
pointment of Power to the Cortes; it was expected that he would inform 
the Crown of the many problems affecting the colony. 
However, the instructions Power received from the ayuntamientos 
(municipal governments) of San Juan, Coamo, Aguada, and San GermJn did 
not reflect a concern for the conditions of the masses but rather the 
interests of the emerging bourgeoisie, which consisted of rich merchants 
and landowners. Except for the instructions received from the Ayunta- · 
miento of San Germcin, which clearly indicated political dissatisfac-
. 29 p I ' ' d h d • f d b • t~on, ower s ~nstruct~ons concerne t e re uct~on o t.ra e arr~ers, 
elimination of commercial restrictions, promotion of agriculture, dimi-
nution of taxes, and equality of opportunity for private economic 
. 30 
~nterests. All these concerns merely reflect the economic self-
25 
interests of the Liberals. According to historian Loida Figueroa~ 
Power was successful in advancing some of the recommendations given to 
him by the liberals. 
Power supported by the orders received by the City Councils, 
proposed a number of measures under one law~ which bears his 
name. Among these measures is the repealing of the tax 
known as the forced supply of meat to the capital, the re-
pealing of the State monopolyover the importation of flour, 
the exportation of cattle subject only to a minimum tax~ and 
the recommendation of setting up minor ports in distant 
points of the Island.31 
The Puerto Rican representative and vice-president of the Cortes~ in 
spite of his influence, made no proposals for major political changes 
or concessions~ the abolition of slavery, or the autonomy of Puerto 
Rico. 
32 
Power was able to separate the Intendency from the Captaincy-
General, an action that permitted the separation of powers in the insu~ 
lar government and great improvements in the economic system of the 
island. He was also able to repeal the powers that had been given to 
Governor Mel~ndez by the Consejo de Regencia, which the latter had used 
to suppress political dissention in Puerto Rico. 
32 
The Puerto Rican 
representative to the Cortes~ however, could not remove Governor Melen~ 
dez from his position of power, in spite of the fact that he ruled des-
potically. In a secret session of the Cortes, Power had requested the 
appointment of a commission to investigate Governor Mel~ndez's con-
33 
duct. The commission, however, referred the investiga;tion to the. 
Consejo de Regencia, which resolved that the case did not have suffici-
ent merit to warrant a suspension of Governor Mel~ndez from his command 
34 
in Puerto Rico. 
The governor, nevertheless, utilized all available means to ob-
struct Power's work in Spain. He accused him of being a member of the 
26 
separatist movement and a leader of a plot to oust the royal govern-
ment. He refused to provide Power with some needed documents for his 
work at the Cortes and even solicited the Consejo de Regencia to re-
strict Power's actions in Spain. When these measures failed to curtail 
Power, the governor began to intercept his official correspondence to 
the ayuntamientos. Finally, Governor Meldndez circulated an indictment 
of Power among several members of the Cortes under the title Primeros 
sucesos desagradables en la Isla de Puerto Rico consecuentes a la for-
' 35 macion de la Junta Soberana de Caracas. This attack required Power 
to defend himself in the Cortes. 
Power's work in the Cortes received substantial benefits in 1812 
when the Cortes proclaimed a constitution which temporarily ended abso-
lutism in Spain. Under this document the Spanish government became a 
constitutional monarchy in which~ according to historian Figueroa, 11 the 
king had fewer powers than his English counterpart 9 the English being 
the most advanced nation in Parliamentary procedures. 1136 The Constitu-
tion of 1812 provided for popular franchise~ however 9 it did not provide 
for equality~ freedom of religion~ freedom of assembly 9 or the right of 
association. This constitution was written at a time when the movement 
of independence was growing in Spanish America and when Napoleonic forces 
were threatening to eliminate all resistence in Spain. The new consti-
tution provided for a large measure of representation for the Spanish 
American colonies, but excluded all persons of African origin -- those 
even distantly related to them. The constitution~ therefore~ deprived a 
great proportion of Puerto Ricans of the rights of citizenship. 
In other ways the Constitution of 1812 represented a considerable 
improvement over the authoritarianism of the military regime. In 
27 
addition to providing for insular representation at the Cortes~ the 
constitution gave the Puerto Ricans the Spanish citizenship; the freedom 
of speech, thought, petition, work 9 and suffrage; and many other trade 
37 
and commercial advantages. It recognized in part the political lib-
erties of Puerto Ricans, but at the same time it further centralized 
38 
the administrative mechanism of the colony. 
One of Power's principal successes under the constitution was the 
separation of the Intendency from the Captaincy-General. The post of 
Intendent had been created in 1784 to deal with treasury, fiscal, and 
economic matters~ but its duties had been carried out by the governor. 
The liberals had always wanted the separation of these two functions, 
because in this way they could prevent the governor from interfering in 
economic matters. Power's action resulted in the appointment of Alejan-
dro Ramirez as Intendent on February 12, 1813, to deal with the insular 
economy. A brilliant economist, Ram{rez realized that the only way that 
the Puerto Rican economy could be made self-sufficient was by effective 
utilization of native resources rather than depending upon financial as-
. f S . Mt . 39 s1stance rom pa1n or ex1co. 
As a result, Ramirez initiated a series of economic reforms, to the 
delight of the liberals and the displeasure of Governor Mele'ndez. He 
eliminated import taxes on farm machinery and agricultural tools and 
rehabilitated the ports of Aguadilla, Mayagu~z, Cabo Rojo, Ponce, and 
Fajardo to encourage foreign commerce. The Intendent distributed better 
seeds to improve agriculture, organized a lottery to add income to the 
treasury, founded the first non-governmental newspaper, and facilitated 
the immigration of white settlers to Puerto Rico. Finally, he reor-
ganized the monetary system by introducing the moneda macuguina (a type 
28 
of silver coin from Venezuela) to replace the paper currency which no-
40 
body wanted. 
Like.other liberal .reforms made under an authoritarian system, how-
ever, the separation of the Intendency from the Captaincy-General was 
of a short duration. Governor Mel~ndez continually obstructed Ram{rez's 
activities. He also hindered the actions. of Jose Mar:!a Ram{rez de 
Arellano~ Ram{rez's successor in the Intendency. Finally, in 1819, 
Governor Mel~ndez took over the intendent's respo~sibilities, thereby 
reestablishing authoritarian control over the country's economic af-
fairs. 
In 1814 Ferdinand VII~ released from prison at Bayonne by the over-
throw of Napoleon, returned to Spain. He refused to accept the consti-
tutional monarchy that had been devised by the Spanish Cortes and the 
Constitution of 1812. Reverting to absolutism, "as it was understood 
by the most absolute of his predecessors," he brought back the monastic 
orders such as the Jesuits~ reinstated the inquisitional authority of 
the Church, restored all the lost privileges to the nobility, and filled 
the prisons with political prisoners and dissenters. The members of the 
Cortes had to escape to either England or France because Ferdinand VII 
decreed the death penalty to any one ''who dare even to speak in favor 
41 
of the constitution." 
In Puerto Rico~ Governor MelJndez did not even wait for official 
instructions from the Crown. He immediately reinstated absolutism, 
abolished all liberal reforms, and curtailed the freedom of the press 
and all other concessions that the Cortes had granted. As a result of 
these events, Puerto Rico reverted to its former colonial status and the 
Puerto Ricans lost their Spanish citizenship and the civil and economic 
rights that Power had struggled for. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE STRUGGLE FOR PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE 
1810 - 1820 
The failure of the liberal reform movement and the return of ab-
solutism in 1814 resulted in increasing attempts for Puerto Rican in-
dependence. The movement for .Political emancipation in Venezuela and 
Santo Domingo also strengthened the nationalistic spirit of Puerto Rico 
creole separatists and their desire for independence. The revolution-
aries, who came mostly from the middle class and were well-educated, 
influential, and patriotic, believed that Puerto Rico, after a forma-
tive period of three centuries, was ready to become a sovereign politi-
cal unity, with its own geographical, social, economic and cultural 
boundaries. 1 
These separatists furnished the directing force of the movement 
for Puerto Rican independence. They found, initially, great difficulty 
in achieving their goals because of the opposition of the creole upper 
class and the peninsulares, and the passivity of the rural lower 
classes. These rural Puerto Ricans were poor peasants, free blacks, 
and slaves of exceedingly docile character. Uneducated, living in 
poverty, unaware of the basic issues of the revolutionary struggle 
that was developing in Spanish America, and restricted in their actions 
by an absolutist government, they had shown little interest in the po-
litical process and little revolutionary motivation. The political' 
33 
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apathy of the masses had also been intensified by years of absolutism 
and military oppression. Therefore, while Spain was being swept by de~ 
mands for political reforms and Spanish America was contemplating a 
long struggle for independence 9 the majority of the people in Puerto 
Rico remained loyal to the Crown. 
Most Spaniards who resided in Puerto Rico opposed the separatists' 
goals. They were employed in government service or were engaged in com-
mercial and financial pursuits. Liberal creoles did not accept the 
separatists' plans either. As members of the upper class, they pre-
ferred an autonomous system of government which they could control and 
which they could acquire through peninsular concessions under an es~ 
tablished political order. 
The activities of the separatists began in 1810 in Puerto Rico and 
nearby islands. Seditious proclamations inviting the Puerto Ricans to 
rise up in open rebellion and join the cause of liberty appeared peri• 
odically in St. Thomas between 1810 to 1811. 2 In the United States~ the 
Spanish Minister warned the Governor of Puerto Rico that Venezuelan 
3 
agents were arriving in Puerto Rico to support independence. Many of 
these agents reached the island; Spanish authorities, however~ captured 
others, who were imprisoned in the Morro Castle. 
In 1810 the ayuntamientos of Caracas~ Cartagena, and Coro in Vene~ 
zuela, in support of the independence movement~ urged the members of the 
Ayuntamiento of San Juan to revolt against Spanish domination and join 
Venezuela and the rest of South America in their struggle for political 
. . 4 emanc1pat1on. On May 25, 1810, however, the Ayuntamiento of San Juan 
rejected the first of these invitations. The members of the Ayuntamiento 
reaffirmed their loyalty to Ferdinand VII and the Consejo de Regencia 
35 
because they could not agree with the actions taken by the Spanish 
5 
American revolutionaries. On December 11~ 1810, the Ayuntamiento sent 
6 
a similar rejection to Cartagena, and later criticized the activities 
7 
of Cora. The Spanish government praised this loyalty to Ferdinand VII. 
Both the Consejo de Regencia and the Cortes sent their congratulations 
to the liberals on the island for ''their fidelity, love, and noble un-
dertaking."8 
The activities of the Puerto Rican patriots did not end with the 
opposition of the lo·cal ayuntamientos to the independence. With the 
help of Venezuelan revolutionary agents~ they increased their activities 
during 1810. One of the principal Venezuelan subversive age~ts was Mi-
guel Jose Sanz~ the Secretary of State and Foreign Relations of the new 
revolutionary government. Sanz had many friends in Puerto Rico, includ-
ing Bishop Juan Alejo Arizm~ndi and other members of the clergy. Sanz's 
activities for the independence of the Spanish colonies caused his ar-
rest on one occasion. He was imprisoned in Puerto Rico but later es-
caped~ perhaps with the help of the separatists. Upon his return to 
Venezuela~ Sanz campaigned actively for the independence of Puerto 
Rico. He corresponded periodically with the separatists and sent them 
copies of the Gaceta de Caracas~ a revolutionary newspaper~ and other 
9 
seditious literature. 
Sanz's letters to Puerto Rican separatists reflect the extent of 
the support for the independence on the island. It appears that the 
movement had important supporters among the clergy and the armed forces. 
As the clergy was closer to the people and understood better than anyone 
else the hopeless conditions of Puerto Ricans 9 it is not unusual that 
they became partisans of independence as other priests had done in 
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Spanish America. During the early stages of the wars for independence 
the activities of the revolutionaries had been supported by a large part 
of the lower clergy. 
This was true especially in Brazil, whose revolution of 
1817 has been called a 'revolution of the priests.' In 
Argentina, sixteen of the twenty-nine members forming the 
Congress of Tucuman in 1816, which proclaimed the inde..; 
pendence of the country, were priests. In Mexico, where 
such names as Hidalgo and Morelos fill the pages of revo-
lutionary history, the priests were leaders in the inde-
pendence movements.lO · 
Sanz wrote to Juan Fen, a parish priest from Ponce; to the arch-
deacon of San Juan, Jose Guti~rrez del Arroyo; and to the Bishop of San 
11 
Juan, Juan Alejo Arizmindi. Many of these letters~ however, were in-
tercepted by the agents of Governor Meldndez when they were being carried 
to their destination and the governor was aware of the extent of creole 
. 12 
implication in the revolut1onary movement. Therefore~ when the sepa-
ratist activities increased Governor Meldndez began to arrest and exile 
many of the revolutionaries and sympathizers of the struggle for inde-
13 
pendence. 
Governor Meldndez believed that sedition existed in all sectors of 
creole society. As a result, he sent a long indictment to Spain ac-
cusing, among others, Bishop Arizmdndi and the Puerto Rican representa-
. h c I p G . 1 f b . . . . 14 t1ve to t e ortes Ramon ower y 1ra t o su vers1ve act1v1t1es. 
This indictment to the Spanish government may have been justified, how-
ever, as many of the individuals accused were in fact separatists who 
15 
had been planning an uprising in San Germdn. Two of the individuals 
accused by Governor Melendez, Bishop Juan Alejo Arizmdndi and the Puerto 
Rican representative to the Cortes Ramdn Power y Giralt require special 
mention because of their high positions. 
Many historians who have written about Arizmdndi describe him as a 
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liberal who accepted impassively the existing colonial regime in Puerto 
Rico. Professor Lidio Cruz Monclova, one of Puerto Rico's leading his~ 
torians, describes Arizm~ndi as a supporter of the Spanish system and 
as an individual who believed in the need to maintain ties with Spain, 
especially during the critical years when the Consejo de Regencia di-
16 
rected the affairs of the nation. The Puerto Rican scholar Cayetano 
Coll y Toste viewed Arizme'ndi as a "benevolent, charitable, religious 
f l "b 1 . 1" . rr 17 man o 1 era 1nc 1nat1ons. ArizmEfndi 1 s political activities indi~ 
cate~ however, that while he did not conspire ?Penly ~gainst the govern~ 
I 
ment, perhaps due to his religious and moral responsibiltties~ he did 
. 18 
support separat1sm. 
When France had invaded Spain in 1808 and chaos prevailed in the 
peninsula~ Arizm~ndi proposed to the Governor of Puerto Rico the crea~ 
tion of a junta similar to those that had been organized in Spain and 
h . h 1 1 d h . d d · S · h A · 19 w 1c ater e to t e 1n epen ence movements 1n pan1s mer1ca. The 
governor did not oppose the plan but indicated that he believed a junta 
was unnecessary in Puerto Rico because the island was not at war. Ariz~ 
m~ndi became~ therefore~ the only supporter of such a radical plan. He 
did not~ however~ press the proposal. Puerto Rico, according to Pro~ 
fessor Loida Figueroa, therefore, "lost the opportunity of being the 
20 
first colony to use this resource." 
ArizmJndi's recommendation for a junta was not an isolated case of 
his "Puerto Ricanism." He often clashed with government policy. On 
August 16, 1808 9 during a pub lie ceremony in San Juan to celebrate the 
election of Ramdn Power y Giralt as Puerto Rico's representative to the 
Junta Suprema~ Arizmdndi gave his episcopal ring to Power as a symbol 
of brotherhood and patriotic trust. He also offered these words: 
Everything that you have promised was awaited by the 
people and the Island from (you), a good son whose 
Catholic devotion, patriotism, and charity we all 
recognize •••• This (ring) will insure that you remember 
yout connnitment of protecting and defending the rights 
of your compatriots. 21 · ·· · · · .o • · • · 
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Arizm~ndi's action was especially significant because his pronouncement 
took place during an official government ceremony and in the presence 
of the Spanish military governor and many peninsular civil and military 
functionaries. His remarks were considered subversive and highly ir-
22 
regular by the Spanish authorities. 
On July 20, 1810, Arizm~ndi again disobeyed the authority of Gov-
ernor MelJndez. Six seminarians had arrived from Venezuela to be or-
dained. As Caracas was in a state of rebellion, Governor MelJndez 
planned to arrest the clergymen. Arizmdndi, however, gave them ec-
clesiastical protection~ ordained them as priests~ and secured their 
safe return to Venezuela in spite of the Governor's opposition. 
Arizmdndi maintained regular correspondence with the Venezuelan 
revolutionary leader Miguel JosEf Sanz. Some of these letters indicate 
the prelate's separatist inclinations. In a few of them he even dis-
cussed the problems of the clergy and government attempts to suppress 
their activities. 23 
Ram6n Power y Giralt~ the Puerto Rican representative to the Cor-
tes~ was not a separatist; he was a liberal who represented the inter-
ests of the upper class creoles. Josd Alvarez de Toledo~ a Cuban rebel 
and adventurer who represented Santo Domingo at the Cortes, claimed in 
1811 that he possessed a document which authorized him to organize an 
army in Spanish America and establish a revolutionary government in 
northern Mexico. According to Toledo~ Power had been one of the 
Spanish American delegates who had signed the document. No evidence 
has been found, however, to authenticate Alvarez's claim or to prove 
24 
Power's support of rebellion in Spanish America. 
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While Powers accepted the instructions given to him by the ayun-
tamientos of San Juan, Coamo, Arecibo, and Aguada after his election as 
a. representative of Puerto Rico to the Cortes, he did not recognize 
those of San Germ~n because he considered them to be contrary to the 
purposes of his mission. These were the only instructions at that time 
which contained recommendations for the political future of the is-
25 
land. It is probable 1 however, that Power refused them because they 
' 
had been directed to the Junta Suprema, not to the Spanish Cortes. 
26 
Their legality, therefore, was questionable. 
Among those accused of sedition by Governor Meldndez were many 
members of the Church who supported separatism. As it has been already 
indicated, the movement for independence had many supporters among the 
27 
clergy. Besides the feelings of Arizm~ndi for independence~ the ac-
tivities of other church officials, such as Archdeacon Jos~ Guti~rrez 
del Arroyo and of the priests Juan Crisdstomo Rodriguez and Juan Fen, 
uphold the view that the clergy supported the separatist:movement. 
Further evidence could be found in the conjura of 1810 (a conspiracy), 
which began at the monastery of Santo Domingo in San Juan. 
In August, 1810 1 several members of the clergy, among them Arch-
deacon Jos~ Gutie'rrez del Arroyo and Father Jos~ Cris6stom9 Rodr{guez 9 
participated in a dinner held in honor of the patron saint of Santo 
Domingo. Among those who were present at the affair were Colonel Lor-
enzo Ortiz de Zirate and the Commander of the Third Battalion, Federico 
Sanjurt. Other important members of the government and the armed 
forces were also present. During the celebration, Archdeacon GutiJrrez 
40 
del Arroyo, perhaps influenced by the recent events in Venezuela or by 
his separatist views, had a serious ,aq~ument with Colonel zc!rate con-
cerning a political manifesto that had been issued by the Venezuelan 
' ... :~ :· r ."; ; -·~ . ·,_;··. -.•.• -.. · ' ).-:·:_ : ~- • .. ,;.._ -·· . 
revolutionaries. The Archdeacon supported the patriots because he be-
. 1: """ . - • • .... If. . ... 
lieved that the government did not have the authority to make changes 
in the government without the c9nsent of the ayuntamientos. Ort{z de 
I Zarate, on the contra+y, observed that it wa~ illegal to revolt against 
" I'; 
the au~hority of the king because that was equivalent to rising against 
God. The discussion finally terminated when one of the guests at the 
dinner proposed a toast to terminate the dispute. The discussion at 
the dinner, however, did not end at that point. Exchanges and accusa-
tions between some of the participants continued for some time after-
wards. Both Governor Mel~ndez and Bishop ArizmJndi intervened later in 
the argument, Arizmendi telling the governor to stop meddling with' 
Church affairs. 28 Governor Mel~ndez, therefore, accused Bishop Ariz-
m~ndi, Archdeacon Guti~rrez del Arroyo artd Father Jose Cris6stomo 
Rodriguez of being the leaders of a plot to oust the Spanish government 
in Puerto Rico. Father Francisco Fajardo, Father Ju~n Antonio Mambrtb, 
and Father Angel de la Concepcidn, were arrested and exiled for being 
separatists. 
In October, 1810, the Consejo de Regencia sent to Puerto Rico 
Antonio Ignacio de Cortabarrfa as a royal magistrate, with full powers 
to resolve the Spanish American problem. The Crown's representative, an 
old, feeble, gentleman with little knowledge of the circumstances that 
caused the conflict, arrived in Puerto Rico on October 24, 1810, with 
"every intention of directing the pacifying operations from there, and 
29 
hoping to obtain aid from the Island militia if it were necessary." 
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One of his first decisions, perhaps as a sign of goodwill toward the 
junta in Caracas, was to free Vicente Tejera, Diego Jugo, and Andr~s 
Moreno, three Venezuelan agents whom Governor MelJndez had confined in 
San Juan. 
Soon thereafter, Cortabarr!a began peace negotiations with the 
Venezuelan insurgents but failed to convince them to remain loyal to 
Spain. He even appealed to the "faithful and loyal people of co lor" 
in Venezuela to help achieve a prompt and lasting cessation of hos-
30 
tilities. Discouraged, he then decided to press the issue by sending 
a miLitary force from Puerto Rico, hoping to win on the battlefield 
what he had not been able to gain at the conference table. The sepa-
ratists, realizing the significance of this decision, gave Cortabarr{a 
a warning. They affixed to his door a note which declared "this coun-
try, so docile in obeying the official authorities, will never permit 
sending away one single American from this island to fight against its 
b - 31 rothers, the Caraquenos." The royal magistrate changed his plans 
concerning the proposed expedition against Venezuela as a result of the 
influence exercised by the Puerto Rican separatists. I Governor Melendez, 
however, ordered several separatists who had been detained to go to· 
Venezuela to fight in the Spanish army, 32 together with some suspected 
Spanish peninsular officers who were living in Puerto Rico, including 
Colonel Manuel Fierro. Fierro was one of the Spanish officers who had 
33 
been corresponding with the Venezuelan revolutionary Miguel JosJ Zanz. 
To counteract the influence exercised by the South American revo-
lutionary agents and to curtail the movement for independence, on Sep-
tember 4, 1810, the Consejo de Regencia granted dictatorial powers to 
the insular governor. 
J 34 
These powers -- the Facultades omn1modas --
42 
were directed primarily against the revolutionary elements on the is-
land. The governor received the authority to assume emergency controls 
over life and property and to act as he deemed necessary to suppress all 
political activities. He was empowe·red to prevent the infiltration of 
Venezuelan revolutionaries and to suppress Puerto Rican demands for 
home rule. 
This reactionary move created great dissatisfaction among the lib-
erals and the separatists. The Puerto Ricans considered this action as 
a new measure of colonial despotism. This decree forced the separatists 
to continue their activities underground, "with tactics commensurate 
35 
with the dangers that they faced." At times, however, they resumed op-
enly their activities to let Governor Melendez know that their hostility 
toward the colonial system and their solidarity with the rest of the 
Spanish American revolutionary cause had not been suppressed. 
The first important attempt at Puerto Rican independence occurred 
in San German the following year. Three of the principal creole fami-
lies of that town -- the Quinones, the Ramirez de Arellano, and the 
Irizarry -- conspired with some lesser known individuals. These revo-
lutionaries included Francisco Antonio Ramfrez de Arellano; Jos~ de 
Quinones~ his cousin; Felipe de Quinones, Ensign of the Ayuntamiento; 
Mauricio de Quinones, Captain of the Militia; Ramdn Ramfrez de Arellano~ 
the Town Constable; Vicente Gonzcflez (alias "Chence"), leader of the 
mulattoes; Josd Marfa Guadalupe; Pedro de Silva, Captain of the Mi-
1 . ' J 1 U ' B B ' . d b h f 1.t1.as; ose rs1.no; uenaventura arr1.ento, a pr1.est an rot er o 
Bonifacio Barriento~ a well-known revolutionary and Venezuelan sym-
pathizer; Bernardo Pavdn Davila; Juan Eloy Tirado, a notary public; 
Tomds Cardoso, a mulatto who had been exiled in Caracas; Carlos Plumer; 
and other members of the Quinones and Ramirez de Arellano families. 
Political and economic interests were equally important to this group 
36 
of creoles. 
These separatists met periodically in the residence of Francisco 
43 
Antonio Ramfrez in the coastal town of Gu~nica. His home also served as 
a place to meet clandestinely with Venezuelan agents who arrived in the 
southern part of Puerto Rico. The separatists had also some support 
from several of the revolutionaries of San Juan, among them~ the Arch-
deacon Guti~rrez del Arroyo and Doctor Francisco Marcos Santaella. 
Other men from interior towns who sympathized with the creoles of San 
German included Bernardo Rivera; Jose de Balbis; Juan, "the Dutchman;" 
a captain Mandeli; Ildefonso del Toro; Domingo Barrios; and many 
37 
others. 
Local dissatisfaction with the Spanish colonial regime reached such 
a high point during this time that many of the creoles were already 
considering independence an accomplished fact. These individuals plan-
ned to retaliate against the Spaniards by ending the payment of taxes 
and expelling the peninsulares from the country. They also planned to 
38 
"cut off the heads of the Catalans, 11 seize their property to pay for 
the expenses of the revolution, and remove those who survive from any 
39 
position of responsibility. 
The major factors that caused the creoles' desire for independence 
were the high taxes enforced by the Spaniards and the unequal treatment 
they had received from the peninsulares who resided in San Juan. For 
decades, these individuals had ignored the communities of the interior 
and had scorned the Puerto Ricans constantly. Although San Germdn had 
a larger population than the capital, most of its inhabitants lived in 
44 
poverty and were denied the political and economic advantages that San 
40 
Juan enjoyed. 
A system known as the abasto forzoso (forced supply) had been in-
stituted in the rural communities for many years. Under this system~ 
the municipalities of the interior were regularly forced to supply all 
the beef that San Juan consumed. Every farmer had to give one head of 
cattle for every six that he owned. He also had to ensure the safe ar-
rival of this cattle to the capital, regardless of the problems en-
countered during its transportation. Any cattle that was lost or died 
during the journey had to be replaced at the expense of the farmer. 
The law provided for no exceptions, as its purpose was to ensure an am-
ple supply of beef to the peninsulares of San Juan at the lowest price 
. 41 
poss~ble. This injustice lasted for many years and was strictly en-
forced by the Spanish authorities. 
When the news of the Venezuelan insurrection had reached San Ger-
mAn in 1810 the Ayuntamiento 9 which was composed principally of the 
Quinones family, had acted immediately to plan some kind of similar 
revolutionary action; the influence of members of the armed forces, how-
42 
ever, prevented the success of any plan. The revolutionary spirit, 
however 9 had continued to grow among the creoles who only awaited for a 
more convenient time to act. By 1811 the plans for a general insurrec-
tion to coincide with the Christmas season were well developed. The 
direction of the armed movement had been given to Domingo Postig&, a 
militia officer, and to Bernardo Pab6n, a creole from San GermJn. 
It was impossible 9 however 9 to keep the proposed revolt a secret. 
Members of the revolutionary movement began to express openly their 
ideas and plans for independence and their dissatisfaction with the 
45 
colonial regime. One of them, Jose GonzAlez~ mentioned that "he was 
not going to continue the payment of taxes" because of the forthcoming 
revolt. A Lieutenant Agarra declared that he would "not pay anything 
else because very soon we are going to be independent." Another man~ 
Antonio Cordero~ connnented to Josl Varea~ a Spanish citizen, that "very 
soon all taxes will be ended because we are going to have here the 
43 
Caracas law." The indiscretion of these people led to the disclosure 
of the plans for the uprising. Josl Varea informed the Spanish author-
ities of the involvement of the Ram{rez de Arellano and Quinones fami-
lies in the attempted creole uprising. 
, 
Governor Melendez~ therefore~ 
arrested the principal members of the conspiracy and ordered their pros-
ecution~ when they appeared before him to protest their faithfulness and 
deny the accusations of Varea. The arrival of Spanish troops in Aguadil-
la on December 23~ 1811, and the disclosure of the uprising before it 
I 
could be completely organized "imposed moderation and fear~ and~ apart 
from this~ it now would have been impossible to take the authorities by 
44 
surprise." 
The activities of the Separatists caused a continuous alarm in 
Puerto Rico$ principally, among the peninsulares and the government 
officials. As the defense of the island had been entrusted to both the 
peninsular troops and the local militia, Governor Meldndez became quite 
concerned with the revolutionary potential of the popular military force~ 
composed mostly of native Puerto Ricans. This militia, which by 1810 
totaled 17,019 men had given valuable services to Spain in the defense 
45 
of Puerto Rico against various foreign invasions. Many of its mem-
bers, however~ sympathized with the separatists and with the Spanish 
American struggle for independence, and posed a threat to the colonial 
control of Spain. 
46 
To prevent the utilization of these individuals in a local up-
rising, the governor attempted to dissolve the militia, but the Consejo 
de Regencia opposed his plans. To curtail the militia's effectiveness~ 
Governor Mel,ndez reduced its activities from defense to minor tasks~ 
such as repairing roads and constructing military fortifications. The 
governor also disarmed the militia, except for its regular cutlasses. 
The creoles protested to Spain the misuse of the militia forces. 
As a result the Consejo de Regencia overruled the governor's decision~ 
thereby reinstating the militia to its former responsibilities. To 
counteract this decision in 1813 Governor Meldndez organized an elite 
military unit composed entirely of Spanish citizens. He named this 
armed force the Cuerpo de Voluntaries Distinguidos and issued its mem-
46 
bers the same weapons and uniforms used by the regular armed forces. 
Governor Mel{ndez took additional precautionary measures to prevent 
an armed uprising in the island. He reorganized the military forces 9 
augmented military patrols, and armed privateers to defend the coastal 
waters against incursions from Venezuela. He organized an important 
espionage cell to operate in Venezuela and Puerto Rico to gather infer-
mation and spy on the separatists. The cell consisted of Bartolom' 
Mascarenas~ Jose Lopes, Mateo Ocampo~ and several other residents of 
47 
Cumani, Coro and Curacao. Their efforts allowed Governor Mel{ndez to 
intercept Sanz's letters and to arrest several messengers who had ar-
rived from Venezuela. 48 The governor also censured the newspapers and 
the mail 9 and exiled many separatist leaders and sympathizers? including 
49 
Juan Cris6stomo Rodriguez Carrera. 
In spite of these measures~ revolutionary activities continued to 
grow on the island. These activities 9 however~ diminished considerably 
47 
as a result of· a series of defeats :;_hi~'h Ven~~U-~lan r~vofu'ti~ftari~s 
suffered in South America. Puerto Rican extremists had depended upon 
Venezuela for help to continue their attempts for independence because 
of their insular position. One of their principal problems was access 
to information concerning the progress of the revolution on the mainland 
to counteract government claims andpropaganda. The governor had ob-
structed the distribution of printed material arriving from Venezuefa 50 
and~ in some cases~ had confiscated the personal mail that came from 
51 I 
Caracas and La Guayra. Governor Melendez also secured the cooperation 
of the Captain-General of Venezuela, who informed him of all departures 
52 
of suspected revolutionaries, their mission, and final destination. 
The arrival of new troops and the continuing utilization of Puerto 
Rico as a base of military operations against Venezuela reduced further 
53 
the revolutionary activities. Military forces reached the island en 
54 
route to Venezuela or Mdxico, temporarily increasing the garrison in 
Puerto Rico. To inform Spain of the movement of these troops~ con-
ditions on the island, and the progress of the conflict~ the governor 
55 
frequently sent reports to the peninsular government. 
The early defeats of the Venezuelan rebels~ as it has already been 
indicated, and the uncertainty of success in the independence movements 
in other Spanish American colonies also discouraged the separatists. 
Two other events served to lessen creole activism during the years 1812 
and 1813. On Holy Thursday~ March 26~ 1812, at 4:07 in the afternoon, 
one of the severest earthquakes ever recorded in South America struck 
. 56 
Caracas and surround1ng areas. In Caracas alone, more than 20,000 57 
pepple died. For many people~ religious implications of this disaster, 
both in Venezuela and Puerto Rico, were very profound. The revolution 
48 
also had begun in Venezuela during a Holy Week two years before. To 
many people the coincidence of these two events was terrifying and re-
sulted in the belief that God was punishing them for the transgression 
58 
of beginning a revolution during a Holy Week. 
The ecclessiastical authorities~ who supported Spain and the Crown, 
quickly reinforced this belief by telling the people that the earth-
quake had been a chastisement of Heaven for abandoning the cause of 
Ferdinand VII. The superstitious idea spread considerably in Venezuela, 
with the result that the royalist forces were able to win an easy vic-
tory in Coro and penetrated as far as Valencia, where they were joined 
by a considerable portion of the inhabitants of the interior. 59 
The other event that lessen creole activism was the arrest of many 
separatists on October 15, 1813. On that day~ Governor MelJndez ordered 
the mass arrest of all known separatists and sympathizers of the revo-
1 . 60 utJ.on. During this time--related a witness--San Juan displayed the 
appearance of a fortress sieged by a large enemy force~ its inhabitants 
terrorized~ not knowing the intentions of the Governor nor the purpose 
61 
of the measures taken. 
The demands of the Puerto Ricans for a better system of government, 
however~ continued during the next two years. To soften these demands, 
on August 10~ 1815~ Spain promulgated the C~dula de Gracia~ which would 
help foster the economic development of the island. This law provided 
for the exemption from several taxes for fifteen years and expanded 
trade with Spain and foreign countries. The cddula also permitted 
foreigners to settle in Puerto Rico and enjoy the same rights as Span-
iards after a five year residence. This act stimulated the growth of 
1 . d h . f . 1 62 popu atJ.on an t e J.nvestment o capJ.ta • 
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As a result of the concessions granted by the C~dula de Gracia, 
many immigrants -- royalists fleeing mostly from Venezuela, Santo Do-
mingo, Louisiana, and Florida--settled in Puerto Rico. The flow of im-
migrants was so great that Spain had to provide financial assistance 
for them.. These exiles increased the number of peninsulares on the 
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island~ as over one thousand families arrived during this t1me. The 
refugees strengthened the pro-Spanish conservative forces by opposing 
the political activities of the liberals and separatists. The situa-
tion was similar to the exodus of Loyalists from the thirteen British 
American colonies to parts of Canada after the Revolutionary War. In 
Puerto Rico~ as in Canada~ the loyalists "long exerted political in-
64 . . 
fluence" 1n the affa1rs of the country. 
The repressive local measures~ the exile of the influential revo-
lutionary leaders~ the impact of the refugees upon the political system~ 
and the return of absolutism to the island forced the separatists to 
take a different approach to the emancipation of Puerto Rico. When 
Simdn Bol!var returned to Venezuela to resume the revolutionary strug-
gle against the Spaniards in 1816, Puerto Rican revolucionaries decided 
to seek his help in their struggle for the independence. The inter-
nationalization of their movement added a new dimension to Puerto Rican 
politics. The goals of the separatists paralleled the interests of the 
Spanish American republics. 
In June~ 1815 9 representatives of the Puerto Rican separatist move-
ment met in MJxico City with other revolutionaries from Cuba~ Mexico 9 
and Santo Domingo. There, they planned an expedition for the liberation 
of the Spanish Caribbean. This group issued a declaration which out-
lined their goals and objectives and gave Jos4 Alvarez de Toledo~ a 
Cuba rebel and adventurer, the authority to organize an army for the 
. 65 
purpose of liberating Cuba, Santo Domingo and Puerto R1co. 
50 
Alvarez de Toledo, whom Luis de Onfs, the Spanish Minister to the 
United States~ labeled one of the principal anti-Spanish leaders in the 
Caribbean~ had been a substitute representative for the island of Santo 
Domingo to the Cortes. In C~diz$ he had joined the radical liberal 
element. Accused of treason, he fled to the United States$ where he 
arrived in September, 1811. While in the United States 9 he informed 
Secretary of State James Monroe that Great Britain, with the approval 
of the Cortes~ planned to take possession of Cuba, Santo Domingo, and 
Puerto Rico. He sought Monroe's aid in a plan for unifying these co~ 
1 . . . d d f d . f h . 1. b . 66 on1es 1nto an 1n epen ent con e erat1on a ter t e1r 1 erat1on. 
Toledo's plans for an expedition to liberate Cuba~ Santo Domingo$ and 
Puerto Rico~ and his proposal for an Antillean Confederation~ were not 
k . .d . 67 ta en 1nto cons1 erat1on. Monroe, however~ gave Toledo funds to re-
turn to Cuba and initiate an uprising. 68 Toledo did not go to Cuba im-
mediately because he believed the time was not proper for a revolution. 
He did 9 however, continue his revolutionary activities for the inde-
pendence of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the United States. 
In the sunnner of 1815 Toledo went to New Orleans to organize an 
expedition. Louisiana was being utilized by the Mexican and South 
American insurgents as a staging area for their operations against 
Spain. It was a place where conspirators could easily conduct public 
enlistments~ purchases of weapons 9 and other warlike activities. He 
contacted some insurgents and several of the survivors of his previous 9 
69 
ill-fated 9 military expedition against San Antonio de Bejar. Among 
70 
the men he contacted was an able American officer named Colonel Perry. 
The two made plans to organize and arm a military force. The enter~ 
prise was condemned by Luis de On{s~ the Minister of Spain to the 
United States. He urged the government to act 9 however 9 11 before the 
correspondence of Onis with the State Department began, measures had 
71 
been taken to frustrate the designs of the plotters." 
United States policy of neutralism and the self-interests of the 
51 
nation prevented the success of the expedition. The United States did 
not want to give Spain justification for preventing future negotiations 
concerning the American acquisition of Florida. As a resultj the 
United States Attorney for the District of Louisiana requested that a 
naval force from Commodore Patterson's squadron be sent to Belleisle~ 
at the mouth of the Bayou Teche~ the suspected insurgent rendezvous 
point. Patterson received orders to search for and~ if necessary~ use 
force to disperse the insurgents~ thereby frustrating their illegal in-
. 72 tent1ons. No one was captured~ and no arrests were made. The naval 
force did~ however~ seize a large quantity of arms intended for the 
1 . . 73 revo ut1onar1es. 
While there is no absolute evidence that the Perry-Toledo expedi-
tion intended to liberate the Caribbean, its timing (summer of 1815) and 
the instructions which Toledo received in Mexico in June~ 1815, seem to 
indicate that the liberation of Cuba~ Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico were 
its primary goal. These plans~ however 9 could not be carried out be~ 
cause Toledo and several of his principal associates were indicted in 
the United States District Court of Louisiana for violating, or attempt-
74 
ing to violate~ the neutrality laws of the United States. The rest of 
the expedition embarked for some place on the coast of Mexico where the 
75 
insurgents dispersed; their plans totally defeated. 
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This incident and Toledo's other suspicious activities resulted in 
many complaints by the Spanish Minister in the United States. 76 To 
satisfy the Spanish government, the American authorities intensified 
controls in New Orleans, Baltimore, and Philadelphia. On March 3 9 
1817, the United States strengthened its neutrality laws. The United 
States would impose fines of up to $10,000, seize vesselss and imprison 
any one engaged in fitting our privateers in the United States for raid-
ing Spanish commerce or the trade of any other power which was at peace 
with the nation. This policy gravely affected the Caribbean revolution-
aries because it prevented temporarily the departure of armed expedi-
tions from New Orleans and other ports of the mainland. 
With the failure of the expedition that had been planned in Mexico, 
the separatists turned their attention to Venezuela. Three months af-
ter the meeting in M~xico City, Simdn Bol{var added the independence of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico to his revolutionary goals for Spanish America. On 
September 15, 1815, Bolfvar, in his famous letter, An Answer of a 
Southern American to a Gentleman of Jamaicai he expressed his concern 
for the political future of Puerto Rico and Cuba: 
The islands of Puerto Rico and Cuba, with a combined popu-
lation of perhaps 700,000 to 800,000 souls, are the most 
tranquil possessions of the Spaniards, because they are not 
within range of contact with the Independents. But are not 
the people of these islands Americans? Are they not mal-
treated? Do they not desire a better life?77 
This declaration by the principal Spanish American revolutionary leader 
raised considerably the morale and the expectations of the separatists. 
After this date, Bolfvar emerged as a firm supporter of the independence 
of Cuba and Puerto, an ambition that he pursued until his death in 
1830. 
By the end of 1815, the separatists had renewed their efforts for 
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the independence of Puerto Rico, inspired by Bolfvar's declaration and 
the beginning of a new struggle in South America. Several new patri-
otic groups were organized during this time, including Freemasonic 
. 78 
lodges such as the Yaguez ~n Mayaguez. Like their counterparts in 
M~xico and Cuba~ Puerto Rican masons labored for independence. The ac-
tivities of the separatists were well-known in Venezuela, as Bartolome 
Mascarenas~ one of Governor Mel~ndez's best spies indicated: 
In spite of the fact that he ignored the bases foJ; the al-
legationsp in the place where he resided (Venezuela) it was 
common·knowledge that in Pt,Jerto Rico there are juntas that 
conspired against the Govermnent and that the Island would 
not delay much in becoming independent. 1 I will continue 
to inquire until I can find the meaning of this. I can as-
sure you, that there are plenty of blazing (groups) in and 
outside of the island. 1 79 · 
In 1816 the visits of secret emissaries from Jean Jacques Dessa~ 
lines and other Haitian revolutionary leaders became frequent in Puerto 
Rico. The separatistsll however, did not expect much help from Haiti be-
cause of that nation's great difficulties in achieving political sta-
bility after the years of disorder and frightful excesses that followed 
its separation from France. The Haitian emissaries also sought to 
foster slave revolts in Puerto Rico, which even the separatists be-
lieved detrimental to their interests. 
As the struggle for independence progressed in the Spanish Ameri-
can colonies, a large number of privateers took advantage of the exist-
ing political turbulence in the Caribbean. Most of them were foreigners, 
but many others were Venezuelan and Colombians who served under Pedro 
Luis Bri~n, a Dutch sailor and merchant who had become Bol{var 1 s naval 
commander. The main objects of these privateers, as part of Bol{var's 
strategy to isolate the Spanish forces who were fighting in South Amer-
ica~ were raiding the Spanish ships and purchasing weapons for the 
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revolution. 
Argentinian and Uruguayan privateers also joined the struggle. The 
purpose of their activities was to injure the enemy while enriching 
themselves. They equipped their own vessels and gathered their fol-
lowers from the United States~ the Caribbean~ and the British colonies. 
There is no doubt that the activities of these privateers did consider-
able damage to Spanish commerce and helped. the independence movements in 
Spanish America during the years when Bolfvar was striving to organize 
an army capable of winning decisive victories on the battlefield. Ac-
cording to Samuel Flagg Bemis, the clearing of Spanish ships from the 
Caribbean "by scores of privateers fitted out in the United States had 
been an important factor in keeping the revolts alive. 1180 In spite of 
the statutes of March 3~ 1817, American neutrality also made it pos-
' ' . . 
sible for Spanish American revolutionaries to purcpase m~litary weapons 
and contraband of war in the United States. The sympathy of the Ameri-
can citizens with the revolutionary struggle allowed the privateers to 
fit their vessels in North American. ports and to gather American crews 
in the United States~ "all contrary to the laws of neutrality whether 
. . 81 domestic or 1nternat1onal. 11 
The Spanish navy, since the battle of Trafalgar and a result of 
Spain's fatal alliance with France~ was unable to protect the Carib-
bean. In her last stages of decay, the navy could not subdue the in-
surgents and privateers that infested the waters off Venezuela, Cuba 9 
and Puerto Rico. Spain's peninsular defeats and the subsequent events 
of the Spanish American colonies almost annihilated her maritime 
82 
power. 
On the renewal of hostilities between Spain and her rebelling 
55 
colonies in 1816, Venezuelan and Colombian privateers blockaded the 
northern coast of South America. and the Spanish possessions in the Car~ 
ibbean. They prevented the arrival of reinforcements for the royalist 
forces and destroyed the Spanish merchant marine. As a result of the 
blockade~ the Spanish, English, and American commerce suffered con-
siderably. While the privateers concerned themselves with raiding 
Spanish commerce~ American public opinion tolerated them and even helped 
their activities by acquitting them when brought to court by an over-
zealous navy captain for violation of law. But "when their irresponsi-
ble captains began piratically to plunder neutral vessels~ and even the 
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shipping of the United States, their popularity declined." 
Most historians of this period have labeled all privateering in 
the Caribbean as "piracy." According to Walter Adolphe Roberts~ how-
ever, there was a notable difference between privateers~ buccaneers, and 
pirates. It is true that for the affected country, in this case Spain~ 
England~ and even the United States, all illegal acts at sea were pira-
tical. There was a marked distinction, however? between privateers and 
buccaneers who had varying conceptions of nationalism and pirates who 
. 84 
were "robbers pure and s1.mple •11 
Privateers served as the principal link between the Puerto Rican 
separatists and the revolutionaries in the rest of Spanish America~ and 
their activities near Puerto Rico became increasingly important for the 
separatists. On January 25, 1817, Thomas Taylor~ an American privateer 
who commanded El Patriota~ raided the town of Fajardo, on the eastern 
coast of Puerto Rico. Taylor was operating under a license granted by 
85 
the government of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata. A 
former merchant and sailor~ in 1810 he had settled in Buenos Aires. 
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Later entering the government naval service~ he styled himself "Commo-
dore Taylor of the Buenos Aires Navy.n86 Taylor had a large privateer-
ing squadron of thirteen to seventeen vessels. Although he disrupted 
Spanish commerce and blockaded Cuba and Puerto Rico~ he never raided 
American or British ships~ which he allowed to continue on their 
voyages once they had proved their nationality. 87 Following the stand= 
ard law of nations, he even informed foreign nations of his intentions 
88 
when imposing naval blockades. 
Taylor landed a large force in Fajardo and tried to capture a 
schooner that had taken refuge in the port. The local militia, under 
the command of Antonio Planells y Bardaxi valiantly resisted the priva-
teer's attack. Taylor lost thirty of his men and a great quantity of 
arms and ammunition during the battle that ensued after his landing. 
The purpose of the attack on Fajardo, according to Governor Melindez~ 
89 
was to plunder the town, obtain foodstuffs~ arms~ and gunpowder. 
Historians Lidio Cruz Monclova and Loida Figueroa, on the other hand, 
believe that the attack on Fajardo was part of a raid to support the 
separatists. According to Monclova~ it failed when "the separatists of 
the island~ perhaps because of poor organization or the suddenness of 
h k ld "d d h 1 •• 90 t e attac , cou not prov1 e a equate e p. This second view seems 
more accurate because Taylor did not stop his activities after his de-
feat at Fajardo. 
On February 12, 1817, Taylor and the Governor of Puerto Rico ex~ 
changed prisoners. Taylor declared the island of Puerto Rico under a 
1 bl k d d . . d 1 f . 91 tota oc a e an pos1t1one seventeen vesse s to en orce 1t. He 
contemplated another landing in Puerto Rico but apparently changed his 




Between 1817 and 1819, insurgent privateers held Puerto Rico in a 
state of semi-blockade, much to the satisfaction of the separatists, 
who believed that the measure would weaken Spanish domination of the 
island. During this time, the Spanish authorities constantly feared an 
insurgent attack. Expeditions, real or imaginary, occupied the atten-
tion of the governor. While visiting the town of Caguas, he received 
information that an expedition, which revolutionaries had organized in 
London, was going to land in the island. He immediately returned to 
the capital, called a council of war, declared a national emergency, 
and reinforced the armed forces in the coast with the Second Battalion 
f h d R . 93 o t e Grana a eg1ment. 
In 1818 Governor Mel,ndez received information from Juan Manuel 
Cajigal, Captain-General of Cuba, that privateer Brown, with three ships 
and 10,000 rifles, was preparing an invasion of the island. 94 Rumors 
of an expedition from Barbados to overthrow the Spanish regime also 
spread during this time. The Governor immediately alerted his forces 
95 
and added seven small vessels to the defense of Suan Juan. 
In the middle of 1818 the Governor of Puerto Rico received infor-
mation from the Spanish Minister in the United States that an expedition 
under the command of the privateer Louis Aury had been organized in 
Charleston to invade the island. 96 Another expedition, organized in 
Haiti and under the command of the privateer MacGregor, apparently had 
. '1 b. . 97 s1m1 ar o Ject1ves. Later during the year, a group of privateers es-
tablished themselves in the south at Key Caja de Muertos, off the coast 
of Ponce. From here, they conducted occasional raids onto the Puerto 
R. . 1 d 98 1can ma1n an • 
In 1819 several Venezuelan vessels, among them the brigantine 
58 
Brion, unsuccessfully attacked near Boca Chica in the southern part of 
the island. Other attacks occurred at Guayama and Humacao in the 
99 
southwest. In April, 1819, the military commander a.t Aguadilla in-
formed the Governor that well-armed Venezuelan insurgent vessels were 
cruising not far from the coast. These vessels, under the command of 
Captain Charles Barnard, who used the port of Norfolk as his base of 
100 
operations, captured a small Spanish fleet near Aguadilla. 
The hopes of the separatists subsided with the failures of the 
privateers. The large number of Spanish troops on the island~ the de-
fensive measures taken by the Governor~ the constant state of alert of 
the peninsular forces and the militia made the task of liberating Puerto 
Rico a difficult one for the separatists~ the Venezuelan revolution~ 
ariesll and the privateers. As a result, according to Moncloval> "the 
sadness of seing their high expectations faint into nothingness de-
pressed the feelings of the separatist sector; its impetus declining 
. . f h h . 11 . d h" h " 101 once aga1n, even 1 t e ope st1 rema1ne 1g • 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT BETWEEN 
1820 AND 1825 
After 1821 the Spanish American prospects for the success of their 
revolutions increased considerably; the victory at Carabobo~ Venezuela 9 
and other decisive rebel successes placed Spain in the defensive again. 
These events raised the separatists' hopes in Puerto Rico because they 
expected Sim6n Bol{var to turn his attention to the Caribbean after the 
victorious completion of his wars for independence on the mainland. 
The year before 9 General Rafael de Riego and General Antonio Qui-
roga had led a military revolt in Spain to reestablish the Constitution 
of 1812. Ferdinand VII was forced to abolish absolutism in Spain and 
the Spanish American colonies which still remained loyal to Spain. Un-
der the new constitution 9 Puerto Rico received for a second time a sta-
tus. equal to that of the Spanish provinces. Once again Puerto Ricans 
were allowed one elected deputy in the Spanish Cortes. The new conces-
sions revived liberal activism on the island. The liberals founded a 
society which they called the Liberales amantes de la patria (Liberals 
for the Motherland) 9 and a newspaper entitled El Investigador 9 which 
1 
was used primarily for local political propaganda. During this time 9 
one of the separatist leaders, Nicol&s Quinones Ramfrez 9 a lawyer from 
the separatist stronghold of San Germ~n~ transferred his allegiance to 
2 
the liberal movement and became one of its principal spokesmen. 
66 
67 
On August 7~ 1820~ a new governor~ Gonzalo Arostegui, arrived in 
Puerto Rico to institute the new political reforms of the constitution-
al regime. The separatists 9 however, did not accept the changes and 
continued their insurrectional activities. At the same time, abolition-
ist forces emerged and received support from Jean Pierre Boyer 9 the 
president of Haiti. This faction planned a revolt of 1500 slaves on 
the plantations of Bayam&n~ R{o Piedras~ Guaynabo 9 Toa Alta and Toa 
Baja. The rebellion~ however~ failed to take place because the govern-
. 3 
ment d1scovered the plan. 
After Bolivar's victory at Carabobo on June 24, 1821, both Venez-
uelans and Puerto Rican separatists planned new activities to gain the 
independence of Puerto Rico. Bolfvar sent new revolutionary agents to 
. 4 
the 1sland. About this time~ an English schooner, the Im6genes 9 
loaded with guns~ ammunition 9 and many rebels was captured at the port 
5 
of Patillas on the southern coast. I In San German and Mayaguez~ agents 
6 
from Venezuela were captured; and in the rural town of Yauco ten indi-
7 
viduals were arrested after assaulting the residence of the mayor. To 
suppress these activities and eliminate further attempts against govern-
ment officials 9 the governor instituted the death penalty~ alerted the 
local militia 9 and increased the military personnel of the Granada Regi-
8 
ment to one thousand men. He also established permanent guards in all 
rural and coastal towns. 
9 
Meanwhile in Santo Domingo~ Jose Nunez de clceres began a revolu-
tion against Spain on December 1, 1821. The Dominican revolutionary 
leader later sent agents to Puerto Rico to incite the people to a simi-
lar revolt and to help the separatists. He invited Governor Gonzalo 
Arostegui to join him in a common struggle against Spain by proclaiming 
68 
10 
the independence of Puerto Rico. The Governor, who had been born in 
Cuba, refused the offer and condemned Nunez de C~ceres for his action 
11 
in Santo Domingo. The republic established in Santo Domingo did not 
last long. Jean Pierre Boyer~ the Haitian chieftain, led his army to 
the eastern part of the island and forced Nunez de CJceres to accept a 
union with Haiti instead of an annexation to Colombia~ which the Do-
12 
minicans desired. During this time~ the separatists had most of the 
disadvantages in the struggle for independence. They had to struggle 
against the opposition of the liberals and the conservatives~ the 
apathy of the masses, and the hostility and aggressiveness of the 
government. Also they had to contest the increasing influence of the 
exiles~ who escaping from the war of emancipation in Venezuela 9 had 
13 
sough~ refuge in Puerto Rico. 
Realizing the difficulty of obtaining independence through an in-
ternal revolution, the separatists decided to seek help from outside 
sources to achieve their goals. In the winter of 1821~ agents of the 
Puerto Rican separatists 14 invited General Ho L. V. Ducoudray Holstein 
to take conunand of an invading force, which was being planned for an 
attack on Puerto Rico in conjunction with an uprising scheduled to take 
,. 
15 
place during the following year. General Ducoudray Holstein was a 
. 16 
native of Sw1t.zerland and had served in France during the French Revo-
lution as a member of the Staff of Napoleon and in Venezuela as Chief 
I 17 
of Staff of Bol1var. While in the service of Bol{var, he had received 
the conunand of the fort of Boca Chica with the high rank of Jefe de 
Brigade (Brigade Conunander). 18 Displeased with Bolfvar 9 on June 23, 
19 1816, he left the service at his own request. Ducoudray Holstein 
then went to Aux Cayes in Haiti, where he taught languages and music 
69 
and waited to an opportunity to join the wars of independence that were 
b . f h . s . h Am . 20 e1ng oug t 1n pan1s er1ca. It seems;that at one time he had 
planned to organize a foreign legion~ composed of European expatriates~ 
"attracted by the cause of liberty and the sacred cause of the Spanish 
21 
Americans~n to help the revolutions. 
Among the separatists involved with Ducoudray Holstein in the 
planned invasion and uprising were Carlos Rigotti; AndrJs Level de Goda~ 
a refugee from CumanJ who was living in Puerto Rico; an individual named 
Moloni; a Dominican by the name of Castro~ whose residence was in St. 
22 
Thomas; Pedro Dubois~ a mulatto and one of the principal leaders of 
23 
the revolt; and a Dutchman named Carlos Romano~ a resident of the 
coastal town of Guayama. Ducoudray Holstein later stated in his ~oi~ 
his relations with the separatists: 
I received one night~ at Curacao~ a v1s1t from some rich 
foreigners who were settled in the Island of Porto Rico. 
They urged me strongly to place myself at the head of a 
numerous party of wealthy inhabitants of that island~ for 
the purpose of expelling the Spaniards from it~ and render-
ing the island free and independent. I had declined various 
proposals made to me to join the patriots in Mexico and 
Buenos Ayres~ and I now declined this urgent one of the 
inhabitants of Porto Rico~ notwithstanding that they as-
sured me they placed entire confidence in me~ and in me 
alone; and that they would have nothing to do with any 
other military chieftain. About a month later~ a larger 
number of them came to me~ and gave me such proofs of their 
spirit and ability to accomplish their purpose that I con~ 
sented to their proposal. This happened at the end of the 
year 1821. 24 
After accepting the command of the invading forces 9 Ducoudray Hol-
stein moved to St. Thomas, where he left his family. He went to the 
. . 25 
United States in the spring of 1822 to organize the planned exped1t1on. 
Ducoudray Holstein was not a soldier of fortune but rather a capable of-
ficer with a good military background. Juan Bautista Arismendi, one of 
the principal Venezuelan revolutionary leaders who knew Ducoudray 
70 
Holstein very well, believed that the Swiss general· was ' 1much better 
instructed in military matters than Bolfvar himself .rv 26 But Ducoudray 
Holstein was a man difficult to get along with and very temperamenta1. 27 
While in the service of Bolfvar~ he developed an antagonism toward 
General Carlos Soublette~ one of the Liberator's principal friends. It 
is possible that this enmity precipitated Ducoudray Holstein's depart-
28 
ure from Venezuela. 
In the United States~ he met Baptist Irvine~ an Irish immigrant, a 
leading journalist 9 and a political agitator. Irvine had worked for 
William John Duane, the editor of the Philadelphia Aurora~ as a journey= 
man, and had become a successful editor of newspapers in New York and 
Baltimore~ including The Baltimore Whig~ The New York Columbian, and 
29 
the City Gazette of Washington. On the recommendation of New York 
Governor De Witt Clinton, Congressman Samuel Smith, and "many other ha-
bitual recommenders" 30 including 9 perhaps, Henry Clay, on January 21, 
1818, Irvine had obtained an appointment as Special Agent to Venezuela. 31 
In spite of being a "constant advocate of Latin American independence 9 1132 
Irvine~ however~ did not promote in Venezuela the cause of the Spanish 
American republics, but rather sought restitution of two American ves-
sels, the Tiger and the Liberty, that had been captured by the revolu-
tionaries while carrying weapons for the Spanish garrison at Angos-
33 
tura. During this time Irvine also had worked as a secret agent for 
the Department of State. In spite of the fact that Secretary of State 
John Quincy Adams did not like Irvine~ he entrusted him with the mission 
of collecting and transmitting to the State Department information con-
cerning the state of the Spanish American revolt 9 the situation of the 
patriot and royalist forces, the effects and probable consequences of 
71 
the emancipation of the slaves, and any other information "the knowledge 
34 
of which it may be interesting to us to possess." 
Irvine had many friends in Washington, Baltimore and Philadelphia, 
including Manuel Torres, the Colombian Minister to the United States~ 
35 
and the Chilean diplomat Josd Miguel Carrera. He also was a personal 
acquaintance of the Secretary of State Henry Clay and had attended 
various social functions given in Clay's honor. Through his Spanish 
American friends, Irvine met Ducoudray Holstein in Philadelphia. 36 
Ducoudray Holstein needed a propaganda chief for the enterprise, and 
Irvine seemed t() possess the nece-ss .. ary qualifications for the position. 
• .c· •• :·._;_ :··-- .• 
Irvine~ who at that time was experiencing ' __ --~ serious personal financial 
37 
difficulties, readily accepted the offer. In the United States, 
Ducoudray Holstein also met Charles Traugott Vogel~ who became the 
agent responsible for raising men and officers for the expedition and 
. . 38 
for obtaining arms and mun1t1ons of war. While in Philadelphia, 
Ducoudray Holstein received about $18,000 from Puerto Rican separatists 
39 
for the proposed invasion. 
In Philadelphia and New York he organized the basic elements of an 
. . 40 
exped1t1on. He recruited forty men to serve as officers of the in-
41 
vading army. Later, he chartered the brigantine Mary from Thomas 
42 
Watson for $20 9 000. The amount was to be paid "within five days af-
ter arrival in Puerto Rico, one half in produce of the Island" if the 
separatists could not provide "Spanish milled dollars •1143 It was pos-
sible that Ducoudray Holstein's expedition had the sanction of the 
Colombian Minister to the United States, a friend of Irvine, but there 
44 
is no evidence to support this assumption. Robert Tillotson, the 
Collector of the Port of New York, however, wrote to John Quincy Adams 
on January 23, 1823, that the expedition 
••• had the sanction, through her agent in Philadelphia (D. 
Manue~ de Torres), of the Colombian republic, under whose 
flag 9 and in conjunction with those forces it was to be 
carried into effect; General Ducoudray in particular assert-
ing, as we were informed, that Commodore Daniels, with his 
squadron, would cooperate in the attack.45 
72 
Later 9 after the operation had been discovered, the government of Haiti 
was also implicated in the affair by the editor of Niles' Weekly Regis-
ter. The accusation was unfounded, however~ because the members of the 
expedition had no immediate plans for the emancipation of the slaves, 
. . . f H . . . 46 a necessary prerequ1s1t1ve or any a1t1an ass1stance. 
The men recruited in the United States to serve as officers of the 
liberating army included European adventurers and former soldiers 9 Bona-
partist exiles 9 and thirteen Americans. Among the recruits were a 
Lieutenant Grecourt; a Lieutenant Janet; a Lieutenant Colencourt 9 an 
ex-member of the French Parliament and ex-governor of Guadalupe; Ho C. 
Birchau; Pedro Bignet; Jose Alberti; Issac Reid; and Captains Aaron 
Burns and William Gould. 47 
On August 13 9 1824, the expedition left the United States with a 
quantity of muskets 9 sabres 9 pistols 9 cartridges 9 gunpowder 9 and other 
munitions of war in the schooners Andrew Jackson and Selina and the 
48 
brigantine Mary. This expedition was "one of the earliest attempts 
to effect the independence of Puerto Rico and establish there a liberal 
bl . . " 49 . "1 h f h u . d s repu 1can reg1me s1m1 ar to t at o t e n1te tates. According 
to plans, on September 8, 1822, it arrived in the Swedish colony of St. 
Bartholomeu in the eastern part of Puerto Rico, where Ducoudray Holstein 
expected to receive additional funds from the separatists to purchase 
more weapons and recruit the necessary men for the invasion. 
During this period~ St. Bartholomeu was a meeting place for 
73 
smugglers, privateers~ revolutionaries, exiles, and refugees. In its 
principal port of Batavia ships of all nations~ principally from the 
United States~ stopped for refitting and repairs and for selling the 
. so 
merchandise seized by pr1vateers. The Swedish authorities seldom en-
forced the laws~ and~ as Ducoudray Holstein needed military equipment 
and men for the invasion of Puerto Rico~ St. Bartholomeu seemed to be 
51 
the best place to secure them. 
In St. Bartholomeu~ Ducoudray Holstein purchased another ship, the 
52 
brigantine Econdracht~ and recruited many people, among them several 
blacks. He remained in Batavia about eleven days awaiting the funds~ 
munitions~ and men that the separatists were going to provide him. 
Failing to receive the additional men and supplies~ he proceeded to St. 
Thomas after the Governor ordered him to leave the island of St. Bar-
53 
tho lomeu. The Swedish authorities also detained the Andrew Jackson 
and prevented it from sailing with the rest of Ducoudray Holstein's 
54 
squadron. In spite of these difficulties, the revolutionaries pro-
ceeded with the plans for the invasion of Puerto Rico. 
The officers of the expedition planned to recruit 100 men in St. 
Thomas for the invasion and another 100 in St. Croix~ which was~ like 
. 55 
St. Bartholomeu, a meeting place for smugglers and pr1vateers. De-
parting from St. Bartholomeu, the vessels sailed for Five Islands~ a 
place about ten miles distant. According to Irvine~ it seemed that 
there was some doubt about the success of the expedition because the 
separatists had failed to provide the necessary money and supplies to 
Ducoudray Holstein. Also the officers had been recruited with the con-
dition that they could change their minds about continuing with the ex-
56 
pedition any time before arriving at St. Thomas. Being mercenaries 
74 
and not true patriots 7 these officers disputed constantly with the 
principal leaders of the expedition during the time that they were at 
57 
the Five Islands~ and some of them even refused to continue serving 
Ducoudray Holstein. 
The expedition proceeded to Crabb Island~ east of Puerto Rico, 
where Ducoudray Holstein expected to receive additional support from 
the separatists. But, after being at sea for several hours~ Irvine and 
some of the officers changed their minds and decided to proceed to La 
Guayra in Venezuela~ instead of Crabb Island. Irvine staged a short 
revolt among the officers and accused Ducoudray Holstein of deceit and 
ignorance of the events~ and, at the point of a gun, forced the expedi-
58 
tion to change its course. It is strange~ indeed, that Baptist Ir-
vine changed his mind so unexpectedly and so close to the final ob-
jective~ unless~ as this writer believes, he was an agent of the United 
States government charged with disrupting the expedition. Nevertheless~ 
Irvine's actions resulted in the cancellation of the plans for the in-
vasion of Puerto Rico. 
The expedition~ however, ended in Curacao~ not La Guayra. On Sep-
tember 16, 1822, Ducoudray Holstein encountered a heavy storm at sea and 
was forced to put into the port of Curacao with the Encondracht and the 
59 
Mary. According to Irvine, "by the artifice of Captain D's mate who 
commanded the Endracht, there happened a deviation from the prudent 
resolution and we entered Curacao under assurances which he violated 
60 
with infamous perfidy." 
The Captain of the Encondracht had thrown overboard all the guns in 
his vessel and, under the pretense that the ship was seriously damaged 
and leaky~ he changed the course for Curacao, after giving assurances 
75 
61 
that everything would turn out all right. But in Curacao the Dutch 
officials embargoed the vessels and arrested the leaders of the con-
spiracy on request of the Spanish authorities, who were aware of the 
revolutionary plans of the separatists and the purposes of the inva-
sion. Ducoudray Holstein, Irvine and Vogel were condemned to thirty 
62 
years imprisonment after being found guilty of conspiracy. The thir-
teen Americans were set free and returned to the United States by the 
A . 1 63 mer~can consu . The leaders of the expedition~ after serving eigh-
teen months in prison~ were pardoned by the king of the Netherlands as 
64 
a result of international political pressure. 
The separatists could not help Ducoudray Holstein because their 
conspiracy had been discovered due to the indiscrete activities of Pedro 
Dubois, a leader of the uprising. While organizing the revolt Dubois, 
in an effort to recruit new members from the foreign settlers of the 
island who could help finance Ducoudray Holstein's expedition, had con-
tacted M. De St. Maurice, a French planter from Fajardo. St. Maurice~ 
who did not support independence for Puerto Rico, encouraged Dubois to 
discuss with him the details of the conspiracy. Dubois, believing per-
haps 9 that St. Maurice~ as other French citizens residing in Puerto 
Rico had done, would join the separatists 9 detailed to him the plans for 
. . 65 
the upr~s~ng. 
Dubois told St. Maurice that his brother-in-law Pedro Bignet, had 
arrived in the town of Naguabo with instructions to promote an insurrec~ 
. 66 tion on the ~sland. Bignet had given Dubois directions and proclama-
tions written in French for that purpose. According to the information 
that Dubois gave St. Maurice, the expedition consisted of twenty-seven 
vessels 9 600 men, and 10,000 muskets and was under the command of General 
76 
Janet, General Grecourt, and General Co lencourt. To determine the sta-
tus of the insurgency, Bignet made several inquiries in Naguabo and in-
structed Dubois to contact a rebel leader named Carlos Romano, who re-
sided in Guayama, for additional information. Bignet indicated to 
Dubois that he would return soon to Anasco 9 a port on the western coast 
67 
of Puerto Rico. 
St. Maurice then gave this information to some friends~ who 9 not 
wanting to get involved with suspected revolutionaries 9 informed the 
mayor of F~jardo of the activities of Dubois. These individuals tried 
afterwards to surprise and arrest Dubois 9 but unable to do so, they for-
d d h . f . h h . 68 war e t e 1n ormat1on to t e government aut orit1es. Governor Fran-
cisco Gonzcilez de Linares had already received information concerning 
Ducoudray Holstein 1 s expedition from the United States. On August 10~ 
1822 9 a Frenchman named Wischaur had told the Spanish vice consul in 
Philadelphia that he had received information concerning an invasion of 
Puerto Rico by Ducoudray Holstein and that the planned expedition had 
sent advanced agents to the island to incite the black slaves to pro-
claim the Republica Boricua (the Republic of Boricua). On the same day~ 
the vice consul sent this information to the Governor of Puerto Rico, 
allowing Governor Gonzc!lez de Linares to alert the military forces im-
. 69 
med1ately. 
Miguel de la Tor~e 9 who had become Captain-General of Puerto Rico, 
under a tempo.rary separation of powers 9 instituted defensive measureso 
De la Torre arrested Dubois and Romano and deployed military units near 
70 
Anasco to prevent any landing by Bignet. The Captain-General went to 
Guayama with many troops to quell a slave rebellion incited by the 
separatists. He arrested the leaders of the movement 9 then shot two of 
77 
them in the public square as an example of "Spanish justice." 71 Many 
foreigners and black residents of Guayama were exiled or imprisoned, 
while the armed forces, including the militia, were alerted to maintain 
law and order. Dubois was tried by a military court and found guilty 
of conspiring to overthrow the government. He was shot on October 12, 
1822. 72 
Joel Robert Poinsett, on his-way to Me'xico~ where he had been sent 
as a special agent of the United States~ arrived in San Juan during this 
time. On September 27, 1822, he had written in his journal that: 
The authorities of the island have received information that 
an expedition was about to sail from New York for the purpose 
of revolutionizing the island~ and are prepared to defeat the 
project~ whatever it may be.7J 
The failure of the separatists resulted in a campaign of propaganda 
"mounted to discourage the independence sentiment of the Puerto Ri-
74 
cans." This defeat, however, did not discourage the separatists. 
They began immediately to organize another rebellion -- this time cen-
tered in San Juan. Colonel Manuel Suirez del Solar was selected to com-
mand the new uprising. He was aided by separatists from Venezuela and 
Puerto Rico, including Colonel Matias Escut~, a Puerto Rican officer 
who was a member of the Spanish garrison in San Juan and who had partic-
75 
ipated in the revolutionary campaigns in Venezuela. The efficient es-
pionage system-of the government, however, was able to discover and 
frustrate the insurrection. 
At the end of July, 1823, the Conservatives informed Marshall de la 
Torre~ the Captain-General, of rumors spreading in San Juan concerning 
revolutionary activities. These rumors were confirmed by the Spanish 
agents operating in Venezuela. On August 30, 1823, one of these agents 
reported to the governor: 
Yesterday I was called by an individual who esteems you 
very much to inform me that A ••• and A ••• are secret 
agents of this country (Venezuela) in the Island, and 
that they are planning to bring the Island under their 
control soon. For their purposes they depend on many 
refugees from here and with a large contingency of 
troops from there.76 
A subsequent message from the same agent read: 
It is indispensable that you inform the authorities im-
mediately, as A ••• and A ••• are beginning their revolu-
tion soon. They have everything ready and the uprising 
is scheduled for the end of the month. 77 
As in previous occasions, the governor mobilized his forces to 
. 78 
prevent an insurrection. He ordered a strict vigilance of all ports 
and bays of the is larid and of all vessels arriving in Puerto Rico. 
I 
These measures were successful. Coldnel Suarez del Solar was arrested 
when he arrived to direct the insurrection. In his baggage the author-
ities found the nmnes of many separatists and letters that compromised 
many creoles. These documents were used as evidence for the arrest of 
the principal leaders of the revolt, including Colonel Escute', who was 
. . 78 
transferred to Spain for 1mpr1so.nment. 
Creole dissatisfaction with the colonial government continued to 
grow in Puerto Rico as a result of the dictatorial measures established 
by Governor De la Torre and the reimposition of absolutism in Spain. 
Ferdinand VII, who had been kept virtually a prisoner of the Spanish 
Cortes after the Riego Revolt, appealed for help to the Holy Alliance 
to regain his throne and reestablish absolutism in Spain. Europe at 
this time was still under the political control of Alexander I of Rus-
79 
sia, Prince Metternich of Austria, and Lord Castlereagh of England. 
Constitutionalism, as it had been institutionalized by the liberal 
Cortes in Spain, was contrary to the monarchical principals of the Holy 
Alliance. Therefore, when Ferdinand VII appealed to the alliance, the 
79 
representatives from the monarchical systems of Europe, after consider-
able debate, decided in 1822 to invade Spain and reinstate the Bourbon 
dynasty. England protested vigorously, but the Allied Powers had de-
cided upon their courses of action. On April 7, 1823~ Louis Antoine de 
Bourbon, due d'Angouleme, marched into Spain with 100,000 troops and 
successfully reestablished Ferdinand VII to the throne. Absolutism re-
turned to Spain and, therefore, to Puerto Rico. 80 
In Puerto Rico Governor De la Torre, consolidated the Captaincy-
General and the Governorship 9 reinstated absolutism and took measures 
to suppress separatism, liberalism, and any other form of creole dis-
sent. He dissolved all political and masonic societies and prohibited 
any criticism of the government. He published the Bando de Policia y 
Buen Gobierno (a law enforcement decree) which condemned dissidents~ 
restricted civil liberties, and established military rule on the is-
land. This decree also prohibited evening reunions of citizens in 
stores, warehouses and public places; established a curfew after ten 





of the King. 
colonials by the Crown, subject to the whims 
The renewed dictatorial measures of the government increased 
separatist activities. Bolivar's successful campaigns in South America 
gave new impetus and hope to the Puerto Ricans for a successful strug-
gle. During this time, a Caracas newspaper, El Venezolano, published 
. 82 
articles in favor of the independence of Puerto R1co. The separa~ 
tists, in jest, even asked the Captain-General to declare the inde-
. 83 
pendence of Puerto R1co. 
In October, 1824, government authorities began to arrest 
80 
independence sympathizers in Mayaguez and other towns of the inte-
84 
rior. The separatist leader, Jose Ignacio Grau, was arrested and con-
85 
fined to the prison in San Crist6bal Castle. On October 23~ 1824, a 
conspiracy was discovered in San Juan, res.ulting in the arrest of the 
first Puerto Rican woman-patriot, Maria Mercedes Barbudo, in whose 
house the separatists had met to plan insurrectional activities. 
Dona Marfa de las Mercedes' activities were uncovered 
through a letter intercepted in St. Thomas, which ac-
companied by an incendiary proclamation and two other 
letters from the religious Friar Jose Antonio Bonilla 
•••• Upon being prosecuted, three letters were found in 
her house from a certain J. M. de Rojas, written from 
. Venezuela and stating that newspapers from that country 
had been sent with thim. Through these letters it was 
verified that Doctor Perez, a priest resident in Puerto 
Rico who had managed to leave the Island by requesting 
permission to go to Cuba, was recommended to Rojas by 
Dona Mar{a •••• The Barbudo wished to defend herself~ but 
the proofs were too clear. La Torre did not concede the 
forty day prolongation she requested~ jailing her at 
once in the San Crist&bal Castle. 86 
Dona Mercedes Barbudo was deported to Cuba on the recommendation of 
Prosecutor Francisco Marcos de Santaella, who had once been accused of 
being a member of the separatist movement. According to historian 
J • 87 
Figueroa, "the latter destiny of D. Mar1a has been lost to h1.story." 
Some of the members of the Barbudo family, including the Actuary of 
Anasco, Josl Barbudo, were also exiled as a result of their separatist 
sentiments. 
The separists renewed their efforts for independence the following 
year. In March, 1825, Venezuelan vessels raided the coastal town of 
Aguadilla and landed a token force of revolutionaries who promptly took 
the Spanish fortification of Punta Borl.nquen. The invaders, however~ 
could not repel a counterattack made by the more numerous Spanish forces 
and had to retreat to their ships. Again, as in 1817, the lack of 
81 
proper coordination, perhaps caused by the destruction of the Barbudos' 
revolutionary cell 9 contributed to the victory of the peninsular 
88 
forces. 
These revolutionary activities resulted in increased government 
controls. 
- 1 89 
The Crown promulgated again the Facultades omn1modas of 
1810, which had given the Governor absolute powers over life and death; 
the authority to establish a military dictatorship~ and to enforce co~ 
lonial laws as he deemed necessary. The separatists disregarded the 
dangers~ continued a large~scale propaganda campaign in the interior, 
and even threatened the life of the governor. The situation had become 
so critical during this time that Governor De la Torre deGided to stay 
in Puerto Rico for his office swearing ceremony than to go to Puerto 
90 
Principe . as he had been directed to do. 
Governor De la Torre received new military forces from Spain and 
Cuba and augmented his espionage elements, adding to them the ex-
governor Gonz~les de Linares~ Hirault de Ligny, Mariano Rodriguez, JosJ 
f 91 Mar a Pando, Geraldo Patrullo and JosJ Aluche. He continued his pro-
gram of exiling the separatist leaders such as Juan Antonio QuirJs~ who 
. 92 was banished after being accused of esp1onage. 
A number of factors frustrated Puerto Rican efforts for inde-
pendence between 1820 and 1825. The dictatorial actions of the govern-
ment and the exile of the principal revolutionary leaders affected con-
siderably the struggle for independence. The geographical position of 
Puerto Rico prevented the spread of the national liberation movement 
from Spanish America. As a result, the Puerto Rican separatists re-
mained isolated from the maintstream of revolutionary activity~ could 
not purchase weapons or receive economic help in the amount needed-for 
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a successful revolution. Racial peculiarities, regionalism, apathy, 
and ignorance would have prevented a successful insular insurrection. 
Clearly, Puerto Rico needed the help of the Spanish American republics 
to attain independence. 
The rapacity of the military governor, the suppression of indi-
vidual liberties and the reestablishment of absolutism did not discour-
age their efforts. The government's strong military measures, however» 
made an internal revolution virtually impossible. The separatists 
recognized this fact. After years of continuous defeats» improper prep-
aration, and poor coordination, they resolved at the beginning of 1825 
to place their hopes in Simdn Bolivar, the proposed PanamJ Congress~ 
and the victorious armies of the Spanish American republics. These 
hopes would be crushed, however~ not by Spain, but rather by the emerg-
ing power of the United States in the Caribbean. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 
Monclova, Vol. I, p. 106. 
2 . 
Ib1.d., P• 109. 
3 
Cdrdova~ Memorias, Vol. III~ p. 434; Monclova~ Vol. I, p. 120. 
4 ' Cordova~ Memorias, Vol. III 9 p. 437. 
5 
Ibid. 
6 . Ib1.d., p. 434. 
7 
Ibid., PP• 435-436. 
8 . I b1.d., p. 436. 
9Ibid. 
10coll y Toste~ Vol. II~ p. 138; Monclova, Vol. I~ pp. 120-121. 
11 . . I -Ib1.d. A copy of the reply of Governor Arostegu1. to Jose Nunez 
de cJceres can be found in cJrdova, Memorias~ Vol. III~ PP• 457~460. 
For the "Constitutive Act of the Provisional Government of the Inde-
pendent State of the Spanish Part of Haiti" see British and Foreign 
State Papers 9 Vol. III~ pp. 557-570. 
12 
Joseph B. Lockey, Pan Americanism, Its Beginnings (New York: 
McMillan Co.~ 1926) 9 p. 38. 
13 
Monclova, Vol. III~ p. 121. 
14 
Baptist Irvine to a member of Congress~ January 12, 1823. Letter 
published in Niles' Weekly Register, March 22~ 1823. 
15Ibid. 
16John Quincy Adams believed that Ducoudray Holstein was a German 
officer. See Charles F. Adams~ Memoirs of John Quincy Adams~ Vol. V 
(Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co.~ 1875) 9 p. 57. 
17 
H. L. Va Ducoudray Holstein, Memoirs of Simon Bol{var 2 President 
Liberator of the Republic of Colombia and of His Principal Generals, 






JosJ F. Blanco~ Documentos para la vida pJblica del Libertador~ 
Vol. 5~ p. 450; Madiriaga, Bolivar, Vol. I, p. 22. 
20 I 
Santana~ p. 224; Ducoudray Holstein~ Vol. II~ p. 192; Madariaga~ 
I Vol. I~ p. 22; Cordova, Memorias, Vol. III 9 p. 480. 
21 
Ducoudray Holstein~ Vol. I, pp. 2-7; Santana~ p. 222. 
22 
Monclova~ Vol. I, p. 122. 
23 
Coll y Toste~ "Carta del Dr. Coll y Toste 
a una consulta sobre el governador don Miguel de 
hist6rico de Puerto Rico~ Vol. V~ pp. 131-134. 
24 
Ducoudray Holstein~ Vol. II~ pp. 192-193. 
25 
Ibid.~ p. 193. 
al Consul de Venezuela 
I la Torre~" Bolet~n 
26 
Salvador de Mad.:hiaga~ Bol!var (New York: Pelie,grine and Cudahy? 
1952) ~ p. 279. This is an English translation of his two volume work. 
It contains changes not found iri the original. 
27 
Santana~ p. 223. 
28MadAriaga~ Vol. I~ p. 616. 
29Lewis Hanke~ "Baptist Irvine's Reports on SimJn Bolfvar~" ~­
panic American Historical Review, XVI (1936), p. 360; Adams~ Memoirs 9 
Vol. V ~ p. 57; S antanas pp. 223-224. 
30 
Clarence Brigham, "Bibliography of American Newspapers, 1690~ 
1820.'1" American Antiquarian Society Proceedings~ XXVII (1917)s p. 387; 
Adams~ Memoirs~ Vol. V~ p. 57. 
31 
Adams~ Memoirs, Vol. V~ p. 57. 
32 
Santana9 p. 224. 
33 J • Madar1aga9 Vol. I 9 p. 615. 
34 
John Quincy Adams, Secretary of State~ to Baptist Irvine~ Special 
Agent for the United States to Venezuela, January 31, 1818, in Manning, 
Diplomatic Correspondence, Vol. I, pp. 55-56. 
35 
Arthur Preston Whitaker, The United States and the Independence 
of Latin America 9 1800-1830 (New York~ Russell and Russell, Inc. 9 1962)~ 
pp. 159-160. 
36 
R. W. Meade 9 Agent for the Government of Colombia in the United 
States, to John Quincy Adams~ December 17, 1822~ Annals of Congress~ 
17th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 40, pp. 1269-1271. 
37 Ibid. 
38 
Robert Tillotson, Collector of the Port of New York to John 
Quincy Adams~ January 23, 1823, Annals of Congress 9 17th Cong.j 2d 
Sess., Vol. 40, pp. 1255-1258. 
39 
R. W. Meade to John Quincy Adams 9 p. 1271. Historian Loida 
85 
Figueroa mentions that Ducoudray Holstein received twenty-four thousand 
pesos (Figueroa, p. 163). 
40 
Santana~ p. 233; Robert M. Harrison, U. So Consul in St. Barthol-
omeu, to Secretary of State9 Annals of Congress 9 17th Gong., 2d Sess.~ 
Vol. 40 9 pp. 1258~1259. 
41 
Irvine in Niles' Weekly Register~ March 22, 1823. 
42 
Co J. Ingerson, Collector of the Port of Philadelphia, to Secre~ 
tary of State9 January 8, 1823~ Annals of Congress~ 17th Gong.~ 2d 
Sess., Vol. 40, p. 1246. 
43 
Memorandum of agreement entered into between Thomas Wattson of 
the city of Philadelphia (merchant) and Ducoudray Holstein~ now of said 
city, viz., Annals of Congress 9 17th Cong. 9 2d Sess. 9 Vol. 4?, p. 1247. 
44 
See Tillotson to Secretary of State~ Annals of Congress 9 p. 1255; 
R. Wo Meade to Secretary of State, ibid.~ p. 1269. 
45Ibid. 
46 
Niles' Weekly Register~ November 23~ 1822. 
47 
Monclova~ Vol. I~ p. 122. 
48 
Harrison to Secretary of State~ September 16~ 1822~ Annals of 
Congress~ p. 1258~1259. 
49 
Santana, p., 219. 
so ' J 
Vicente Lecuna 9 Cr6nica razonada de las guerras de Bol1var, Vol. 
I (New York: Colonial Press~ Inc.~ 1950), p. 439. 
51 
Santana 9 p. 238. 
52 
Aaron Burns to Thomas Wattson~ September 26 9 1822, Annals of Con-
gress~ p. 1251. 
53 
Several local inhabitants complained to Governor Noderling of the 
recruitment and fitting of the expedition in St. Bartholomeu. The 
American Consul also complained. As a result 9 the Governor ordered the 
expedition out of the Swedish colony. 
54The Andrew Jackson was detained by order of the authorities. 
This vessel's military stores were transferred to the Endracht 9 together 
with thirty of the members of the expedition, before the rest of the 
squadron departed for St. Thomas. 
55 I 
Cordova, Memorias, Vol. III~ p. 480. 
56 
Irvine in Niles' Weekly Register, March 22, 1823. 
86 
57 
Aaron Burns to Thomas Wattson, September 26, 1822 1 Annals of Con-
gress, p. 1252. 
58Ibid. 
59 
Ducoudray Holstein, Vol. II, pp. 193-199. 
60 
Irvine, Traits of Colonial Jurisprudence, p. 7. 
61 
Santana, p. 244. 
62 
Niles' Weekly Register, November 9, 1822; November 23, 1822; 
December 7, 1822; and December 14, 1822. 
63 
Santana, p. 243. 
64 
Ducoudray Holstein, Vol. II, pp. 193-199. The best description 
of the planned operation of Ducoudray Holstein for the liberation of 
Puerto Rico can be found in Chapter VI of Professor Santana's work. 
This chapter includes the principal details of the expedition. Profes-
sor Santana believes that the expedition "was significant because it was 
an effort by a group of American and European adventurers to establish 
in Puerto Rico an independent republic based on the institutions and 
ideas then prevalent in the United States. He utilizes, to a great ex-
tent, a small book by Baptist Irvine entitled Traits of Colonial Juris-
prudence or a Peep at the Trading Inquisition of Curacao (Baltimore, 
1824), and written two years after the expedition, for some of his most 
important arguments. While this book, as well as the Memoirs of 
Ducoudray Holstein are important sources for the study of this period~ 
they must be used with utmost care, as they contain a one-sided view of 
the affair. Professor Santana writes that Baptist Irvine 1 s interests 
were mostly literary, as he was writing during this time a book on 
Spanish America and wanted information possessed by Ducoudray Holstein. 
Irvine, however, wrote soon after he had been arrested in Curacao that 
"the part I had agreed to act would be merely military •11 This informa-
tion does not appear in Professor Santana's study. There is the pos-
sibility that Irvine, being a newspaper man, went with the expedition 
to acquire firsthand information of the invasion for a newspaper story, 
as he had with him pre-prepared "battle reports" addressed to the editor 
of the Philadelphia Aurora. His bulletins described in detai 1 "the 
success of the attack and the landing in Puerto Rico." In his corres-
pondence with Clay, Irvine accused Ducoudray of inefficiency and irre-
sponsibility, and in his letter to the Niles' Weekly Register he paints 
him "as destitute of leadership qualities." There is the possibility 
that Irvine was an agent of the United States, responsible for dis-
rupting the expedition. While in St. Bartholomeu, he informed 
frequently the American Consul of the status of· the expedition. This 
consul, Robert M. Harrison, transmitted the information to the S·ecretary 
of State. Governor Norlerling of St. Bartholorneu~ who had initially 
sympathized with Ducoudray 1 s plans for personal benefit~ informed the 
Swiss general to be careful with the American Consul, as he was a spy 
of the United States. Ducoudray was able to purchase military supplies 
and recruit personnel initially without interference from the Swedish 
authorities; but, perhaps, due to the pressure exercised by the American 
consul, he ordered the expedition out of St. Bartholorneu, suggesting 
instead the Five Islands as a rallying point. 
After the departure from the Five Islands~ en route to Puerto 
Rico, Irvine disrupted the operation to the degree that he threatened 
to use force against those who wanted to continue the enterprise. This 
information does not appear in Professor Santana's work. 
During the time that the expedition was in St. Bartholorneu, Cap-
tain Robert T. Spence of the United States Navy, with the warship Cyane 
maintained a constant patrol in San Juan and between Puerto Rico and St. 
Bartholorneu, corning at one time very close to the invasion fleet. Cap-
tain Spence must have. followed the expedition to Curacao because, after 
the arrest of Irvine, he entered the port with the Cyane and demanded 
from the Dutch Governor Irvine's immediate release. 
As the Vice-Consul of Spain in Philadelphia knew about the pur-
poses of the expedition, he must have informed the United States Govern-
ment of it. Irvine, who had already been an agent of the Department of 
State and was unemployed, seemed to be the perfect choice to disrupt 
the invasion plans. It is significant that he appealed to Secretary of 
State Henry Clay on several occasions to intercede in his favor while 
imprisoned in Curacao. There are no published documents that prove 
American interference with the liberating attempt of Ducoudray; but 
subsequent events, as described in the following chapters of this 
thesis, justify this assumption, as it was not in the best interests of 
the United States to see the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean attain 
their independence. (See Santana, pp. 219-253; Irvine in Niles' Weekly 
Register, March 22, 1823; Ducoudray Holstein~ Memoirs, Vol. II, pp. 192-
199; Adams, Memoirs, Vol. VI,. pp. 430-431; Irvine to Clay, in Hopkins, 
Papers of Henry Clay~ Vol. III~ pp. 594-596, 600, 618-619; Cadilla de 
Martinez, p. 302; Captain Spence to the Secretary of the Navy, trans-
mitting correspondence with the Governor of Porto Rico.ll. Annals of 'Con-
gress, 17th Gong.~ 2d Sess., Vol. 40, pp. 1228-1243. Message of Presi-
dent James Monroe to the House of Representatives, February 4, 1823, 
concerning "Expedition Against the Island of Porto Rico~" Annals of Con-
gress, 17th Gong., 2d Sess., Vol. 40, pp. 1245-1274. 
65 
C~rdova, Mernorias, Vol. III, pp. 473-479, Vol. IV, pp. 12-22; 
Brau, pp. 207-208; Cadilla de Martinez, pp. 302-303; Monclova, Vol. I, 







69cadilla de Mart!nez, pp. 302-303. 
70 
C&rdova~ Memorias, Vol~ III 9 pp. 473-479. 
71Ibid. 
72coll y Toste, Vol. II~ p. 138; Monclova, Vol. I, p. 142. 
73 
Joel Roberts Poinsett, Notes on Mexico Made in the Autumn of 
88 
1822, Accompanied by an Historical Sketch of the Revolution and Trans- -
lations of Official Reports on the Present State of that Country, By a 
Citizen of the U. So (Philadelphia: H. Co Carey and I. Lea, 1824). 
Facsimile reprint, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1969)SJ pp. 3-8. 
74 
Figueroa, p. 164. Proclamations of the government can be found 
in cJrdovaSJ Memorias, Vol. III, pp. 457~460. 
75 1 





Ibid., p. 65; Monclova, Vol. I, P• 155. 
79 
Harold Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning (Hamden: Archon 
Books, 1966), p. 3. 
8°For a br1." ef 1 · f h 1 f h f F d · d ana ys1.s o t e resu ts o t e return o er 1.nan 
VII to the Spanish throne see Terrero, Historia de Espana, p. 428. 
81 
Monclova, Vol. I, pp. 175-176; Coll y Toste, Vol. II, P• 25. 
82 
CJrdova, Memorias, Vol. IV 9 P• 60. 
83Ibid., PP• 139-143. 
84 
Ibid., p. 236. 
85 
Monclova, Vol. I, P• 180. 
86 
Figueroa, History of Puerto Rico, p. 165. 
87Ibid. 
88 
Monclova, Vol. I, p. 240. 
89 
See note 17, Chapter II. 
90 
Monclova, Vol. I, p. 184. 
91coll 1 349 y Toste, Vo • IX, P• • 
92 
Monclova, Vol. I, PP• 184-185. 
89 
93 
England did not allow the purchasing of weapons in her colonies 
nor in the colonies of Holland, France, Denmark and Sweden that were 
located in the Caribbean and which w·e·re under her control during the 
European war (Lecuna, Crcfnica razonada, Vol. I, p. 90). Prior to the 
return of Ferdinand VII~ the Junta Suprema purchased all available 
rifles in the United States ·market with $300,000 that the government 
sent to t·he Spanish Minister. At this time there was a weapon shortage 
in the United States as a result of an Army order for 80,000 rifles and 
the purchases made by the Spanish American republics (Francisco josd 
Urrutia, Los Estados Unidos de America las re ublicas his anoameri-
canas - p~ginas de his tori a dip lorn tica (Madrid: Editorial America~ 
1918), p. 24. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CARIBBEAN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 
United States interests in the Caribbean began early in the 
seventeenth century, when New England shipping enterprises and merchants 
recognized the excellent trading opportunities there despite the bar-
riers imposed by Spain's mercantilistic policies. Trade contacts be-
tween North America and the Spanish colonies were limited mostly to 
clandestine operations prior to the American Revolution. With the ter-
mination of British control over the American colonies~ however~ these 
commercial contacts increased~ and by 1800 a well-organized and profit-
able trade flourished between the United States and the Spanish co-
lonies in the Caribbean. 1 
The political turmoil in Spain during the Napoleonic invasion re-
sulted in the breakdown of mercantilism in the Caribbean. To preserve 
her colonies from economic ruin and starvation, Spain allowed neutral 
ships to enter the colonial ports with 
••• foodstuffs~ lumber, naval stores, manufactured goods, 
and slaves; and to take off the produce of the colonies~ 
such as sugar, coffee, tobacco, indigo, cacao, and hides. 
These neutral ships also took large ~ounts of specie from 
the Spanish colonial ports.2 
United States commerce in the Caribbean, which had been expanding 
3 
steadily during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, "increased 
4 
rapidly during the course of the next decade." This was the result of 




most of the ports of the Antilles to neutral shipping. The Spanish 
colonies augmented their trade with the United States~ not only as a 
result of this decree but also because of the proximity of American 
ports and the trading facilities offered to the Spanish by the American 
merchants. Thus» "it was only in the Caribbean and on the Atlantic 
coast of South America that the Spanish toleration of neutral trade with 
its colonies was directly beneficial to the United States. 116 
During the first decade of the nineteenth century most American 
commerce with the Spanish colonies was concentrated in Cuba and Puerto 
7 
Rico. In 1798 United States exports to the Spanish Caribbean colonies 
rose to $5,080,543. In 1799 the amount reached a total value of 
$8,993~401. In the next two years it fluctuated between $8,993~401 and 
$8,437»659j then decreased slightly to $7,690~888 by 1805. 8 During this 
period, Puerto Rico imported about 20 per cent of her goods from the 
United States and exported to that nation between 15 and 50 per cent of 
9 
her tobacco~ sugar, and coffee. In 1803, Puerto Rico exported to the 
United States 263»000 pounds of sugar~ at $0.06 a pound» for a total ex-
port value of $15,792. This trade increased to 3»796,900 pounds with a 
market value of $227,814 in 1810; and to 19,788~600 pounds valued at 
$791»544 in 1828. The export of sugar during this last year represented 
73 per cent of the total Puerto Rican sugar production. This same year~ 
Puerto Rico exported to the United States 2,245~044 pounds of raw mo-
10 
lasses, valued at $44,900. 
The Jeffersonian embargo of December, 1807, reduced American trade 
considerably in the Spanish Caribbean. During a Congressional debate on 
the embargo in November~ 1808, Timothy Pitkin of Connecticut, James 
Lloyd of Massachusetts~ and other members of the Congress stated that 
92 
the Jeffersonian commercial policies had ruined the American trade in 
Spanish America. Large supplies of American beef, flour, meal, and 
cotton failed to reach the Spanish markets in the West Indies. These 
individuals, who represented New England trading interests, also be-
lieved that the continuation of such a policy would damage permanently 
American trade in the Caribbean because the Spanish colonies, as a re~ 
11 
sult of the embargo, were seeking new markets in France and England. 
During this period American exports to the Spanish colonies dropped 
from $13,025,579 to $6,685,617 in 1809; sugar imports were reduced from 
12 
87,763,464 pounds to 34,657,330 pounds. 
During the Madison and Monroe administrations~ the volume of trade 
between Puerto Rico and the United States amounted to $269,008 in 1813~ 
. 13 
$1,082,299 in 1816, and $2,103,498, 1n 1818. This increased trade was 
the result of the many concessions granted by the C~dula de Gracia to 
. . 14 
fore1gn countr1es. Trade with Cuba also increased. The United States 
had sent commercial agents to the island since 1781, and "the American 
consuls in Cuba were actively promoting trade and commercial contacts1115 
with the Spanish authorities. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, political and stra-
tegic considerations, in addition to trade and commercial interests, 
also became part of the United States concern in the Caribbean. The 
United States feared that Great Britain or France would seize the Span~ 
ish colonies in the Caribbean as a result of the unstable political 
conditions existing in Spain and the marked inability of that country 
to protect her overseas possessions. 
These fears were not completely unfounded. In the summer of 1819, 
it was rumored in Europe that England might seize Cuba to balance 
93 
United States hegemony in the Gulf of M~xico, which had been one of 
the results of the American acquisition of Florida. British newsp<;ipers 
reported during this time that the Duke of San Carlos had indicated 
16 
that Spain would prefer British control of Cuba. The London Times 
described Havana as the best commercial port in the world and "a sta-
tion from which the British navy would have complete command over the 
whole line of the southern and eastern coasts of the United States. 1117 
During this time the British press~ which had condemned the Florida 
treaty in strong terms~ demanded that England seize Cuba because of the 
dangers to which "British trade in the Gulf of Mexico would be exposed 
18 
in case of a future war with the United States." England had pro-
vided substantial military assistance to Spain during the peninsular 
19 .. 
campaign~ and that country owed about $15,000~000 for m1l1tary sup-
plies and maintenance of the British army. She also owed money to many 
British merchants who had suffered commercial injuries during the war. 
As Spain was unable to satisfy her financial obligations, it was pos-
sible that she would transfer Cuba and Puerto Rico, her last remaining 
colonies in the Western Hemisphere, to England as payment for these 
debts. There was some speculation.that Spain might cede the islands 
to France, which h.ad provided substantial military assistance to Ferdi-
20 
nand VII to help him regain his Spanish throne. 
In April, 1823 9 many rumors circulated in Washington concerning 
the possible transfer of Cuba and Puerto Rico to England or France. 
Either possibility seemed dangerous to Secreta~y of State John Quincy 
Adams. In a letter to Hugh Nelson$ the American foreign minister to 
Spain, Adams discussed the effects of such an event: 
Whatever may be the issue of this war, ••• it may be taken for 
granted that the dominion of Spain upon the American conti-
nent ••• is irrecoverably gone. But the islands of Cuba and 
Porto Rico still remain nominally and so far really de-
pendent upon her (Spain). These islands~ from their local 
position, are natural appendages to the North American con-
tinent and one of them, Cuba, ••• has become an object of 
transcendent importance to the political and commercial 
interests of our Union.21 
Adams also believed that the French invasion of Spain to rees-
tablish absolutism under Ferdinand VII might cause "the Spanish con-
stitutionalists to cede Cuba and perhaps Porto Rico to England as the 
22 
price of a new Anglo-Spanish alliance in another Peninsular War." 
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The anxiety concerning the possible disposition of the Spanish colonies 
in the Caribbean was expressed by Secretary Adams to John Forsyth, the 
United States Minister to Spain, on December 17, 1822: 
It is even asserted from sources to which some credit is 
due that they have been for more than two years in secret 
negotiation ••• for the cession of the Island; and it is 
added that Spain, though disinclined to such an arrange-
ment, might resist it with more firmness, if for a limited 
period of time she could obtain the joint guarantee of the 
United States and France in securing the Island to her-
seu.23 
Believing that both France and England had agents "observing the course 
of events," Secretary Adams stated that the President wanted the United 
States minister to 
••• obtain correct information whether such a negotiation 
as has been above suggested is on foot between Spain and 
Great Britain, and if so, to communicate to the Spanish 
Government in a manner adapted to the delicacy of the 
case, the sentiments of this Government in relation to 
this subject. 24 
Henry Clay, expressing a similar concern~ told George Canning, the 
British Foreign Secretary, in February, 1823, that the United States 




Many other American political leaders and statesmen, including John 
C. Calhoun~ Thomas Jefferson, James Monroej and James Madison, also be-
lieved that the control of the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean was, 
as John Quincy Adams had indicated, "an object of transcendent import-
26 
ance to the political and commercial interests of our Union." During 
his administration~ President Madison had indicated that 
••• the position of Cuba gives the United States so deep 
an interest in the destiny of that island~ that although 
they might be inactivej they could not be a satisfied 
spectator at its falling under any European government~ 
which might make a fulcrum of that position against the 
commerce and security of the United States. 27 
Thomas Jefferson had told Calhoun in 1820 that the United States 
ought to take Cuba "at the first possible opportunity" 28 even "at the 
29 
cost of a war with England." This was not inconsistent with United 
States policy at that time. In the opinion of John Quincy Adams, there 
were two reasons which could involve the United States in a war with 
Europe: "a maritime war resulting in the impressment of American sea-
men, or a war threatening the transfer of neighboring Spanish terri-
tory, like Cuba or Porto Rico." 30 
This possibility led Secretary of State Adams to apply the No-
Transfer Principle of 1811 to the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean in 
31 
the summer of 1823. The decision took into consideration the po-
sition of Spain and her colonies in the Caribbean and the peculiar cir-
cumstances of the existing crisis. As in 1811~ when the No-Transfer 
resolution had been passed by the Congress to protect American interests 
in Florida, its application to the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean 
became a matter of necessity for the United States as part of the na-
tion's foreign policy. The resolution emphasized the fact that the 
·United States could not witness without serious concern 
••• any part of the said territory pass into the hands of 
any foreign power; and that a due regard to their own 
safety compels them (the United States) to provide under 
certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of 
the said territory.32 
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This resolution had concerned Florida, but its application in the Car-
ibbean meant that United States armed forces might occupy "temporarily" 
Cuba or Puerto Rico for the strategic defense of the nation. 
The reasons for United States concern in the Caribbean were many. 
The war of 1812 had shown the military weaknesses of the nation and her 
inability to protect her southern flank and the recently acquired 
Louisiana territory. 33 Florida, purchased from Spain in 1819 and ac-
quired several years later, could not be properly defended from aggres-
sion of a foreign power which controlled the Caribbean. British or 
French domination of Cuba or Puerto Rico could also cut off connnunica-
tions between New Orleans and the Atlantic ports in the event of a con-
flict with either of these nations. 
Just as the security of New Orleans, Florida~ and the southern 
flank of the United States became a strategic necessity, United States 
commerce in the Caribbean demanded that Cuba and Puerto Rico remain 
free of foreign interference. American commerce "required that neither 
Britain nor France should establish herself in Havana harbor, virtually 
impragnable if properly fortified, and so situated that from it a first-
class sea power could command the commerce of the entire Caribbean re-
. 34 
g1on." 
As both Cuba and Puerto Rico had a large black population, their 
political independence could have affected the control of the slave 
population of the southern states and probably the stability of the 
97 
nation itself. The Missouri Compromise of 1819 had almost set the na-
tion afire. Representatives of the southern states had fought for their 
rights to expand slavery beyond the Mississippi~ while the representa-
tives of the free states wanted gradual emancipation of the slaves and 
a reduction of the institution of slavery. If Cuba and Puerto Rico had 
become independent during that critical time they would have freed the 
slaves 9 as their sister republics in South America had already done. 
The prospects of such a situation, so close to the United States 9 could 
have upset the precarious balance that had been achieved by the Mis-
souri Compromise. In addition, southern states would have lost their 
principal sources for slaves with whom they could extend the plantation 
economy. The slavery issue was so critical that President Monroe re~ 
fused to annex Texas because he feared that the acquisition of that 
great territory would only intensify sectional controversy over 
35 
slavery. 
The slave issue became of considerable importance during the Con-
gressional debates held in 1826 concerning the nomination of American 
representatives to the Congress of Panama. As this congress was sup~ 
porting the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico, the issue of slavery 
in the Caribbean became a matter of major concern for Southern legisla-
tors. During the debates 9 one of the principal defenders of the South-
ern point of view was Senator Thomas H. Benton of Missouri. Represent-
ing the pro-slavery interests of the Southern members of the Congress 9 
Benton justified their position by saying that the South could not "al-
low the principle of universal emancipation to be called into activity 




John Randolph, the senator from Virginia, supported the same po-
sition~ fearing "that the emancipation proclamations coming from the 
new republics would arouse and inflame the passions of the Southern 
slaves and eventually lead to slave revolts in the United States." 37 
Other congressional representatives also opposed the independence of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico because of the danger involved in the emancipa-
tion of the Caribbean's black slaves. As Senator Benton indicated: 
When we look to the situation of those islands, to the 
command position they occupy with reference to the com-
merce of the West Indies, we cannot be indifferent to 
a change in their condition. But when we reflect that 
they are in justaposition to a portion of the Union 
where slavery exists; that the proposed change is to be 
effected by a people whose fundamental maxim it is that 
he who would tolerate slavery is unworthy to be free; 
that the principle of universal emancipation must march 
in the van of the invading force; ••• they are swallowed 
up in the magnitude of the dangers with which we are 
menaced ••• with a due regard to the safety of the Southern 
states, can you suffer these islands to pass into the 
hands of buccaneers drunk with their new-born freedom? 
Cuba and Puerto Rico must remain as they are.38 
The Southern members of the Congress also viewed the independence 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico as a. threat to the institution of slavery and 
as a danger to the peace and security of the South. These individuals 
considered that the large black population in the Caribbean would create 
black republics similar to the one previously established in Haiti. 
These new republics, therefore, would be entitled to send black or mu-
latto ambassadors and consuls to the United States to "parade through 
our country and establish themselves in our cities." 39 This situation 
would have given the black slaves in the United States an example of 
the rights which awaited them, if they did likewise and revolted 
against their masters. This circumstance was intolerable to the citi-
zens of the South. 
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An independent Cuba would also have terminated the illegal African 
slave traffic, gravely reducing the necessary manpower for the South. 
Cuba had served as a staging area for the slave traffic of the South, 
but with independence and emancipation the trade would have ended en-
tirely. 
The American policy of expansionism which anticipated the annexa-
tion of Cuba intensified the United States determination to prevent the 
independence of the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean. Many American 
statesmen had expressed the desirability of taking Cuba; the island was 
indispensable to United States security, trade, and commerce. Puerto 
Rico probably would have followed in the wake of Cuba if that is land 
had been seized by the United States. 
As early as 1808, President Thomas Jefferson had expressed his de-
sire to take Cuba. In a letter to his successor, he foresaw no problem 
in acquiring Florida and Cuba, because Napoleon would "consent to our 
receiving Cuba into our Union to prevent our aid to Mexico and the 
. 40 
other prov1nces.'' Although J~fferson continued to discuss the pos-
sibility of acquiring Cuba and "even welcomed the idea of a war with 
Spain," since 9 as he informed Madison, "Cuba could be seized without 
much difficulty," the United States took no steps to acquire Cuba or 
41 
Puerto Rico before 1808. In the spring of that year, however, Jef-
ferson sent General James Wilkinson to Cuba to convince the Captain-
General to transfer Cuba to the United States. With the French invasion 
of the peninsula, there were no guarantees that Cuba could remain under 
Spanish tutelage. Wilkinson's mission was a failure because the Spanish 
42 
Captain-General refused to change his allegiance to the United States. 
United States intentions toward the Caribbean had been a matter of 
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great concern to Spain since 1789. In that year, the Conde de Aranda 
informed Charles III that he believed the United States would someday 
become a giant on the North American continent. Forgetting the help 
which European nations had provided her, the United States would seize 
Florida, the Caribbean, and even attempt to control the rest of the 
Spanish American empire. Spain could not have been able to prevent 
this because of her internal weaknesses and the proximity of the United 
. 43 
States to the Car1bbean. Concerning the same subject, Pedro de 
Quevedo, Bishop of Orense, declared in 1806 "that the United States 
44 
would create serious problems for Spain." Therefore, 
When James Wilkinson was sent on a special mission to 
Havana to foster sentiments in favor of annexation towards 
the American republic, the Spanish charge d'affairs, 
Valentin de Foronda, promptly informed the Minister of 
State that Wilkinson was under instructions to negotiate, 
'a reunion of the Kingdom of Mexico, and the Islands of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico under these United States.'45 
President James Madison continued Jefferson's policy toward the 
Spa~ish Caribbean. 
States "could not 
As early as 1810, he had indicated that the United 
46 
be a satisfied spectator" to the transfer of Cuba 
to any European government because she could be made a fulcrum "against 
47 
the commerce and security of the United States." In 1947 a National 
Congress of Cuban historians held in La Habana declared that Madison's 
policy toward Cuba became the official position of the United States 
government thereafter: "From then on, and continually, Yankee policy 
in respect to Cuba was support for the continuation of Spanish sover-
eignty while it could not be convenient for the island to be part of 
. . 48 
the North Amer1can Un1on." 
In 1810, Madison appointed William Shaler as consul to Cuba to ad-
vance the government's policy of annexation through the organization of 
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a conspiracy runong creole planters. Shaler, one of the earliest 
American advocates of expansionism, informed the Cubans that the United 
States would favor the annexation of the Spanish colony if they re-
volted against Spain. While some Cuban creoles sympathized with this 
plan, nothing came of the conspiracy. As a result of his activities in 
Cuba Shaler was arrested in November, 1811~ by the Spanish authorities, 
and ordered to leave Cuba. 
Before departing~ Shaler notified Someruelos that the 
United States was satisfied with a continuation of the 
existing status of Cuba, that is, as a possession of. 
Spain; that it would never allow the island to pass into 
the hands of another power, and that the Spanish of-
ficials should appeal to the government of the United 
States for aid and protection whenever such a danger 
approached. 50 
Shaler's declaration illustrates United States policy toward the 
Spanish Caribbean during this time. While Shaler did not mention 
Puerto Rico, it can be assumed that the policy also applied to this is-
land because the foreign relations of the United States concerned Amer-
ican hegemony in all of the Caribbean. As J. Fred Rippy has written, 
The policy of the United States with respect to the region 
of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea can be defined 
with greater precision than its policy with reference to 
any other region. This is possible because of the Gulf-
Caribbean Area which is the most vital zone in the defense 
strategy of the United States •••• The maxim is the domina-
tion of the area at least to the extent deemed necessary 
to prevent its domination by any other first rate power 
•••• No statesmen have ever baldly formulated the maxim. 
Perhaps that would have been undiplomatic. But one may 
assert with confidence that the policy which the maxim 
describes began to take form before 1800. At first it 
embraced the lands bordering on the Gulf, but gradually 
it was extended to the whole of the Gulf-Caribbean Area. 51 
During Jrunes Monroe's administration, the Secretary of State John 
Quincy Adams, whose intentions concerning Cuba were well-known, pursued 
the same course of action which Jefferson and Madison had taken. 
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According to Samuel F. Bemis, the focus of attention had now shifted 
52 
from the Great Lakes and the Northwest to the Caribbean. As a re-
sult of the acquisition of Florida, the Spanish possessions became as 
essential to the protection of Florida as previously Florida had been 
. . 53 
to the safety of Lou~s~ana. The United States defense system in the 
southeast, the integrity of both Florida and Louisiana, and the security 
of the westward-advancing Continental Repub lie now depended on the con-
54 
trol of the Spanish Caribbean. "There is nothing I so much desire," 
said Governor Clairborne of Louisiana on December 10, 1810, 
••• as to see the flag of my Country reared on the Moro 
(sic) castle. Cuba is the real mouth of the Mississippi, 
and the nation possessing it, can at any time command 
the trade of the Western States. Give us Cuba and the 
American Union is placed beyond the reach of change.55 
John Quincy Adams expressed similar views about Cuba on April 28, 
1823, in a letter to the United States minister in Spain: 
Cuba~ almost in sight of our shores~ from a multitude 
of considerations, has become an object of transcendent 
importance to the commercial and political interests of 
our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the 
Gulf of Mexico and the West India seas; the character of 
its population; its situation midway between our southern 
coast and the island of St. Domingo; its safe and capa-
cious harbor of the Havana, fronting a long line of our 
shores destitute of the same advantage; the nature of its 
productions and of its wants~ furnishing the supplies and 
needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable 
and mutually beneficial,--give it an importance in the 
sum of our national interests with which that of no other 
foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to 
that which binds the different members of the Union to-
gether. Such, indeed, are between the interests of that 
island and of this country, the geographical commercial, 
moral, and political relations, formed by nature, gather-
ing, in the process of time, and even now verging to ma-
turity, that, in looking forward to the probable course of 
events~ for the short period of a half a century, it is 
scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annex-
ation of Cuba to our federal republic will be indispensable 
to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. It 
is obvious, however~ that for this event we are not yet 
prepared •••• There are laws of political~ as well as of 
physical gravitation;--Secretary Adams continue--and if 
an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, 
cannot choose but to fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly 
disjointed from its own unnatural connection with Spain, 
and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards 
the North American Union, which, by the same law of na-
ture, cannot cast off its bosom. 56 
103 
While the United States had desired Cuba, she was not yet ready to 
pay the high price of ownership--most probably a war with England or 
France. On September 27, 1822, after a cabinet meeting during which 
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun had expressed "an ardent desire that 
the island of Cuba should become a part of the United States," Secre-
tary Adams wrote in his diary that the United States was not prepared 
for war at that time. As a result, the "nation's object must be to gain 
time." Adams also cormnented that 
••• as to taking Cuba at the cost of a war with Great Britain, 
it would be well to enquire, before undertaking such war, 
how it would be likely to terminate •••• I held it for certain 
that a war with Great Britain for Cuba would result in her 
possession of that island •••• In the present relative situa-
tion of our maritime forces, we could not maintain a war 
against Great Britain for Cuba. 57 
Adams 1 concern for Cuba and the Spanish Caribbean was the result 
of an early demonstration of "Manifest Destiny." On November 16, 1819, 
Adams had told his colleagues in the cabinet that the rumors about Amer-
ican expansionism which had been circulating in Europe were true. He 
continued that: 
••• nothing that we can say or do would remove this impres-
sion until the world shall be familiarized with the idea 
of considering our proper dominion to be the continent of 
North America ••• Spain has possessions upon our southern 
and Great Britain upon our northern borders. It is im-
possible that centuries shall elapse without finding them 
annexed to the United States; not that any spirit of en- 58 
croachment or ambition on our part renders it necessary •••• 
With the Spanish colonies of Cuba and Puerto in mind, Adams went on to 
say that: 
••• it is a physical, moral, and political absurdity that 
such fragments of territory, with sovereigns at fifteen 
hundred miles beyond the sea, worthless and burdensome 
to their owners, should exist permanently contiguous to 
a great powerful and rapidly growing nation. Most of the 
Spanish territory which had been in our neighborhood has 
already become our own •••• This renders it still more un-
avoidable that the remainder of the continent should ul-
timately be ours. But it is very lately that we have 
distinctly seen this ourselves; very lately that we have 
avowed the pretention of extending to the South Sea; and 
until Europe shall find it a settle geographical element 
that the United States and North America are identical, 
any effort on our part to reason the world out of a be-
lief that we are ambitious will have no other effect than 
to convince them that we add to our ambition hypocrisy.59 
As Adams indicated, this was an explicit policy of expansionism di-
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rected toward the annexation of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The only things 
that prevented this nascent imperialism from accomplishing its goals 
were the military weaknesses of the United States and the threat of war 
with either England or France for the possession and control of the 
Caribbean. 
While the United States was interested in maintaining a sphere of 
influence in the Caribbean because of national defense needs, protection 
of trade~ and the continuation of slavery, England and France had other 
objectives. The British government did not want to see the Spanish co-
lonies in the Caribbean transferred to France or the United States any 
more than the United States cared to have them transferred to Great 
B . . F 60 r1ta1n or ranee. England believed that American possession of Cuba 
would jeopardize the Jamaica trade and ruin Britain's position and 
61 
interests in the whole Caribbean. George Canning, the British Foreign 
Secretary, was very specific about the policy of his government on this 
matter. On November 15, 1822, he wrote: 
It may be questioned whether any blow that could be 
struck by any foreign power in any part of the world 
would have a more sensible effect on the interests of 
this country and on the reputation of its government.62 
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Canning had feared that the United States wanted to extend her control 
in the Caribbean~ and so informed his cousin, the English ambassador in 
,Washington, in October, 1822. 63 
France~ like England, also had important interests in the Carib-
bean region. With the loss of Haiti, her only footholds in the area 
were the islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. Since France wanted to 
reestablish part of her once glorious empire, she looked with great 
interest upon the fate of Cuba and Puerto Rico. The acquisition of 
these islands would have given France a strong position in the Carib-
bean and control of the commerce between Europe and the emerging Spanish 
American republics. 
The United States~ England, and France~ therefore~ were suspicious 
of each other's intentions in the,Caribbean. It was clear~ however~ 
that none of them could take possession of the Spanish American colonies 
without inflicting serious damage upon the other's interests. Posses-
sion of these islands would have given a definite advantage in the Ca-
ribbean to the controlling power, because of their proximity to the 
routes across the Isthmus of Panama. The conditions of these islands 
were of such importance to the contending powers that ''their subordi-
nates were constantly reporting to each of them the supposed designs of 
64 
the others •11 During this occasion, Niles' Weekly Register~ quoting 
the London Courier, declared: 
Cuba is the Turkey of transatlantic politics~ totering to 
its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggles of 
those who contend for the right of catching her in her 
descent.65 
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During the years between 1822 and 1825, the three powers increased 
their naval forces in the Caribbean. Spain sent troops to protect the 
islands against possible invasions by the European powers or the United 
States. The risk of an actual confrontation became more pronounced in 
1823 and 1824. On April 29, 1823, as a result of the international 
tension in the Caribbean, Secretary Adams instructed the United States 
agent in Cuba to observe the course of events in that island and to in-
form the government of "any apparent popular agitation; particularly of 
such as may have reference either to a transfer of the Island from Spain 
66 
to any other power." Joel Roberts Poinsett 9 an agent of the United 
States 9 had visited Puerto Rico six months before, apparently with the 
67 
same purpose. All American naval commanders in the Caribbean were in-
structed to be on the alert for any activities of the English or French 
naval squadrons in the area. On February 17, 1823, Charles J. Inger-
soll, the United States District Attorney for Pennsylvania, stated that 
Clay says that Canning told him the day before yesterday, 
as I also heard Mr. Adams state publicly, that England 
had no views on Cuba. Clay told him distinctly that we 
would fight for it should they attempt the possession, 
which sentiment I find more general than I supposed. Mr. 
Baylies 9 of Massachusetts 9 a Federalist, is for it as he 
said this afternoon. The idea given out is that any 
British force going there is to protect it from the French 
who might try to take it.68 
In December 9 1822, British sailors landed in Cuba temporarily. 
This action created a flurry of activity in Washington. These activi-
ties did not stop until Canning informed several governments, including 
the United States, that the landing had been made to suppress piracy and 
that England had no aggressive designs. Canning suggested 9 however, 
that "if the United States meant to annex Cuba, ••• we might have to an-
nex Porto Rico to preserve the balance of power in the Caribbean."69 
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Commencing in August~ 1823, Canning approached the United States 
concerning the possible future disposition of the independent Spanish 
American colonies~ the balance of power in the Caribbean, and the threat 
of the Holy Alliance in Europe. Since a major American concern during 
this time was that other European nations might intervene in this hem-
isphere to restore Spanish colonial rule, the United States began dis-
cussions with England concerning the feasibility of a joint declaration 
against that purpose. The major result of this discussion was the 
proclamation of the Monroe Doctrine in December, 1823. Noncolonization 
and noninterference became the two major objectives of the declaration. 
The Monroe Doctrine reflects a fear of the Holy Alliance and its despo-
tism. More importantly, however, it was a result of the struggle for 
supremacy in the Caribbean and "an attempt on the part of British and 
American traders to- gain a large share of the economic advantages to be 
gained from the independence of Latin America. 1170 
According to Thomas H. Reynolds, subsequent events have proven that 
the Monroe Doctrine was promulgated to serve specifically the pecular 
interests of the United States in the Caribbean and those interests of 
Hispanic America when the latter do not contradict the 
peculiar inclinations of North America. But, from the 
moment in which appear any incompatibility between the 
interests of South America (as a general principle} and 
those of North America (as political entity}, the second 
takes precedence over the first. 71 
The Monroe Doctrine, however~ did not resolve the international problem 
in the Caribbean. In 1825 the United States again became alarmed by 
France's designs toward the Spanish colonies. In August, 1825, Canning 
approached the United States with a new proposal to ease the tensions 
between the three maritime powers. As the United States and England had 
reached an understanding concerning the balance of power in the 
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Caribbean and both nations had disclaimed any intentions of aggressive 
designs against Cuba and Puerto Rico~ he suggested a Tripartite Agree-
ment with respect to Cuba. 
This arrangement however was coldly regarded by the United 
States~ not because they desired annexations but because 
it would again have negatived all chances of incorporating 
Cuba in the Union. 72 
France also declined the offer because she had important commitments 
to the Holy Alliance in Europe. 
In 1825 an impasse developed concerning the Caribbean. The United 
States could not take Cuba without going to war with the European 
powers; England and France were similarly restrained because it would 
have led to a conflict with the United States or a war among them-
selves. To resolve the existing situation to the satisfaction of all 
interested parties~ England and France accepted the United States rec-
ommendations for the maintance of the status guo in the Caribbean. To 
maintain Cuba and Puerto Rico under the continued control of Spain, 
thenJ became the major goal of American policy in the Caribbean. To 
achieve this purpose, United States opposed not only non-Spanish 
foreign control of Cuba and Puerto Rico but also the independence of 
these Spanish colonies as well. As a result of this policy, the Span-
ish colonies in the Caribbean could not proclaim their independence in 
the second decade· of the nineteenth century when local conditions, 
created by the instability of the peninsular government and the chaos 
which resulted during the wars of independence in Spanish America, 
were most favorable for accomplishing that goal. 
FOOTNOTES 
1Arturo Morales-Carridn, Puerto Rico and the Non-Hispanic Carib-
bean - A Study in the Decline of Spanish Exclusivism (Rio Piedras~ 
Puerto Rico: University of Puerto Rico Press~ 1974), pp. 118-132. 
Zwhitaker, p. 8. 
3For a detailed analysis of American trade during this period see 
Santana, PP• 1-110. 
4 . 2. Wh1taker, P• 
5Ibid., P• 8. 
6Ibid. ~ P• 14. 
7 
Ibid.t p. 16. 
8 . Amer1can State Papers, Commerce and Navigation, Vol. I, pp. 417, 
431, 432, 439, 453, 462, 469, 477, 519~ 671~ 675, and 681. 
9 
Thomas G. Mathews 9 "Puerto Rico~" Encyclopedia Britannica ( 1972) 9 
Vol. XVIII~ p. 851. 
10 
William Dinwiddie~ Puerto Rico: Its Conditions and Possibilities 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1899)~ p. 101. Dinwiddie 
wrote this book about a year after the occupation of Puerto Rico by the 
United States with the object of informing the American industrialists 
and manufacturers of "the possibilities 11 that existed in the Island for 
trade and commercial exploitation. 
11 
Annals of Congress 9 lOth Gong.~ 2d Sess.~ pp. 21-33; 134-135; 
184-185, 1217-1219; Whitaker, p. 50. 
12 . 
Amer1.can State Papers 2 Commerce and Navigation, Vol. I, pp. 815-
816; 851-857. See also Santana, pp. 65-67. 
13 . , 
Morales-Carn.on, p. 142. 
14 
See pp. 48-49, this thesis. 
15 ./ . Morales-Carr1on, p. 122; Bem1s, Diplomatic History~ p. 196. See 
also Roy F. Nichols, "Trade Relations and the Establishment of the 
United States Consulates in Spanish-America, 1779-1809," The Hispanic 
American Historical Review, XIII (August~ 1933) 9 pp. 289-313. 
109 
16James Morton Callahan, "Cuba and Anglo-American Relations," 
American Historical Association Annual Report, 1897; u. s. Congress, 
House, 55th Gong., 2d Sess., Doc. 577, 1898. 
17 
As quoted in Niles 1 Weekly Register, December 6, 1819. 
18 
Callahan, p. 196. 
110 
19John H. Latanl, "The Diplomacy of the United States in Regard to 
Cuba," American Historical Association Annual Report, 1897; U. S. Con-
gress, House, 55th Gong., 2d Sess., Doc. 577, 1898. 
20 
Chadwick, PP• 219-220. 
2 ~orthington C. Ford, ed., Writings of John Quincy Adams, Vol. 
VII (New York: McMillan & Co., 1917), PP• 371-372. 
22 . 
Bem1s, Diplomatic History, p. 372. 
23Ms., Department of State, Instructions to United States Minis-
ters, Vol. IX, p. 158, quoted in Reuben J. Clark, Memorandum on the 
~oe Doctrine (Washington: Publication No. 37, Department of State, 




John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law, Vol. VI, u.s. 
Congress, House, 56th Gong., 2d Sess., Doc. 551, 1906. 
26 
See note 21, above. 
27 
John H. Latan.l, The Diplomatic Relations of the United States 
and Spanish America (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1900), p. 91. 
28 
Adams, Memoirs, p. 71. 
29Ibid. 
30Bemis, p. 372. 
31Ibid. 
32 
John A. Logan, Jr., No Transfer: An American Security Principle 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), P• 119. 
33 . . Dur1ng the War of 1812 the super1or sea power of Great Britain 
controlled the access to the Gulf of Mlxico and blockaded New Orleans 
for more than two years. It was not until the Treaty of Ghent had been 
signed that General Jackson's frontiersmen were able to repulse Paken-
ham's regulars from New Orleans. 
34 
Logan, p. 140. 
35 
James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, May, 1820, s. M. Hamilton, 
ed., The Writings of James Monroe (New York: 1898-1903), Vol. VI, p. 
119. 
36u. s. Congress, Register of Debates in Congress, 19th Cong., 
lll 
1st Sess., Vol. II, part I (1825-1826), pp. 289-292. See also pp. 152-
234 (Pan American Congress Debates). 
37 
Gene Mitchell Kelly, "United States Congressional Opposition to 
the Panama Congress of 182611 (Unpublished Master 1 s Thesis, Department 
of History, Oklahoma State Universi'ty, 1975), p. 44. 
38 
Register of Debates, pp. 289-292. 
39 
Thomas Hart Benton, Thirty Years' View, 1820-1850, Vol. I (New 
York: Appleton and Co., 1893), p. 69. 
40 . Chadw1ck, p. 216. 
41 
Foner, Vol. I, p. 125. 
42 
Issac J. Cox, "The Pan American Policy of Jefferson and Wilkin-
son," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. I ( 1914), pp. 222-223. 
43 
Charles Edward Chapman, Colonial Hispanic America (New York: 
1933), pp. 20-21. 
44 
Monclova, p. 171. 
45 
Morales-C arri&n, pp. 122-123. 
46James Madison to William Pinckey, October 30, 1810, Gaillard 




~ - I I Reprinted in Antonio Nunez Jimenez, La liberaci6n de las Islas 
(La Habana, 1959), p. 458, and in Foner, Vol. I, p. 127. 
49Roy F. Nichols, ''William Shaler, New England Apostle of Liberty," 
New England Quarterly, Vol. IX (1933), pp. 76-77. 
50 
Foner, Vol. I, p. 128. 
51 
See introduction to Ludwell Lee Montague, Haiti and the United 
States, 1714-1938 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1940), p. 1. 




55L • . •- I 1 • • h b h Ul.S Mar1.no Perez~ "Re at1.ons Wl.t Cu a," Sout ern History Asso-
ciation Publications, Vol. X (1906), pp. 203-214. 
56 u. S. Congress, House, 32nd Gong., 1st Sess., Doc. 121, pp. 6-7, 
1851-1852. 
57 




Ibid., Vol. IV, pp. 438-439. 
60 c. K. Webster, ed., Britain and the Independence of Latin Ameri-
ca, 1812-1830 (New York~ Octagon Books, 1970), Vol. II, pp. 393-394; 
Bemis, p. 373. 
61 Ibid. 
62 
Canning Memorandum for the Cabinet, November 15, 1822, Doc, 540 
(F.O. 72(266), in Webster, Vol. II, pp. 393-394. 
63 
Harold W. V. Temper ley, "The Later Latin-American Policy of 
George Canning," American Historical Review~ Vol. XI (1906) 9 p. 789. 
64 
Webster, Vol. II, p. 35. 
65 
Niles 1 Weekly Register, August 6, 1825. 
66 
Clark, Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine, p. 84. 
67 
See Poinsett, Notes on Mexico~ pp. 3-9. 
68 
From the Diary of Mr. Charles Jared Ingerso 11, Monday night, 
February 17, 1823, quoted in Moore, p. 380, 
69 
Harold W. Vo Temperley, The Foreign Policy of Canning? 1822-27 
(Hamden: Archon Books, 1966), p. 169. 
70 
Thomas H. Reynolds, Economic' Aspects of the Monroe Doctrine 
(Nashville: George Peabody College for Teachers, 1938) 9 p. 17. 
71Ibid, 
74remperley, Foreign Policy, p. 171. 
CHAPTER VI 
UNITED STATES~ THE EUROPEAN POWERS, AND THE 
STATUS QUO IN THE CARIBBEAN 
To accomplish her principal foreign policy objectives in the Carib-
bean and her national interests~ the United States resolved to enforce 
the status quo in Cuba and Puerto Rico. The United States could not 
permit non-Spanish domination of the Caribbean or the independence of 
Cuba and Puerto Rico to threaten, the security and commercial advantages 
of her people. The maintenance of the status quo, therefore, became a 
satisfactory answer to the Caribbean problem until measures could be 
taken to prevent the transfer of the Spanish colonies to another Euro-
pean power or until acceptable ways were found for their incorporation 
as territories of the United States. 
These plans were threatened, however, by the sudden intervention 
of Mexico and Colombia in the political affairs of the Caribbean. Since 
1824, Cuban and Puerto Rican revolutionaries had asked Simdn B~l!var and 
the Mexican revolutionaries to intervene in the islands to secure their 
independence, as they could not do it themselves as a result of their 
isolation and the military measures of the insular Spanish governors. 
For the separatists, it was clear that the only way to accomplish their 
goals was an invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico by the combined forces of 
Mexico and Colombia, assisted by the revolutionary forces on the is-
lands. Clearly, a military operation of this magnitude would have ended 
113-
114 
Spanish rule in the Caribbean. At the same time Colombia and MJxico 
would have emancipated the slaves, because both nations and the separa-
tists favored the end of slavery after independence. The United States 
would not tolerate this situation because it was contrary to her ob-
jectives in the Caribbean. 
To prevent such action, the United States informed Mlxico and 
Colombia that their plans contradicted United States' policy and would 
upset the status quo and the peace and security of the Caribbean. The 
United States also attempted to convince Spain that, unless she ended 
the Spanish American conflict and recognized the independence of the new 
republics, she was in danger of losing her possessions in the Ca.ribbean. 
This move would also influence MJxico and Colombia because these na-
tions desired to end the hostilities on the mainland. United States 
foreign policy, therefore, employed the strategy of a,ttempting "to con-
vince Spain that only by making peace with its revolted colonies and 
recognizing their independence could she keep Cuba and Puerto Rico. 111 
By securing peace in the Western Hemisphere, the United States could 
prevent the republics from attacking the Caribbean colonies, an event 
which would have disturbed the status guo in that area. Clay, recog-
nizing this problem very early, stat·ed that 
••• in respect to Cuba and Puerto Rico, there can be little 
doubt, if the war were once ended, that they would be safe 
in the possession of Spain. They would, at least, be se-
cured from foreign attacks and all ideas of Independence 
which the inhabitants may entertain, would cease with the 
cessation of the state of war which had excited them.2 
On April 27, 1825, Alexander Everett, the United States Minister 
to Spain, was instructed to approach the government of Ferdinand VII in 
the most conciliatory manner on this matter and express at the same time 
the views of the United States concerning the hostilities between Spain 
and the Spanish American republics. The Secretary of State wrote to 
the American minister that 
••• the war upon the continent is, in fact, at an end. Not 
a solitary foot of land from the western limit of the 
United States to Cape Horn owns her sway •••• It should be 
borne in mind, however, that the armies of the new States, 
flushed with victory, have no longer employment on the 
continent •••• To what object,~~ then, will the new republics 
direct their powerful and victorious armies? ••• From the 
proximity and great value of Cuba and Porto Rico, is it 
not anticipated that they will aim, and aim a successful 
blow too, at those Spanish islands? It is not, then, for 
the new Republics that the President wishes you to urge 
upon Spain the expediency of concluding the war •••• And, 
as the views and policy of the United States in regard to 
those islands may possibly have some influence, you are 
authorized frankly and fully to disclose them. The United 
States are satisfied with the present conditions of those 
islands, in the hands of Spain, and with the ports open to 
our commerce, as they are now open. This government de-
sires no political change of that condition.} 
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Since "political change" included independence, it be said that op-
position to the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico was part of the 
policy of the United States. The evidence to support this assertion 
appears in the many statements of official policy made during this 
time. To Everett, the Secretary of State wrote on April 27, 1825: 
"This Government desires no political changes (in Cuba and Puerto Rico). 
The population itself of the islands is incompetent at present, from 
its composition and its amount, te maintain self-government." To Henry 
Middleton, United States Minister to Russia, Clay stated on May 10, 
1825, that the United States "desired for themselves no political 
5 
change in them," adding subsequently, "if Cuba were to declare itself 
independent, the amount and the character of its population render it 
improbable that it could maintain its independence." 6 Middleton in-
formed the Russian Government on July 2, 1825, that while the 
United States have seen with satisfaction the efforts of the 
nations of the American continent to withdraw themselves 
from the yoke of Spanish domination, it was not so with re-
gard to the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico. The character 
of the population of these islands render extremely prob-
lematical their capacity to maintain independence. A pre-
mature declaration would probably result only in the af-
flicting repetition of the disastrous scenes of St. 
Domingo.? 
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These opinions were not merely limited to the Secretary of State 
or to the ministers of the United States. Statesmen, private citizens, 
naval officers, and even the President of the United States held similar 
views. Cuban scholars have long contended that United States opposition 
frustrated the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 8 The National Con-
gress of Cuban Historians which met in 1947 in Havana declared that 
"this Yankee opposition was the primary reason for which there was not 
reached in the Congress of Panama a clear agreement on the independence 
. 9 
of Cuba and Puerto R1.co. 11 
A continuation of Spanish rule in the Caribbean fit perfectly the 
policy of the United States toward Cuba and Puerto Rico. The United 
States constant apprehension concerning the transfer of these colonies 
to a government less friendly than Spain could have been lessened if 
they remained dependent upon the Mother Country. Spain, however, did 
not believe that the United States intended to protect Spanish interests 
in the Caribbean but rather planned to annex Cuba and Puerto Rico at a 
later date. For Spain, the United States desire to keep the Caribbean 
colonies in the hands of the Mother Country was the result of the con-
flict with France and England over trade and commercial privileges in 
the area. Spain, therefore, tried to improve her situation by strength-
ening herself in Spanish America. 
As a result, she refused to accept the recommendations of the 
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United States minister. 
I 
The reply of Francisco de Zea Bermudez, the 
Spanish First Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was categorical: 
His Majesty at no time thought of ceding to any power the 
islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, and, so far from such a 
purpose, is firmly.determined to keep them under the 
dominion and authority of his legitimate sovereignty.lO 
The Spanish Secretary added that 
His Majesty deeply appreciated the feelings expressed 
by the American Minister, but if the United States was 
truly concerned over Cuba remaining under Spain, it 
should guarantee its ownership by the Madrid Govern-
ment .11 
On September 25, and again on October 20, 1825, the Spanish government 
reemphasized this view. Everett informed the Secretary of State that 
Zea BermJdes had explicitly told him that 
••• the Government of the United States placed him (Zea) 
under the necessity of declaring, in the most positive 
manner, the King's unalterable resolution never to 
abandon his rights, and to reject all offers of media-
tion, or of amicable intervention which should contem-
plate on acknowledgment of the independence of the new 
States.l 2 
Spain wanted the United States to guarantee her ownership of Cuba and 
Puerto Rico. The United States refused to provide any guarantees be-
cause she had not abandoned her own plans of annexation; she had only 
postponed them temporarily. The result was Spain's refusal to acknow-
ledge the independence of the Spanish American republics, an important 
factor in United States plans for maintaining the status quo in the 
Caribbean. 
To convince Spain of the necessity of terminating the conflict in 
America, the United States appealed to Russia, France and England. 
"True wisdom," wrote Clay to his foreign emissaries, 
••• dictates that Spain, without indulging in unavailing 
regrets on account of what she had irretrievably lost, 
should employ the means of retaining what she may let 
preserve from the wreck of her former possessions. 3 
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The Secretary of State sent letters to the ministers of Russia, 
France, and England, asking them to exercise their influence to con-
vince the Spanish government to recognize the Spanish American re-
publics and terminate the conflict. These letters emphasized that 
Spain would benefit by a recognition of her defeat 9 since continued at-
tempts to regain her empire would only result in the additional losses 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico. At the same time, the United States reempha-
sized to France and England the need of maintaining the status guo in 
the Caribbean. Clay believed that if M'xico or Colombia intervened in 
the affairs of the Caribbean, England or France would join the conflict 
to protect their interests. This would have meant "that in the main-
tenance of the Monroe Doctrine it would have been necessary to defend 
Spain's possession of those islands and therefore to incur the enmity 
14 
of the Latin American republics" and possibly France or England. On 
May 13, 1825~ Clay wrote to the United States Minister in France asking 
him to "open the matter to the French government, in the hope that 
15 
they [would] cooperate in the great object." 
Even Prince Metternich was concerned with the international prob-
lem in the Caribbean. To the Spanish Foreign Minister he recommended 
that Ferdinand VII endeavor "by the adoption of a mild and conciliatory 
system, and even, if necessary, by concessions and sacrifices," to pre-
vent the extension of the Caribbean problem by inducing the insurgents 
16 
of Mexico and Colombia to desist in their intentions." 
England supported the United States recommendations because she 
wanted to continue her friendship with the United States and feared 
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that the Spanish American republics might extend their operations to 
the British possessions in the West Indies after invading Cuba and 
17 
Puerto Rico. As a result of this belief, and to ease the tensions in 
the Caribbean, she also accepted the status quo for Cuba and Puerto 
Rico. Canning, supporting the American position, informed Viscount 
Leveson-Gower Granville, the French Foreign Minister, that England had 
no interest in Cuba and Puerto Rico. He also indicated that England 
would not support the independence of these islands "by receiving any 
overture which might be made from any party in those colonies desirous 
. 18 
of throwing off the dominion of Spa1.n." Canning, however, indicated 
further that he supported the continuing attachment of those islands to 
the Mother Country for the sake of Spain herself and the general peace 
of the world. 
France also accepted the views of the United States concerning the 
status guo in the Caribbean. On January 10, 1825, James Brown, the 
United States Minister to France, informed the Secretary of State that 
the French government "appeared to concur entirely in the view which I 
19 
took of the subject." France, however, was more concerned with the 
British view than with the United States position. During the summer 
of 1825, a large French fleet had visited the Caribbean prompting much 
speculation about the French government's intentions. The United 
States protested immediately to France, insisting that the United 
States already had an American squadron for the suppression of piracy 
and other beneficial service for all nations in the Caribbean; another 
20 
fleet was not needed. On October 25, 1825, the United States also 
informed the French government that "we could not consent to the occupa-
tion of those islands by any other European power than Spain under any 
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. . 21 
contingency whatever." 
All three powers were jealous or suspicious of one another. Eng-
land distrusted France perhaps more than she distrusted the United 
States. The French squadron's visit to the West Indies had consider-
ably excited the British government and drawn protests from Canning. 
He became very angry and at once demanded an explanation from the French 
government. The Baron de Damas, the French Foreign Minister, replied 
that the Governor of Martinique had been the official responsible. He 
had ordered the French squadron to convoy Spanish troop transports to 
22 
the Caribbean. 
The Governor of Martinique had been authorized~ should the oc-
casion arise, to intervene with French military forces in Cuba and 
Puerto Rico to protect the interests of Spain against the separatists 
-of these islands. 23 England believed that the French intentions in the 
. 24 
Caribbean were a direct violation of the Polignac Memorandum and 
Chateaubriand's pledge in November, 1823, that France would not inter-
fere with any revolution in the Spanish American colonies. 
The concern of the United States as to the designs of France were 
as equally emphatic as those of England. According to Harold W. V. 
Temperley, Adams "was not the man patiently to suffer this, and he pre-
25 
pared vigorously to resist, in case of a French attack on Cuba." The 
United States and England began negotiations on the subject of French 
interference in the Caribbean. The result of these discussions was the 
26 
recommendation of a Tripartite Agreement. The United States also in-
voked the aid of Russia, assuming that the Tzar, as leader of the Holy 
Alliance, would exercise a strong influence in the affair. 
Ru~sia also accepted the United States policy concerning the status 
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quo in the Caribbean. On May 10, 1825, Henry Clay instructed the 
United States minister in Russia to influence the Tsar Alexander I to 
induce Spain to end the hostilities in Spanish America and recognize the 
independence of her colonies. The Russian monarch accepted the sug-
gestion and instructed his envoy in Madrid "to direct the attention of 
the government of Spain to the fact that a significant change had taken 
27 
place in Spanish America; one which required an accommodation by the 
government of Ferdinand VII. 
Russia's concern was not the danger involved in an attack from 
Me'xico and Colombia but rather the use of force by the United States to 
impose a military solution to a political problem. As a result, Count 
Nesselrode wrote to the Russian Minister in the United States that "Mr. 
Adams had declared··that if the is lands of Cuba and Puerto Rico were en-
dangered to the extreme of affecting American power, the United States 
. 28 
would be forced to establish her author1ty there." 
By involving Russia in the political affairs of the Caribbean, how-
ever, the United States had committed a serious blunder. Canning called 
29 
this action "a desperate move." Russia, according to Canning, was in-
alterable in her views concerning republicanism; as a result, she could 
not have given serious consideration to the plight of the United 
States. "The United States," wrote Canning, "are grievously mistaken if 
they imagine that the Emperor of Russia is upon this, so far as to be 
induced to use the influence which he possesses.1130 
Russia could not have taken any steps without a previous under-
standing with her allies. For that reason she did not approach Spain 
with the vigor that the United States expected. "All that the Emperor 
desires, as a friend of the King of Spain," informed the Russian 
government, "is that this issue should be discussed in his councils 
with the care and the impartiality that it deserves. 1131 
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The involvement of Russia hardened the Spanish determination to 
continue the struggle in Spanish America. This action was contrary to · 
the original purpose of the United States. The Spanish government, 
which was seeking a respite to relieve the pressure of England, France, 
and the United States, saw in the Russian intervention a way to avoid 
·making a decision. Frederick Lamb, the British Minister in Spain, in-
formed Canning on February 25, 1826, that the Spanish Foreign Minister 
••• has constantly stated that, the Government of the United 
States, being better acquainted with American affairs than 
any other, and having applied to Russia for her interven-
tion rather than to any other Power, it is impossible for 
Spain to act without consulting her in the question.32 
The failure of American diplomacy in Europe was not entirely detri-
mental to United States interests. On August 20, 1825, Count Nesselrode 
submitted a note to the United States government expressing his appre-
ciation for the generous solicitude of that nation for the rights of 
Spain in her islands in the West Indies. In that note, Nesselrode also 
commented that Russia wanted the United States "to use their influence 
to disconcert every enterprise against the islands of Cuba and Porto 
. 33 R1co. 11 The United States hastened to comply with the wishes of the 
Russian government. As a consequence, Secretary of State Clay, by the 
expressed order of the President, addressed to the ministers of Colombia 
and Me'xico residing in Washington, official letters recommending a sus-
34 
pension of every hostile action against Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
For the United States, then, either Cuba or Puerto Rico must con-
tinue under the colonial control of Spain or, in the event of the termi-
nation of Spanish sovereignty, under the control of the United States. 
In his instructions to Joel R. Poinsett, United States Minister to 
Mexico, Secretary of State Clay ·expressed these views very clearly: 
Although the United States has no desire to acquire Cuba 
yet, if that island must be attached to any American 
state, the law of its position demands that it be at-
tached to us. Any effort of Mlxico or Colombia to seize 
it would be regarded with apprehension, and attempts at 
domination by European powers would be a just cause of 
alarm.35 
123 
This policy resulted from the vital importance of Cuba and Puerto Rico 
to the security of the United States and to the protection of the com-
mercial hegemony in the Caribbean. It had begun to take shape since 
1810 and, in accordance with historian Ludwell Lee Montague, it "accords 
with a maxim almost as unchanging as a law of mathematics or physics. 
That maxim is the domination of the area at least to the extent deemed 
36 
necessary to prevent its domination by any other first rate power." 
It is interesting to note that the United States government, "which 
had rejected the idea of European interference in New World affairs in 
37 
Monroe's famous utterance," now appealed to England, Russia, and 
France, Old World powers, "to employ their moral and diplomatic efforts 
38 
to maintain the status guo" in the Caribbean. By inviting the inter-
ference of the European Powers in the political affairs of the Caribbean, 
the United States had violated its own "noninterference" principle 
enunciated in the Monroe Doctrine. Despite this doctrine, the United 
States wanted the European powers "to become involved in a movement to 
prevent the independence of an American area. The Adams-Clay policy 
was nothing less than a call for European aid to keep M~xico and Colom-
39 
bia from aiding Cuba and Puerto Rico to achieve independence." 
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CHAPTER VII 
BOLIVAR .AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF 
CUBA AND PUERTO RICO 
In December, 1824, the revolutionary forces of Marshall Antonio 
Josl de Sucre decisively defeated the Royalists at the battle of Aya-
cucho, ending for all practical purposes over three hundred years of 
1 
Spanish imperialism in America. In 1822 the United States had of-
ficially recognized the independence of Chile, Argentina, Peru, Colom-
' 2 bia, and Mexico. In 1825 Great Britain also recognized the new nations. 
The independence of Spanish America became an accomplished fact; onl'Y 
Cuba and Puerto Rico remained under Spanish control. 
As we have seen, revolutionary forces had been active in the Carib-
bean since the beginning of the Spanish American wars for independence. 
Because their geographical isolation, the repressive measures taken by 
the Spanish colonial officials~ the exile of the rebel leaders, and the 
conflicts between liberals and separatists 9 they have not been able to 
achieve their independence as had their brothers on the mainland. 
SimJn Bolivar, under whose glorious leadership South America became 
independent, had been unable to devote much at tent ion to the struggle 
for liberty in the Caribbean because the wars of independence on the 
mainland consumed all of his available resources. Even after the battle 
of Ayacucho, M~xico and Colombia were not yet able to provide the neces-
sary military assistance for the independence movements in Cuba and 
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128 
Puerto Rico. When a mission of Cuban separatists had arrived in Colom-
bia in 1823 to seek help for the liberation of their country, the Colom-
3 
bian leaders "expressed great sympathy for the Cuban cause" but made 
clear to them that the liberation of Peru took precedence over the 
4 
Caribbean. 
Although Bolfvar had not been able to assist the Caribbean revo-
lutionary movements with direct military aid, in 1824 he had threatened 
an invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico to force Spanish recognition of the 
Spanish American republics. On December 20, 1824, Bolfvar wrote to 
General Santander about this threat. "I think is advisable," Bolfvar 
wrote, "that the Colombian government make Spain understand that if she 
does not ••• make peace, the same troops will go straight to Havana and 
0 5 
Puerto R1co. 11 
By 1825 the military situation had improved considerably in Spanish 
America. I As a result~ Bol1var now turn his attention to the Caribbean, 
where the separatists in Cuba and Puerto Rico had renewed their efforts 
for independence after the return of Ferdinand VII to the Spanish throne. 
For the Spanish American republics~ the liberation of these islands was 
a strategic necessity and a moral responsibility. Cuba and Puerto Rico 
had served as military bastions of the Royalist forces during the wars 
for independence and had been used as staging areas for Spanish military 
operations against the mainland. The stability and security of the new 
6 
republics depended, in part~ on the removal of Spain from the Caribbean. 
If the war continued~ Cuba and Puerto Rico would remain launching points 
for the Spanish armies or for those of the Holy Alliance~ if the Euro-
pean nations came to aid Spain. Cuba and Puerto Rico had also become a 
heaven and refuge of loyal creoles and peninsulars who had escaped from 
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. 7 Spanish America after the arrival of the liberating arm1es. These 
people posed an extremely dangerous threat to Bol{var; their potential 
for subversion increased with the arrival of new Spanish troops in the 
8 
Caribbean. 
In the spring of 1822, following United States recognition of the 
new republics, General Francisco Morales~ commander~in~chief of the 
Spanish forces 9 had established a blockade of the Venezuelan coast with 
9 
the help of Spanish privateers from Puerto Rico. The vessels raided 
all neutral ships going to Venezuela and Colombia; they also attacked 
towns and villages along the north coast of South America. Their ac~ 
tivities so shocked the United States that the American newspapers urged 
the government to use force against them. These privateers and the 
blockade imposed by General Morales had caused considerable problems to 
Bolfvar~ delaying for many months the end of the struggle in South 
America. 
When a French squadron visited the Caribbean in 1825 to convoy 
Spanish reinforcements to Cuba and Puerto Rico, Bolfvar believed that it 
was a part of an expedition dispatched by the Holy Alliance to rees-
. 10 
tablish Spanish dominance in the Western Hem1sphere. On October 13~ 
1825, he wrote to General Santander from Potos{~ 
I had news from General Carreno at the Isthmus. He informs 
me that a British frigate which arrived at Chagres reported 
that 7~000 Spaniards had reached Havana~ convoyed by two 
French vessels carrying a cargo of arms which had been un-
loaded in Havana. This incident reveals that the French 
government is in Buonaparte with the Spaniards in their 
usual treacherous fashion •••• General CarreRo is according-
ly asking General Castillo for troops and~ because of this 
threat~ I have this very day ordered General Salom to send 
to the Isthmus 1,300 infantrymen and 100 cavalrymen from 
the troops besieging Callao~ who are now accustomed to a 
warm climate. General Carreno has already received~ or 
soon will receive, the Junfn battalion and the squadron of 
grenadiers •11 
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Fearing an attack on Cartagena by either the French or the Spanish, 
Bolivar moved his troops to the north. When the attack failed to rna-
terialize, however, he chose these troops to lead an invasion of Cuba 
and Puerto Rico. The uncertainty of French or Spanish designs in the 
Caribbean convinced Bolfvar that the Spaniards had to be expelled from 
Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
Mexico held similar views. The Spanish forces~ still holding the 
I Mexican stronghold at San Juan de Ulua, were being supported by the 
Captain-General of Cuba. They were causing considerable damage to 
Veracruz and nearby Mexican towns. They also obstructed local and in-
ternational trade through the port of Veracruz and threatened the sta-
12 
bility of eastern Mdxico. For Mlxico also the expulsion of the Span-
iards from the Caribbean became a strategic necessity. 
The arrival of the French naval squadron in Cuba during the sum-
mer of 1825 caused considerable alarm in MJxico; her concern was not 
unfounded. Spain's plans for the reconquest of her lost empire gave 
precedence to M~xico because of her rich silver mines, her large penin-
13 
sular population, and the proximity to Cuba. Since the beginning of 
the year, MJxico had received reports that Spain and France were or-
ganizing a large expedition to protect the Caribbean and attack the 
. 14 
Mex1can coast. When the French squadron arrived~ the President of 
Me'xico requested that England and the United States intervene to defend 
the Mexican territory by invoking the provisions of the Monroe Doc-
trine, perhaps, the first instance of application of this principle to 
the Caribbean. The United States, however? rejected the request be-
cause the Mexican note implied "that the declaration of Monroe gave 
Me'xico the right to demand that the United States interfere on behalf 
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15 
of the new state." This action would have clearly violated American 
neutrality. England, however, as indicated previously, intervened in 
the affair by condemning France for her action. 16 
These considerations, therefore~ demanded the intervention of the 
Spanish American republics in the political affairs of the Caribbean. 
Aware of the separatist movements in Cuba and Puerto Rico, the new na-
tions promised to help the revolutionary cause in the Caribbean. 17 In 
addition to their strategic and military interests, moral considera-
tions also influenced their decision. Bolfvar realized that the inde-
pendence of Spanish America would not be secure while Cuba and Puerto 
Rico remained under the yoke of colonialism. 18 The concept of freedom 
from colonialism was 9 for Bolfvar, an ideal encompassing all matters 
and all people of the Western Hemisphere. He had expressed those views 
19 
as early as 1816. 
To liberate the Spanish Caribbean colonies both M{xico and Colombia 
would rely principally on creole officers from the Caribbean who were 
serving in their armies. These officers who had fought for the freedom 
of Mixico~ Venezuela, and Colombia longed for the independence of their 
own countries. Many were already~ serving as liaisons between the sepa-
ratists and the governments of the mainland. Bolfvar and Francisco de 
Paula Santander~ the Vice President of Colombia~ selected Marshall An-
tonio Valero de Bernabi, a Puerto Rican, to connnand part of the proposed 
20 I 
invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Valero de Bernabe had become the 
principal spokesman for the Puerto Rican revolutionary movement in 
South America. 21 Aniceto Iznaga~ Jost Agustfn Arango~ and General De 
las Heras represented the Cuban independence movement. Other separatist 
groups were actively working for the same purpose in New York, 
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Philadelphia, Baltimore, M~xico City, Guayaquil, and other locations. 22 
All these revolutionaries coordinated their activities with the separa-
tists in Cuba and Puerto Rico· for the proposed"invasion. 23 
Valero had planned for an invasion of Puerto Rico as early as 
1823. His project called for an expedition from Caracas and La Guayra 
under the command of General Carlos Soublette, one of Bolivar's best 
/ 
lieutenants. The military force would consi~t of two infantry battal-
ions totalling 1,500 men, one cavalry unit of 500 men, and sufficient 
war material to arm 4~000 men from the separatist forces operating in 
Puerto Rico. The invading army would be escorted by a war sloop and a 
brigantine which, after reaching the island, would blockade the landing 
24 
site. The -plan called for an initial attack upon the northern coast 
of Puerto Rico, followed by an assault on San Juan by 2,000 men. 
Valero did not expect the Spanish force to surrender immediately. To 
prevent the reinforcement of the city, he planned to obstruct all com-
munications between the capital and the rural zones. Another force of 
300 men was to be delayed in the interior of the is land, where Valero_ 
25 
expected to receive help from the separatists. 
Valero's plans for the liberation of Puerto Rico, however, had to 
wait until the revolutionaries defeated the Spanish forces on the main-
land. When the Spanish forces were finally defeated~ Bolfvar prefer-
red to launch a large scale invasion of Cuba and Puerto Rico in cooper-
ation with M:xico. He therefore rejected Valero's suggestion of an in-
d d . 26 epen ent operat1on. 
By the end of 1824, the emancipation of Spanish America was nearly 
complete. Confident of a victory over the remaining Royalist strong-
holds, Bolfvar began to move contingents of troops to Panama and 
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Venezuela for the proposed invasion of Cuba and Puerto RicoJ the de~ 
fense of the northern coast of South America, and the maintenance of 
political stability in the new northern republics. 
By 1825 the Spanish American leaders were busy planning the liber-
ation of Cuba and Puerto Rico. On April 9, 1825, General Antonio Jos' 
de Sucre informed General Soublette that he was organizing an army of. 
27 
7~000 men for the expedition. Bol1var informed General Francisco 
Rodriguez del Taro on September 25, 1825~ that he had transferred 1~600 
1 28 
men from the Jun{n and the Ayacucho battalions to Panama. He ex-
pected to dispatch another contingent of troops from the Callao battal-
. . h" h 29 1on w1t 1n two mont s. On October, 1825, Bolivar also ordered General 
Salam in Peru to send 1,400 men .to Panamf, including the Callao battal-
30 
ion under the command of Marshall Valero and a company of cavalry. 
These particular units had been selected because they were accustomed 
to the tropical conditions of the Caribbean. The health of these sol-
diers was one of Bolfvar's principal concerns. As a result he ordered 
many of these troops to Turbaco~ Ocana, Valencia~ and Caracas 9 in order 
31 
to accustom themselves to the warm climate. 
Undoubtedly, the Venezuelan and New Granadan armies were the best 
fighting units in America at that time~ and they could have easily de~ 
feated the Spanish forces defending the Caribbean islands. The Spanish 
American navies were poor, however, and depended primarily on privateers 
for naval operations. To resolve this problem, both Colombia and M'xico 
purchased several war vessels from Sweden to form a naval squadron suf~ 
ficiently strong to convoy the invading troops. 
Mdxico had promised to assist the Cuban revolutionary exiles in 
achieving their independence. Jos: A. Torrens, the Mexican 
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representative in Washington, discussed w::kth his government the pro-
posed expedition of Colombia, He believed that "if Mexico would join 
Colombia they could together undertake the ~riterprise which perhaps 
would result in the liberty of the islands and dislodge the Spaniards 
32 
from their last stronghold." On these recommendations, Mexican Pres-
ident Guadelupe Victoria dispatched General Anastasio Bustamante to 
33 
Colombia with a proposal for an unified invasion of Cuba. 
Before taking any action in the Caribbean~ however~ Bolivar wanted 
to know what the response of England and France would be to an extension 
of the Spanish American war to the Caribbean. He was well familiar 
with the interests of the European powers in this area, especially those 
of England. "The Spaniards are no longer a danger to us," he wrote to 
General Santander on May 20, 1825, "but the English are very much so, as 
34 
they~ being omnipotent, are therefore to be feared." 
Colombia had previously begun conversations with France to deter-
mine that nation's position. Josd M. Lanz, the Colombian representa-
tive in Paris~ approached the government 
••• to obtain explanations ••• on two matters of policy. If 
Colombia and her American allies should undertake to lib-
erate Cuba and Puerto Rico from Spanish rule, would France 
take any active part against them? If French soldiers 
should take possession of certain Spanish colonies to pre-
serve them from anarchy, would those soldiers join the 
Royalist forces against the liberating armies of the 
Spanish American republics?35 
These inquiries indicate the concern of Bolfvar and other Spanish 
American leaders for the attitude of the European powers toward the 
liberation of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
General Santander, the Vice President of Colombia» was. less con-
cerned with the international implications of the proposed invasion. 
He contracted a loan with England, "mostly with the purpose of 
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descending on the islands," to purchase ships and armaments in Europe. 
By the end of 1825, he had gathered "a considerable expeditionary force 
37 
in Cartagena" which was ready to sail at any given moment. This ex-
pedition could have liberated Cuba and Puerto Rico during the spring of 
1826. 
Colombian and Mexican plans for the expedition against Cuba and 
Puerto Rico could not be kept secret. The National Gazette of Phila-
delphia published a letter from a member of the Cplpmb:(.an Navy ass~rt-
ing that 11 10,000 men and a strong squadron were ready to liberate 
C b "38 u a. Niles 1 Weekly Register predicted that "the expedition wi 11 be 
easily accomplished since the people of this island are prepared to give 
a favorable reception to the invading forces which may soon be expected 
~.. 39 
from Mexico and Colombia." But the newspaper~ strongly opposing the 
operation, continued that 
••• there is every reason to believe that M/xico and Colom-
bia are preparing a very formidable expedition to divest 
Spain on the possessions of the island of Cuba, which we 
suppose~ will be easily accomplished. But if the expedi-
tion shall be resisted, and the island become a theatre 
for military operations~ we may make a fearful calculation 
of the result, from the excess of the colored population, 
always ready to take any advantage for their own libera-
tion. The scenes that were acted in Haiti will be reacted 
in Cuba, sooner or later~ and the present contemplated ex-
pedition may only hasten events that must happen.4° 
The United States government did not welcome the news of the pro~ 
posed invasion. The expedition threatened the policy of status quo. 
While the United States had been aware as early as 1823 of the inten-
tions of the Spanish American republics and had conducted extensive 
I diplomatic talks to prevent the fulfillment of Bol1var's plans, it was 
clear that the problem had reached a critical point. The combined 
revolutionary forces of M~xico and Colombia, assisted by the 
separatists, were ready to end Spanish rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
The slaves also would be emancipated. The possibility that either 
France or England were poised to take advantage of the situation ap~ 
peared dangerously certain. The United States~ therefore~ requested 




On December 20, 1825, Secretary of State Henry Clay sent identical 
notes to the ministers of Mixico and Colombia in the United States re~ 
questing that 
••• under the circumstances, the President believes that a 
suspension, for a limited time, of the sailing of the 
expedition against Cuba and Porto Rico, which is under-
stood to be fitting out in Carthagena~ or of any other 
expedition which may be contemplated against either of 
those islands~ by Colombia or M/xico, would be salutatory 
influence on the great work of peace.42 
While the note was conciliatory in nature~ it added that such a sus-
pension would prevent the intervention of other nations in the affairs 
of the Caribbean and the danger of a conflict of interests between the 
United States and the Spanish American republics. Clay's note stated 
very clear that "essential interests" would entertain certain consider~ 
ations and duties which the nation will be forced to fulfill in the 
43 
event of "the contemplated invasionof those islands." 
Such a suspension, according to Secretary Clay, would have afforded 
sufficient time for the United States to ascertain Spain's intent in re-
gard to the conflict in Spanish America, and would have provided the 
Emperor of Russia with the necessary support to convince Spain to end 
44 
the war. The Mexican and Colombian governments, unaware of the extent 
of the Russian participation in the peace negotiations, accepted the 
United States declaration "that there was reason to believe the Emperor 
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of Russia was exerting his friendly influence to end the 
45 
war." Rus-
sian interest, however, was limited to protecting the Caribbean islands 
47 
for Spain. 
The United States government was certain that a liberating invasion 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico by the armies of the Spanish American republics, 
supported by the separatists, would be successful. Such a result would 
48 
not be in the best interests of the United States. Secretary Clay had 
expressed these views to Henry Middleton seven months before. Clay had 
indicated that 
••• the success of the enterprise is, by no means, im-
probable. Their [Colombia and Mexico] proximity to 
the islands, and their armies being perfectly acclimated 
will give to the united efforts of the [two] republics 
great advantages. And, if with these be taken into the 
estimate, the important and well known fact that a large 
portion of the inhabitants of these Islands [the separa-
tists] .is predisposed to a separation from Spain, and 
would form a powerful auxiliary of the Republican ar-
mies~ their success becomes almost certain.47 
Even the Spanish colonial government in Cuba had recognized that 
the proposed invasion could not be prevented. Two days before Clay's 
communication to Middleton, Pablo Obregdn, the Mexican Minister to the 
United States, had informed the Mexican Foreign Relations Secretary that 
••• the Ayuntamiento of Havana sent a representation to 
Madrid to ask for help in retaining the island. Latelyj 
due to the fear [of invasion], the same group have recom-
mended the immediate recognition of the Spanish American 
republics as the only way available for saving the island.48 
During this time the situation in Cuba and Puerto Rico was critical 
for Spain. Americans, Europeans, and creoles residing there "look for-
ward, some with joy, and others with fear, to an invasion of the is-
49 
lands." In Puerto Rico, Governor De La Torre declared an emergency, 
intensified defense efforts, alerted all the military forces on the is-
land, and even retained 1,300 men from a military contingent which was 
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going to Cuba under the command of Marshall Jose Miranda CabezJn for 
so 
defense of the island. 
On the other hand, the United States had begun to consider mili-
tary action in the Caribbean to prevent the invasion of Cuba and Puerto 
Rico if diplomatic efforts failed tb achieve the desired results. Com-
modore David R. Porter, the commander of the-naval squadron in the 
Caribbean, received authorization to intensify precautionary activities 
near Puerto Rico and to report any suspected movements of foreign ves-
sels in the area. In spite of the fact that the South American navies 
had become better organized and the distinction between legitimate 
privateering and piracy was now clearer, Commodore Porter was also 
authorized to land in unpopulated areas of Puerto Rico, to pursue pi-
51 
rates if necessary. Even President Monroe had previously considered 
blockading Cuba and Puerto Rico to protect Ameri~an interests and had 
requested congressional power ''to be exercised according to his dis-
53 
cretion, and as circumstances may imperiously require." 
On February 11, 1826, the American Minister to Russia made it 
clear to Count Nesselrode~ the Russian Foreign Secretary~ that the 
United States was considering intervention in the Caribbean. Henry 
Middleton informed the Russian government that 
••• in case of the invasion of these islands by M~xico 
or Colombia, and of the troublesome contingencies that 
may result from it, other Governments [meaning the 
United States] may perhaps see themselves compelled by 
their interests and their duty to interfere.54 
He based his position on the fact that six days after the diplomatic 
exchange with the ministers of Colombia and M~xico, Secretary Clay had 
informed him that 
•.. if the war against; the islands should be conducted by 
those Republics in a desolating manner; if contrary to all 
expectations they should put anns into the hands of.one 
race of the inhabitants to destroy the lives of another; 
if, in short~ they should countenance and encourage ex-
cesses and examples, the contagion of which, from our 
neighborhood, would be dangerous to our quiet and safety, 
the Government of the United States might feel itself 
called upon to interpose its power. 55 
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On December 30, 1825, Secretary Clay instructed Richard C. Ander-
son, the United States Minister to Colombia, to inform the Colombian 
government that the United States opposed any military action in the 
Caribbean. Clay also instructed Anderson to bring a suspension of any 
expedition being prepared against Cuba and Puerto Rico and to convince 
the Colombian government, by direct and friendly explanations, of the 
danger involved in such course of action. 56 A similar letter, ad~pted 
for the Mexican government, was sent to Joet R. Poinsett, the United 
-1 57 
States Minister to Mexico. 
On March 1, 1826, Anderson, in spite of his objections to American 
policy in the Caribbean, infonned the Colombian government of his in-
structions. In his diary, he later wrote: 
Went to see [James] Henderson,, [British] Consul Genl. & 
[Jose Rafael] Revenga. Had a long conversation with him 
concerning the attempt of this Govt. & Mlxico to make 
Cuba and P. Rico independent. I am instructed to dis-
suade this Govt. from the attempt on account of the fear 
that those islands cannot maintain their independence 
& a fear that the slaves will get possession. I do not 
like much my business. I think that every belligerent 
has a right to annoy & distress its enemy in every 
practicable way.58 
Both M~xico and Colombia received coldly the United States re-
quest for a suspension of the planned attack upon Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
When the Mexican Congress approved in January, 1826, a resolution con-
demning United States interference in the Caribbean, "Clay dropped the 
diplomatic language and instructed Poinsett to warn the Mexican 
government that the United States would not permit Spain's expulsion 
59 
from Cuba." These warnings resulted in the postponement of the 
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planned expedition which would have certainly liberated Cuba and Puerto 
Rico during the third decade of the nineteenth century. 
M'xico and Colombia did not want an armed conflict with the United 
States immediately after years of savage fighting for the independence. 
Their insistence on liberating Cuba and Puerto Rico would have upset the 
status quo in the Caribbean. This situation would have been detrimental 
to American strategic and economic interests; and, undoubtedly, would 
have resulted in a war with the United States. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
United States intervention in the political affairs of the Carib-
bean during the first three decades of the nineteenth century had seri-
ous implications for the revolutionary movements in Cuba and Puerto 
Rico and prevented the liberation efforts of the Spanish American re-
publics. The maintenance of slavery in the United States, the concern 
for national security, the need to protect trade and commerce in the 
Caribbean~ and Southern political leaders' desires for future terri-
torial expansion demanded American opposition to the independence of 
these colonies. In addition, it was not in the best interests of the 
United States to allow Cuba and Puerto Rico to gain their freedom be-
cause of the possibility that either Great Britain or France would 
seize the islands after independence. These circumstances~ it was be-
lieved~ would have seriously compromised national security and damaged 
commercial and trade interests in the Caribbean. 
When Colombia and Mdxico turned their attention to the liberation 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico~ the United States immediately opposed their 
plans because they would threaten the status guo in the Caribbean. The 
United States expressed the views that "any effort of M~xico or Colombia 
to seize or invade the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean would be re~ 
garded with apprehension."! Clay emphasized that any attempted conquest 
of Cuba and Puerto Rico by the American republics would "change the 
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whole character of the war against Spain. 112 Daniel Webster~ in a speech 
delivered in the House of Representatives on April 14, 1826, warned that 
"such an event might justly be regarded as dangerous to ourselves~ and 9 
3 
on that ground, call for decided and immediate interference by us." 
United States action prevente~··Mef:x;ico and Colombia from providing 
"' .... , 
the necessary assistance that the Cuban and"·P-ueTto Rican separatists 
needed to achieve the independence of their countries. When England~ 
France, and Russia supported the American measures and political dis-
turbances erupted in M/:x:ico and Colombia~ the plans for the united 
Spanish American effort to liberate Cuba and Puerto Rico were canceled. 
When news arrived in Caracas that the invasion had been canceled, 
the Cuba and Puerto Rican separatists immediately sought Bolfvar 1 s per-
sonal opinion. Bolivar informed them that the opposition of the United 
States and England had been the decisive factor in the suspension of the 
4 
proposed invasion. Bolivar feared an armed conflict between the Span-
ish American republics and the United States. 5 This concern influenced 
his decision of not interfering in the Caribbean in the spring of 1826. 
The United States maintained a powerful naval squadron in the Ca-
ribbean to enforce American policies there. Several times~ United 
States warships had assisted the Spanish authorities in capturing gun-
runners and "piratesn who served the cause of independence. Even when 
American seamen made mistakes, such as Commodore Porter's unprovoked 
6 
attack in 1825 against the eastern side of Puerto Rico, the United 
States sided with the Spanish authorities and accepted their version of 
the incidents to the e:x:tent that commanders were court-martialed to 
7 
satisfy Spain. 
The United States did not believe that either Cuba or Puerto Rico 
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could maintain their independence. The American government anticipated 
that a change in the political status of these islands would only re~ 
sult in racial strife between their white and the black populations. 
According to current opinion, the characteristics of the Cuban and 
Puerto Rican populations made "extremely problematic their capacity to 
. 8 maintain lndependence." A declaration of independence there "would 
probably [have resulted] only in the afflicting repetition of the dis-
9 
astrous scenes of St. Domingo," where the black slaves massacred the 
white population after proclaiming their independence. 
A similar situation, however, could not have occurred in Puerto 
Rico because in this island the white population outnumbered the 
slaves. A census taken in Puerto Rico in 1827 indicated that there were 
only 34~240 slaves out of a total population of 323,838. lO These slaves 
could not have revolted after independence against white creoles as the 
United States political leaders thought. In Puerto Rico slavery was 
unique and there was no reason for concern with a slave insurrection. 
Eric Williams, describing slavery in Puerto Rico, has stated that 
••• in Puerto Rico ••• not only did the white population out-
number the people of colour, but the slaves constituted an 
infinitesimal part of the total population and free labour 
predominated during the regime of slavery.ll 
Secretary of State Henry Clay~ President John Quincy Adams~ and other 
members of the government strongly believed that 11 the population itself 
of these islands (Cuba and Puerto Rico) was incompetent ••• from its com-
12 
position and its amount, to maintain self -government~ 11 therefore, they 
followed a policy of intervention in the affairs of the Caribbean to 
prevent Cuban and Puerto Rican independence, which would have disturbed 
the status quo in a zone where American interests were at stake. The 
American leaders, however~ did not realize that, the political situation 
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in Puerto Rico was different from that of Cuba~ where the slave problem 
had been intensified by years of oppression. Therefore~ by applying a 
single policy and one course of action for both islands, the United 
States prevented the independence of Puerto Rico. 
On June 22~ 1826, a Pan-American Congress convened in Panamd to 
outline the basis of a pact of union) association, and confederation be-
tween the republics of Spanish America. The Congress was attended by 
representatives of Colombia, M~xico~ Peru~ and Central America. Colom-
bia at that time consisted of the present-day republics of Ecuador~ 
Panam~ and Venezuela, as well as Colombia, and Central America included 
the five modern republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador~ Guatemala~ Hon-
duras~ and Nicaraguaj so that eleven of the present-day Latin American 
republics were represented. The United States was invited~ and after 
an extended debate in Congress~ the invitation was accepted~ but the 
delegates failed to arrive before the meeting adjourned. 
Among the purposes of the Congress was "the expediency of combin-
ing the forces of the republics~ to free the islands of Puerto Rico and 
Cuba from the yoke of Spain, and in such case what contingent each ought 
13 
to contribute for this end. 11 United States opposition, however~ pre-
vented the Congress of Panam& from reaching any agreement concerning 
the independence of Cuba and Puerto Rico. "The P lanipotentiaries ~" 
wrote Joel Roberts Poinsett~ the United States minister to M~xico, 
••• were probably deterred from acting upon this important 
subject~ both by the language which had been held by the 
president with regard to these islands, and by the in-
ability of the Governments of MJxico and Colombia, at this 
time~ to undertake any expensive expedition.l4 
The opposition of the United States to the independence of Cuba 
and Puerto Rico or to any change in the political situation of the 
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Caribbean provided that nation with a strong inducement for not par-
ticipating in the Congress of Panami. The delay of the American repre-
sentatives in arriving at the Congress of Panamcl may have been a tacti-
cal ploy to avoid taking an official position against the plans of the 
Spanish American republics for the liberation of Cuba and Puerto Rico. 
Such a position would have offended the sensitivities and pride of the 
Spanish Americans. SimC:n Bolfvar, Santander, and the Spanish American 
delegates were already aware of the~United States position on the is-
sue; the United States did not have to discuss or justify it. 
The Puerto Rican independence leaders clearly understood that a 
continuation of the struggle for liberty without the help of the Spanish 
American republics was futile. Rebellion on the island had far less 
chance of success than on the mainland. The repressive measures of the 
Spanish colonial officials, the exile of most of the revolutionary 
leaders, and the factional disputes between conservatives, liberals, 
and separatists also affected the struggle for independence. Contrary 
to current beliefs, neither M~xico nor Colombia wanted to annex Cuba or 
Puerto Rico after their liberation by the Spanish American republics. 
They only desired to assist these countries in their struggle for inde-
pendence. 
United States policy in the Caribbean was the result of its con-
cern for national security, the volatile question of slavery, and the 
desire for territorial expansion. Most of all, however, it was a policy 
based upon inadequate information concerning Cuba and Puerto Rico as 
well as ignorance of the real intentions of France and Great Britain. 
As Samuel F. Bemis has so clearly stated, 
Great Britain, whose sea powe·r was then dominant in the 
Caribbean as elsewhere, ••• had friendly relations with 
Spain and was a colonial power with possessions of its 
own in the Caribbean. Like France, it had no desire to 
disturb the Antillean sett1ement reached in the Treaty 
of Vienna. It was certainly not prepared to convoy an 
expedition to Puerto Rico:, especially as Puerto Rico 
was a potential compet.itor in the weakening sugar mar-
ket and not a promising outlet for British goods.l5 
As for Cuba, the British government, not the United States~ acted as 
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the real deterrent to French ambitions. The United States feared that 
Great Britain or France would seize Cuba and Puerto Rico after they 
gained independence. More importantly, the United States also sought 
the termination of hostilities between Spain and the Spanish American 
countries because of the fear that the conflict would eventually spread 
to its own borders. Mlxico's political instability provided a vacuum 
in the American Southwest, and the United States was unable to prevent 
attacks into the newly gained territories of Louisiana and Florida. New 
Orleans~ a port of extreme strategic and commercial significance, was 
within easy reach of Havana. Peace and the status quo in the Caribbean, 
therefore, became a matter of great importance for the United States 
foreign policy in the first part of the nineteenth century. 
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